LEBANON: AOUN PLAYING FOR HIGH STAKES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001799

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN PLAYING FOR HIGH STAKES

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Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun continues
to believe that he and only he deserves the presidency, and
will not participate in any efforts, including the French
initiative, to find a consensus, according to his advisor and
son-in-law, Gebran Bassil. Bassil envisioned two scenarios
for the presidency: either a consensus candidate will
emerge, in which case Aoun will not participate, or an
interim government will be formed, leading to early
parliamentary elections. Bassil would not rule out Aoun's
participation in a second government. Aoun's increasingly
threatening rhetoric is an unwelcome development in the final
week before President Lahoud is due to step down. End
summary.

AOUN THE "STATESMAN"
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2. (C) Pol/Econ Chief met with Free Patriotic Movement leader
Michel Aoun advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil at his home
on November 14. Bassil launched into the familiar FPM liturgy
about all the wrongs committed against FPM (unfair electoral
law, contested seats from the 2005 parliamentary elections
which were never resolved because the government dissolved
the constitutional court, the illegitimacy of Siniora
government after the walkout of the five Shia ministers).
Despite all this, the FPM in 2005 recognized Hariri as leader
of Sunni majority and therefore went along with Siniora as
PM, and recognized Berri (to whose party he claims FPM let
have some of the 2005 seats) as leader of Shia majority, now
it was time for them to recognize Aoun as leader of Christian
majority.


3. (C) Bassil confirmed that Aoun's position on the
presidency was still either "me or no one." Only Aoun has
the popular legitimacy to be president, Bassil argued, adding
that if others can come up with a solution, fine, but Aoun
will not play a part. He called Aoun a "statesman" who was
the only one who cared about the good of the country.
Pol/Econ Chief countered that making threats about chaos and
civil war, as Aoun has repeatedly done in his statements to
the press, wasn't very statesmanlike. Bassil replied, in
essence, that everyone else was breaking all the rules, so
why shouldn't Aoun? Two wrongs don't make a right, Pol/Econ
Chief said, and responding to one side's bad behavior with
more behavior did not appear very statesmanlike.

REFUSING TO GO ALONG WITH FRENCH
--------------


4. (C) On the French initiative, Bassil reported that Aoun
told Kouchner he did not want his name on the list, though
Bassil believed Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh had given
Aoun's name. He believed the Patriarch's names already had
been sent to Berri and Hariri. Bassil commented that
Patriarch should not be involved in politics. Furthermore,
which criteria should be used to pick the candidates, and how
do we tell whether the candidates really meet these criteria?
he asked. Pol/Econ Chief said the candidates should adhere
to the principles of a free, sovereign, and independent
Lebanon and be committed to UN Security Council Resolutions
like 1559 and 1701. Bassil retorted that anyone could put on
paper that they support those issues, but Aoun is the only
one who really does. Even (March 14 candidate) Nassib
Lahoud doesn't have good principles, Bassil protested, citing
a recent press report that in his youth Lahoud had been a
member of a pro-Syrian Palestinian militia group in (Saiqa)
in 1969. Aoun has been fighting Syria for years, Bassil
claimed. Furthermore, he is the only candidate with a
credible plan for dealing with Hizballah; since it is
impossible to tell Hizballah to put down its arms
immediately, he said, Aoun's strategy was to postpone the
confrontation and deal with it in a year or two.

TWO SCENARIOS
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5. (C) Bassil envisioned two scenarios for the presidency:

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1) either the French initiative produces a consensus
president; or 2) Lahoud appoints an interim government after
consulting parliament. Lahoud would step down in this
scenario, and the interim government, which would include
members of the opposition, would take on presidential powers.
Both sides continue to work on electing president, but if
they were unable, the interim government would change the
electoral law and call for early parliamentary elections.
Those elections could be in six months or in a year and a
half, Bassil suggested; either way, the current parliament
will have been in power at least three years, plenty of time
in his opinion.


6. (C) Bassil refused to entertain the possibility of Lahoud
stepping down and PM Siniora's government taking over
presidential powers, saying "let's not argue." Why does the
U.S. give Siniora such strong support, he asked. Pol/Econ
Chief that Siniora is the democratically chosen prime
minister representing the majority in power. Bassil
complained that the U.S. supported March 14 when it made its
alliance with Hizballah and Siniora when he let Hizballah
into the government, but when the FPM tried to reach an
understanding with Hizballah that will work towards
disarmament, the U.S. put it on its hate list.


7. (C) Bassil argued that it is President Lahoud's
constitutional right to stay in Baabda Palace if no president
is elected. Pol/Econ Chief interjected that the amendment
extending his mandate for three years specifically puts the
end at midnight on November 23, 2007. Bassil responded that,
since the majority has violated the constitution and is
talking about electing a president using half plus one,
Lahoud also can violate it. Pol/Econ noted that, while the
language on quorum is ambiguous, the language on Lahoud's
term extension and end is very clear. Bassil repeated Aoun's
argument that a half plus one president would be illegitimate
because it would exclude a major part of country; Lebanon is
a special democracy that can only function by consensus, he
said, the majority in parliament doesn't reflect actual
majority of country.

AOUN WILL DECIDE AT LAST MINUTE
WHETHER TO JOIN SECOND GOVERNMENT
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8. (C) Asked to give his assurances that Aoun would not
participate in a second government should President Emile
Lahoud appoint one before the end of his term, Bassil said
Aoun will decide "at the last minute." Acknowledging that
this could lead to the U.S. imposing sanctions on the
General, Bassil admitted that a second government probably
would lead to chaos. Pol/Econ Chief responded that the U.S.
sanctions were aimed precisely at preventing chaos by
deterring people from joining a second government. Nobody
wants chaos, Gebran said; it's not good for anybody, only
Hizballah benefits. Hizballah not only has arms, but
popular Shia support, so they can easily take over. The FPM
has Christian popular support, but no arms, he claimed.


9. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked about Aoun's November 11 al-Manar
interview, which contained some ambiguous language that could
be interpreted as threats. Was it meant as threats? Leaning
forward with a twinkle in his eye, Gebran replied
deliberately, "Yes." Later, however, he clarified that by
threatening, he did not mean the FPM was going to kill
people; "that's not our style." But Aoun has been attacked
from all sides, including the U.S., for too long, Bassil
said, and it is the only way to counter March 14 threats to
go forward with half plus one. Jumblatt makes statements
that are just as threatening, he said, but you don't question
him.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Bassil, more than any of our other FPM contacts, is
an authoritative voice for General Aoun, and his conversation
with Pol/Econ Chief tracked closely with the Ambassador's
recent meetings with Aoun. Aoun appears to be keeping the
stakes high, either in hopes of obtaining a big payoff in
terms of cabinet formation in the next government, or, by
staying out of the process entirely, place himself in a good
position (along with his Hizballah allies) to argue that the

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new president does not enjoy the support of the majority of
the Christians nor of the Shia, and is therefore
illegitimate.


11. (C) While we cannot rule out Aoun taking military action
(it would not be the first time; and we remind our readers
that it was Aoun's troops in 1989 that besieged the U.S.
Embassy, closing it for nearly a year),we hope that when his
bluff is called, he will fold. In the meantime, however, his
increasingly threatening rhetoric, particular toward the U.S.
(his November 15 appearance on OTV was overtly hostile toward
U.S. policy in Lebanon) is a disturbing development in the
final week before the end of President Lahoud's mandate. End
comment.






FELTMAN