LEBANON: UNIIIC COMMISSIONER: STILL MUM ON NEXT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001750 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNIIIC COMMISSIONER: STILL MUM ON NEXT REPORT, BUT PROMISING LINES OF INVESTIGATION AHEAD REF: BEIRUT 1734 BEIRUT 00001750 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (S) UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz's next report to the UN Security Council is unlikely to provide any anxiously-awaited conclusions. However, recent results from forensic studies, combined with a promising new line of investigation involving telecommunications, could help make the connection between the perpetrators on the ground and those who had the political motives for killing former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others. Fatah al-Islam is suspected in at least one attack, while UNIIIC continues to be unsuccessful in establishing any direct connections with Syria. Brammertz was hopeful that, given the right resources, the next six months could produce significant results in the investigations. He asked that the U.S. provide two contractors immediately to help with the telecom line of investigation (see paragraph 9 for action request). Brammertz also used the meeting to vent on his latest bureaucratic woes. End summary and action request. FORENSIC ANALYSIS BEGINS TO BEAR FRUIT, POSSIBLE FATAH AL-ISLAM CONNECTION -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief met with UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz at his office on November 7. Noting that there had been no dramatic evolution other than in telecom analysis (see below),Brammertz said UNIIIC was following up on its action plan by conducting approximately 300 interviews (of which 120 had been completed),and pursuing investigative lines based on forensic analysis. UNIIIC recently had begun receiving forensic evidence from individual attacks, including the Ain Alaq twin bus bombings and assassination of Pierre Gemayel. DNA obtained from one of the buses had, after being analyzed in an international database, begun to produce hits. Though it was a little early to say, Brammertz said DNA obtained from deceased Fatah al-Islam (FAI) members showed the perpetrators were somehow related, which seemed to confirm an FAI connection to the Ain Alaq bombings. ¶3. (C) Regarding Gemayel, UNIIIC was trying to confirm one detainees' claim and an eyewitness sketch of the perpetrator that FAI was responsible by testing forensic evidence found in the Honda CRV that may have been used in the attack. In particular, UNIIIC was trying to link two dead FAI members with the car, and the car to the crime scene, but so far had not been successful. Seventy percent of the analysis done by the Dutch forensic experts had not made a connection. Pierre's father Amine had recently visited Brammertz, he reported, stating he had received conflicting reports about his son's assassination from the military (who claimed to know nothing) and the police (who claimed the case was solved). Brammertz, admitting that there was a possibility of FAI involvement, but this had not yet been confirmed, seemed to suggest that his investigation lay somewhere in-between. ¶4. (C) Brammertz admitted that the motus operandi for the Ain Alaq bombings was different from other attacks, and that so far there was no physical evidence linking the attacks. However, in terms of overall motive, the fact that the bus bombings occurred on the eve of the anniversary of the Hariri assassination demonstrated an obvious linkage in terms of the overall political context of the killings. "The motives are absolutely identical," he said. Agreeing with the Ambassador that FAI as an organization had only appeared last December, after the Gemayel assassination, Brammertz nevertheless noted that individual FAI members had been active before then, therefore this didn't change his working hypothesis. Our conclusion is not that FAI killed Rafiq Hariri, he said, but they may have been responsible for Ain Alaq and possibly Gemayel. GHANEM ASSASSINATION MORE SOPHISTICATED -------------- BEIRUT 00001750 002.2 OF 004 ¶5. (C) The September 19, 2007 assassination of March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem was a different story, Brammertz continued. UNIIIC has video footage of the white taxi that was used to bring the bomb to the scene, video that had been sent to the UK for further analysis, but wasn't likely to produce much due to poor pixel quality. Interestingly, however, the video showed the taxi arriving exactly ten minutes after Ghanem's car arrived. This suggested two teams were involved: a permanent surveillance team that was able to quickly pinpoint Ghanem's movements, and a second team with the bomb that was able to act once they received word from the first team. The perpetrators therefore must have physical surveillance capabilities as well as several bomb-rigged vehicles stationed around Beirut. This is a very sophisticated operation, Brammertz said, unlike the Ain Alaq bombings. It suggests the suspects live permanently in Lebanon and have been here for the past two years. These are probably some of the same people who do surveillance of you and me, he noted; they clearly have operational capabilities. ¶6. (C) The Gemayel assassination also was a very bad job; the killers used the wrong caliber of weapons and used a silencer, which decreased the impact of the bullet. In effect, this was a cruel, brutal execution rather than a sophisticated assassination, he said, adding that Gemayel's bodyguards had more sophisticated weapons than the assassins, but did not have the weapons poised to use. TELECOM ANALYSIS COULD PROVIDE KEY LINKS -------------- ¶7. (S) UNIIIC's most important progress in the last four months was in telecom analysis, Brammertz said, which could help identify the physical perpetrators of the crimes and their links to those who ordered the assassinations. The idea was to test UNIIIC's hypothesis that phones located at the crime scenes or involved in surveillance could provide clues to the killers' identities. This would help close the link between the forensics evidence, which was helping to identify those that actually conducted the assassinations, with the larger political context. The motive behind the attacks was clear, but the telecom analysis would help identify who ordered the attacks. Deeming this track the "most promising avenue for the next six months," Brammertz said it could make a big difference for the Tribunal, potentially linking 10 to 15 people directly to the Hariri assassination as well as to other attacks. "If this works, we have a case," he said. ¶8. (C) However, Brammertz continued, he urgently needed additional staff to work on the project. Currently only four or five people are working on it, he said, and he is asking five countries (three "neutral" countries, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, plus the United States and France) to provide two individuals each on an emergency contractual basis to work exclusively on this project. He already has two from the UK. Asking the UN for additional help would take too much time and not result in qualified people, he said; he is prepared to ask UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon to call heads of state directly, if necessary. If the US does not come forward, he warned, it will mean that we are not interested in seeing results. ¶9. (C) Action request: Post requests that Department provide an immediate interim response to Brammertz' request, then canvas relevant agencies for available participation in the telecom investigation. UNIIIC's list of the desired qualifications was faxed to NEA/ELA. An Australian, Glen Rowley, is running the telecom project for UNIIIC. End action request. NO PROGRESS ON IMPLICATING SYRIA -------------- ¶10. (S) Regarding Syrian involvement, Brammertz said there was nothing new. Recently arrived investigator Stacy de la Torre had now reviewed all the relevant documents and found nothing really substantive explaining the crime. He expected that UNIIIC would travel six or seven more times to Syria to conduct more interviews, but was not hopeful -- so far there had been "close to nothing" in terms of evidence directly BEIRUT 00001750 003.2 OF 004 linking the Syrians to the Hariri assassination. However, he had made a strategic decision to keep up the pressure on the Syrians even if some believed it would not lead to any results. "Don't expect them to help solve the case," he said. NEXT REPORT: "BUSINESS AS USUAL" -------------- ¶11. (S) Brammertz, admitting that he had given extensive thought as to what the nature of his last report (which he had just begun writing the day before) as UNIIIC Commissioner should be, made three points: 1) we are not at the end of the investigation; 2) his departure is not a reason in and of itself to change the nature of his reports; and 3) the closer we come to establishing the Tribunal, the less that should be said to prevent whatever leads we have from being "burned"; instead, allow the prosecutor to follow up on those leads. Referring to the suspects as dominos, Brammertz said toppling one prematurely could make the whole network collapse. Furthermore, presenting too strong a hypothesis would lead to overblown expectations from the Tribunal and would risk giving defendants the right to say they had not been given a fair trial, since UNIIIC's conclusions already had been made public. It is a contradiction, he said, to give a public accounting of what is a confidential investigation. ¶12. (S) Brammertz' plan, therefore, was to present a "business as usual" report saying UNIIIC was continuing its work, had come up with an action plan for further investigation that was 50 percent complete, that it was making progress, and that it was preparing for the transition to the Tribunal. He said his report was due to the UN Security Council on November 27, and that he would present it on December 5. He said the report after that, next June, should consist of one line only: file given to prosecutor. ¶13. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's inquiry, Brammertz admitted that it was not clear with the UN expected him to provide an opinion or preparations for the trial. If I say, even here privately, he said, that there are clear avenues leading to the physical perpetrators, that would compromise the investigation. "They" know what we're up to, he said, and would immediately kill any suspects to prevent them from testifying, or the suspects would simply disappear. Or, if I name three, Syria might hold its own expedited trial and execution, thereby arguing there is no need for the Tribunal, he said. UN BUREAUCRACY IS AN "OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE" -------------- ¶14. (C) Brammertz did not miss the opportunity to update us on his most recent bureaucratic battles (reftel) with UN headquarters. A former UNIIIC employee, Peter Nichols, reportedly wanted to return to UNIIIC. Brammertz had tried to hire him as a consultant, but bureaucracy was again getting in the way. Brammertz therefore suggested to UN Legal Counsel Nicola Michel to take him on board as part of the New York/The Hague/Beirut transition team to the Tribunal. He said he would participate in a videoconference, possible as early as the next day, with the UN political and field service offices to discuss some of the bureaucratic obstacles he was facing, which he complained were virtually "an obstruction of justice." BRAMMERTZ PENCILS IN DEPARTURE DATE -------------- ¶15. (C) Answering our question about his departure date, Brammertz noted that he scheduled his departure on December ¶19. (Referring to the progress in the telecommunications area, he sounded almost wistful, as though he was leaving just as the case was coming together and getting interesting.) COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (S) Brammertz was ready for us: clearly anticipating our questions, he had prepared a careful response regarding why his November 27 report could not be any more forward-leaning in its analysis than his previous reports. Essentially, he argued that pushing him for more substantive BEIRUT 00001750 004.2 OF 004 analysis would risk the trial. Having gone through this with him repeatedly (including over two dinners we hosted for him at the Residence in recent weeks),we did not pursue the issue this time. UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen, meeting the Ambassador later on 11/7, said that he, too, had been advocating that Brammertz share his thinking in this final report. Pedersen believes that Brammertz has eliminated all other options except the Syrian-Lebanese military-intelligence apparatus as behind the Hariri investigation. But unless Brammertz gets explicit instructions from UN headquarters or the Security Council that his report is to offer conclusions and analysis rather than simply serve as an update of what UNIIIC has been doing, Pedersen does not expect the 11/27 report to cover significant new ground. FELTMAN