LEBANON: GEAGEA WARNS OF DANGEROUS GAMES, AND IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001760 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA WARNS OF DANGEROUS GAMES, AND IS PLAYING ONE OF HIS OWN BEIRUT 00001760 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea does not support France's efforts to convince the Patriarch to provide names of presidential candidates, fearing that, without an adequate safety net, this would lead to a weak president susceptible to Syrian and Hizballah influence. Citing Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and Charles Rizk (as a fallback) as the only acceptable candidates, Geagea said if no consensus is reached by the midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud's mandate, March 14 would proceed with a half plus one vote. He conceded that this approach could lead to "skirmishes" and possible Hizballah takeover of parts of the country, though he predicted Hizballah would use "proxies" rather be directly implicated in any ensuing violence. He ruled out any chance of an Aoun presidency, but predicted that Aoun would fight to the end. In a one-on-one pull-aside with the Ambassador at the end, Geagea expressed deep concern that Saad Hariri was poised for unacceptable compromise over the presidency, a step that Geagea feared would destroy March 14 credibility among the Christians. Geagea was dismayed that Hariri, in his view, has abandoned the "half-plus-one" option prematurely. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea at his residence in Maarab on November 8. Geagea advisors Joseph Nehme, Elie Khoury, and Jean-Marie Kassab also attended the meeting. FRENCH INITIATIVE MUSH HAVE SAFETY NET -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador, who met with Patriarch Sfeir immediately prior to the meeting with Geagea (septel), compared notes with Geagea on the mechanism for choosing Lebanon's next president and compared notes on the current French proposal (to encourage the Patriarch to provide a list of five presidential candidates to present to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and majority leader Saad Hariri). Sfeir, the Ambassador noted, stated that he doesn't want to give names. But he also adamantly opposes a half plus one president (i.e., one elected by absolute majority) and insists on having a new president by November 24. The Ambassador told Geagea he had stressed to the Patriarch that the U.S. would not compromise on principles but wanted to help. The Patriarch suggested that the U.S. consult with the various parties to help them come up with a list to take to parliament. The goods news, the Ambassador said, is that the Patriarch is insisting on parliament's role in electing the president. ¶4. (C) Geagea, focusing on the Patriarch's rejection of half plus one, said that March 14 had no choice but to proceed with it at "the right time." Saad had told him the night before that he would only accept the French initiative if it came with a "safety net" attached, i.e., if Berri and Saad cannot agree on a candidate, the list goes to parliament to decide. The list probably would consist of Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and two others, one of which Saad says March 14 should be able to influence and one "wild card." The French, Geagea said (quoting contacts with unnamed French officials),were undecided on the safety net: Sarkozy advisor Jean-Davide Levitte reported was against the idea, while Boris Boillon was in favor, and Claude Gueant appeared to be undecided but unenthusiastic. STRONG OPPOSITION TO WEAK CANDIDATE -------------- ¶5. (C) "We can't endure six more years of a president who cannot stand up to Syrian and Hizballah influence," Geagea said. We will block the election, "if not by will, by necessity." Fortunately, he added, the Patriarch is not giving names, even though the Europeans are pushing him to. He himself would push Sfeir not to do so, since there was no guarantee he would come up with good candidates. Maybe we can insert Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, he suggested, as BEIRUT 00001760 002.2 OF 004 the only fall-back to March 14 candidates Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb. ¶6. (C) The French were talking about five or six names, including two "loose" names, Geagea said, but were too easily fooled by the Syrians, who by virtue of physical proximity have a much better understanding of the nature of the game. If Saad stays firm, the French initiative wouldn't be a problem, Geagea commented. The Ambassador noted that Hariri might be tempted to go along with a weak candidate in order to ensure that he becomes the next prime minister, a scenario that completely excludes Aoun and Geagea. And Hizballah, Geagea added with a smile. ¶7. (C) Joseph Torbey is a perfect example, the Ambassador continued, noting that Berri could live with him. Geagea, noting that he had met Torbey several times, said he could "not locate him politically." Kassab added that Torbey is a "perfectly neutral businessman" who is politically "odorless" but would have no ability to stand up to Syria and Hizballah -- a "catastrophe" for March 14. Khoury agreed, saying Torbey is just a banker, with no political orientation. So let's gain some time, Geagea suggested, by supporting Torbey, securing the Patriarch and Berri's blessings, then let the Syrians dismiss him. The Ambassador noted that, due to Torbey's connection to Credit Lyonais in which the major shareholders are the Saudis, many predict that the Syrians were likely to object to his name. ¶8. (C) Kassab suggested Fady Abboud, President of the Association of Industrialists, as president, citing his strong inclination toward the U.S. and very strong Maronite sensibilities. The Ambassador noted his strong Aounist leanings; Geagea added that he has roots in the Syrian popular party (Note: He is also the nephew of Syrian Vice President Shara) and is "allergic" to Lebanese Forces. (Comment: This was truly a bizarre suggestion that makes one suspicious of Kassab. The Ambassador saw Abboud at a dinner later on 11/8. Abboud proceeded to attack polemically March 14, reserving particular ire for the Lebanese Forces. End comment.) GEAGEA INTENT ON PURSUING HALF PLUS ONE PRESIDENT -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted that many powerful voices were counseling against a half plus one vote. Geagea disagreed. He reported that Lebanese Forces MPs Elie Kairouz and Setrida Geagea (Samir's wife) had recently held a long discussion with Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Lebanon Khoja, in which Khoja never told them not to proceed with a half plus one vote. Geagea added that his impression from other Saudi contacts was also that they were not opposed. For the last two weeks the Saudis have been supporting half plus one he said, although they of course would prefer consensus -- on a March 14 candidate. The Ambassador commented that the Saudis might accept a half plus one vote as a last resort only, but they would need to have the Patriarch on board. Geagea responded that the Patriarch would only be on board at the last minute, after all other efforts failed. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador suggested that March 14 should not proceed with the half plus one option explicitly as its opening hand; rather, it needed to show it had exhausted all other options first to decrease the perception that it was preempting a solution. Geagea, agreeing that even Boutros Harb was dreaming if he thought he could secure more than an absolute majority, said there was no other solution than half plus one, though he admitted that March 14 was not playing its cards well. Lebanese Forces' plan for the next two weeks was half plus one, with either Boutros Harb or Nassib Lahoud, with Charles Rizk as the only possible fallback solution. Jumblatt's plan was the same, he said. ...REGARDLESS OF CONSEQUENCES -------------- ¶11. (C) What will happen on the ground if you proceed, the Ambassador asked? Geagea replied that for the last two weeks, after a two to three week pause, various groups, including Suleiman Franjieh's Marada, had begun arming again -- except for Aoun. (Note: Franjieh advisor and AmCit BEIRUT 00001760 003.2 OF 004 Richard Haykal explicitly denied that Marada is rearming in an October 30 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, claiming individuals, like southern "hicks," had weapons for their own personal defense, but nothing more. Of course, we would not expect him to say otherwise. Geagea advisors told Pol/Econ Chief after the meeting that they attributed unwelcome press coverage as the reason Aoun had ceased rearming. End note.) ¶12. (C) Geagea predicted the opposition would respond to a half plus one president with minor "skirmishes" here and there. Downplaying the Ambassador's concern that Hizballah is said to have the ability to take over large parts of the country, Geagea said they would only be able to take Beirut, the Biqa, and the south. Does Lebanese Forces really want to go that route, the Ambassador asked. Geagea didn't answer, except by acknowledging that Hizballah could "cause huge problems." Kassab commented that Hizballah itself probably would not be involved, but would deploy its "proxies" instead. DANGEROUS GAMES -------------- ¶13. (C) It's a dangerous game, Geagea admitted, one we played before when Elias Hrawi was elected president in 1989. Keep in mind that we have a terrorist enemy and we cannot employ terrorist means against him. Any neutral president would be sucked in by that enemy. Left alone, someone like Torbey would be an okay president, but in this game a weak president would lead to increased marginalization of the Christians. Therefore, Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb are the minimum accepted candidates. ¶14. (C) Does March 14 have an absolute majority, the Ambassador asked. Yes, Geagea stated confidently, claiming Tripoli bloc MP Mohamed Safadi was firmly on board, though he admitted he didn't know about Future Movement MP Ghassan Tueini. But people need to feel the threat of a presidential vacancy, he argued, for the half plus one to proceed, saying that March 14 would wait until November 24 (the day after President Lahoud's mandate expires) to proceed with the vote. ¶15. (C) Geagea rejected the Ambassador's suggestion that, if it came to this, the Patriarch might get desperate and produce names, saying that the two major Christian leaders (we presume he meant Aoun and himself) were telling him not to. But if Saad gets his safety net, the game is not so dangerous, the Ambassador pointed out. If he does, Geagea said, we'll accept; at least that way we'll have half of the Christians on board. But Saad doesn't know yet whether the French will agree. AOUN WILL FIGHT 'TIL THE END -------------- ¶16. (C) Geagea said Aoun had called him the previous Saturday suggesting a meeting, to which Geagea replied he was welcome any time (i.e., at Geagea's residence in Maarab). Aoun reportedly didn't accept, suggesting the Patriarch's residence in Bkirke instead. Geagea agreed, but then Aoun did an about-face and insisted on his residence in Rabieh. Suleiman Franjieh, meanwhile, told Geagea the week before that he was ready to meet at Bkirke, presumably as a knee-jerk reaction to Aoun's meeting with March 14 MP Samir Geagea, his cousin and arch-rival. Franjieh then suddenly changed his mind, due, Geagea guessed, to Syrian opposition. ¶17. (C) Does Aoun recognize that he won't be president, the Ambassador asked. Yes and no, Geagea replied; "he will fight until the end." Then he risks losing everything, the Ambassador pointed out. That's your calculation, Geagea responded, Aoun doesn't calculate. DESPAIR OVER SAAD HARIRI -------------- ¶18. (C) Ushering the others out of the room, Geagea then paced, one-on-one, around his office with the Ambassador, fretting about his two-hour meeting the previous evening with Hariri. Hariri, he said, is well-intentioned. But he is oblivious to Christian sensibilities. Hariri is ready to BEIRUT 00001760 004.2 OF 004 make a deal on a weak president, and he has all but abandoned the idea of using a half-plus-one absolute majority vote. This puts March 14 Christians in a terrible bind. If they go along with a president like Joseph Torbey or Robert Ghanem, their credibility is destroyed: the Sunnis, and the Hariris in particular, will have proven once again that they do not want partners but servants. Yet, if March 14 Christian leaders do not go along with a deal announced by Hariri, then they risk splitting March 14. ¶19. (C) But, Geagea warned, if he has to choose between backing a weak figure like Robert Ghanem to preserve March 14 unity or preserving his Christian credibility by breaking with Hariri over a bad presidential choice, he will chose the latter. Geagea said that he would have no choice but to build an alliance with Aoun, lest all of his followers shift to Aoun on their own. "You have to work on Saad," Geagea said. "Convince him that he can't ignore his Christian partners," persuade him that, in the Sunni struggle against Hizballah, Hariri will need the Christians on his side. "Thank God for Walid," Geagea commented, referring to Jumblatt remaining steadfast in his support of a strong, credible President. Geagea lamented that Hariri is so ready to abandon the "half plus one" electoral strategy, when that may be the only option to get a strong candidate with Christian credibility who is not Michel Aoun. COMMENT -------------- ¶20. (C) Geagea's concern with Saad Hariri is worrying: March 14 needs to stay united beyond the presidential elections. Indeed, picking a prime minister, forming a government, and writing a government program may turn out to be even more difficult tasks than electing a president. If March 14 is divided, Hizballah and other Syrian proxies will remain in lockstep and thus more likely to increase their influence at the expense of the divided March 14 movement. ¶21. (C) While Geagea in the end will probably stick with March 14 for lack of a better alternative -- especially as Michel Aoun seems in no mood to reciprocate Geagea's tentative flirtation -- we suspect that he is right about Saad in one important aspect: Saad is ready to make a deal, almost any deal, with March 8 in order to put the presidential crisis behind him. Having watched his father and Nabih Berri share control over President Elias Hrawi (in office 1989-1998),Saad may very well underestimate the importance of the presidency to his allies. FELTMAN