LEBANON: FORMER PM SAYS IT'S A CRIME NOT TO ELECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001787

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FORMER PM SAYS IT'S A CRIME NOT TO ELECT
NASSIB LAHOUD

REF: BEIRUT

BEIRUT 00001787 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Prime Minister Najib Mikati, claiming, like
many others, to have insider information on the Patriarch's
list of presidential candidates, lamented the fact that the
best candidate, Nassib Lahoud, would not be elected. He
believed President Emile Lahoud would defy Hizballah's demand
that he remain in office past the midnight November 23 end
of his mandate, bowing instead to Syrian pressure to leave,
though he did not rule out the possibility of Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman being called in.
Mikati cited fears about the role of Lebanon's Christians and
about the impact on the economy, along with Syrian
cooperation with the French initiative, as positive signs
that a consensus would be reached. End summary.

PATRIARCH WILL PICK NON-POLITICIANS
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with former PM Najib Mikati on November 14 at his home in
Verdun. Mikati had heard that the Patriarch probably would
submit his list of six presidential candidates to Saad Hariri
and Nassib Berri the next day. Commenting that the list
would create more problems than it solves, Mikati opined that
it probably would contain the three top contenders (Nassib
Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and Michel Aoun),plus three
"non-political" candidates like Demianos Kattar, Simon Karam,
and Pierre Dakkash. Mikati said Hariri and Berri had reached
a deal whereby Hariri would be the next prime minister,
commenting that it was to both of their advantages to have a
weak president.


3. (C) Joseph Torbey also was a possibility for the
presidency, though Mikati did not believe his name was on the
list. Michel Khoury was "excellent," but probably would
never gain Hizballah's acceptance. Mikati ruled out Jean
Obeid, Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, Justice Minister
Charles Rizk, and MP Robert Ghanem as too political. Since
Berri would exclude Kattar, the presidency would come down to
either Karam or Dakkash, he concluded. Mikati repeatedly
stressed that Nassib Lahoud was by far the best candidate:
"It's a crime to compare him to the others!"


4. (C) They will succeed with electing a consensus president
if the U.S. does not block it, Mikati said, noting that the
latest conspiracy theory had the U.S. vetoing Robert Ghanem.
Mikati said it would be easy to convince the Patriarch to add
him to the list, but some thought it would be harder to
convince the U.S. Berri would accept him, Mikati claimed,
and had been able to convince Hizballah that he was the best
candidate. The Ambassador said the U.S. was not vetoing
Ghanem or any other candidate.


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that March 14 faces two bad
options if the Patriarch's initiative fails: either no
president is elected, and the Siniora cabinet takes on
presidential powers, or March 14 proceeds with a half plus
one vote. Mikati suggested that rather than let the Siniora
government continue, President Emile Lahoud might finally
declare it illegitimate (based on the lack of Shia
representation since the November 2006 walkout of six
opposition ministers) and appoint an interim government
before he steps down. If this happens, he said, his support
would go to Hariri "100 percent." But, he added, the
opposition probably already has all of the ministers selected.

LAHOUD WILL LEAVE ON TIME,
BUT MAY ASK ARMY TO STEP IN
--------------


6. (C) Mikati called Hizballah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah's November 11 Martyrs' Day speech a "second
maneuver" following Hizballah's claim of conducting military
maneuvers south of the Litani River (Comment: The alleged
military maneuver was more hype than substance, aimed at

BEIRUT 00001787 002.2 OF 002


rallying support for Hizballah. End comment.) Sidestepping
the Ambassador's question as to whether the speech was a
message to President Emile Lahoud to stay in office, Mikati
said "someone else" already had sent Lahoud a stronger
message. Though Lahoud was under serious pressure from
Hizballah to remain, the Syrians were warning him not to do
anything wrong and instead to let March 14 make a wrong move,
he explained.


7. (C) Mikati said he had been told that Lahoud was preparing
to leave the night of November 23rd and would probably call
upon Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman to "take
care of the nation," without specifying what that would
entail. Mikati noted that in his November 13 statement,
Sleiman said he would do his "national duty," as opposed to
limiting his role to protecting March 14, as a recent
newspaper article had claimed the U.S. was warning him to do.


RAY OF HOPE
--------------


8. (C) Mikati said three things gave him reason for hope.
First, the Maronites realize what is at stake and are afraid.
The Pope's November 11 message had been helpful, he said, as
well as the statement from Michel Sleiman and Amine Gemayel
following their meeting stressing the role of the Christians
and warning that if they lose the presidency, they lose
everything in Lebanon. March 14 also had played a useful
role by using restraint in its response to Nasrallah's
speech, thereby refusing to play Nasrallah's game.


9. (C) Second is the economy, he continued. Whether there is
a void or a second government or March 14 proceeds with half
plus one, the whole country will pay. But March 14 will pay
more than March 8, he said, especially given the large
numbers of March 14 members involved in Lebanon's banking
sector. Therefore, there is an impetus for consensus.
Calling the central bank an "island" that would not be
affected by the current crisis, Mikati nevertheless wonder
aloud where Lebanon would get the $4 billion needed to cover
its foreign exchange deficit?


10. (C) The third reason for optimism, Mikati said, is the
Syrians are starting to be cooperative by supporting the
French initiative.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Mikati is the second half of the so-called "N & N"
scenario, whereby Nassib Lahoud becomes president and Najib
Mikati becomes prime minister, so we were not surprised to
hear him laud Lahoud's credentials. However, his "insider
information" is, we believe, incorrect. As often is the case
when we see him, Mikati's presumed Syrian leanings were
completely absent in this meeting.
FELTMAN