Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT1747
2007-11-07 14:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: FRENCH CHARGE SAYS FRANCE WILL PUSH

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001747 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH CHARGE SAYS FRANCE WILL PUSH
PATRIARCH FOR LIST OF CANDIDATES

REF: A. BEIRUT 1737


B. BEIRUT 1514

BEIRUT 00001747 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001747 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH CHARGE SAYS FRANCE WILL PUSH PATRIARCH FOR LIST OF CANDIDATES REF: A. BEIRUT 1737 ¶B. BEIRUT 1514 BEIRUT 00001747 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) French Charge Andre Parant believes it may be possible to convince the Patriarch to provide a short-list of presidential candidates, although he agrees that letting him decide on the names could result in less than ideal candidates. France is determined to find a solution before the midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud's mandate to avoid a half plus one scenario, Parant said, and probably will push the Patriarch to come up with a list. End summary. PUSHING THE PATRIARCH -------------- ¶2. (C) Stopping by the Embassy on November 6 after meeting with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, French Charge Andre Parant told the Ambassador, DCM, and Pol/Econ Chief that, although he was not 100 percent sure, he believed he had made progress in encouraging the Patriarch to speak out more strongly on the need for MPs to attend the November 12 presidential electoral session in parliament. The Patriarch reportedly responded that the next Bishops' statement, to be released on November 7, would convey this message, but Parant pushed back that it was important that the Patriarch personally speak up. Parant believed Sfeir was "sensitive" to this message. While the Patriarch typically would not tell Parant yes or no about agreeing to do a list, Parant believed it would be possible to convince him to come up with a list if it were done discretely, with no "leakage." FRANCE ENTERS THE NAME GAME -------------- ¶3. (C) The Patriarch refused to divulge names to Parant, arguing that any candidates he doesn't name would immediately become his enemy. Parant, referring to his discussion the day before with the Ambassador (Ref A),again agreed that allowing the Patriarch to choose was risky, given that his list contained weak candidates. He said that he told Sfeir to choose candidates based on the criteria outlined in the annual Bishops' statement (Ref B),and they should be independent and have "personality." So, he concluded, our choice is either to trust the Patriarch to come
up with good names, or push him to accept certain candidates, which may be difficult. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador suggested that it might be better to have Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and majority leader Saad Hariri pick two names to give to the Patriarch, or, alternatively, pick five names and let parliament vote. The ideal scenario, Parant said, would be for the Patriarch to ask the Christian leaders (Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, Phalange leader Amine Gemayel, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea) to present a list, then take it to Berri and Hariri. If the U.S. and France encourage Sfeir to do this and give him assurances on the process and discretion, he might agree. ¶5. (C) Parant said France was "working on" Aoun. He admitted he was not enthusiastic about Robert Ghanem (though he agreed he was better than Jean Obeid),but said France would not object to Ghanem's candidacy. He believed Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's candidacy was dead. France has a "rather positive opinion" about Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, but there was the problem of a constitutional amendment. Many would argue, if you are amending the constitution for Salameh, why not accept Sleiman, he said. France trusts March 14 to pick the right candidate, he said; if they want Sleiman, that is fine with us. But France does not want March 14 to have to proceed with a half plus one vote. Parant noted that in his meeting the day before with Geagea, the Lebanese Forces leader had said he was confident that a consensus would be reached, as long as it was on either Boutros Harb or Nassib Lahoud; BEIRUT 00001747 002.2 OF 002 otherwise March 14 would go with half plus one. The only non-March 14 candidate Geagea would accept is Justice Minister Charles Rizk. (Note: The Ambassador will see Geagea on November 8. End Note.) ¶6. (C) Parant ended the meeting stressing that Paris wants results before November 24. Therefore, despite the risks associated with the Patriarch playing a leading role, France was likely to push for him to establish a list. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) We believe, based on Parant's comments and rumors we have heard from other contacts about the French, that Paris, concerned about the consequences of a half plus one president, is ratcheting up its diplomatic efforts to convince the Patriarch to name names. While our discussions with Parant seem to indicate that France does not have specific names or procedures in mind -- and shares our concerns about some of the weaker candidates -- we should consult closely with the French over the next few critical days and weeks to ensure that are policies are in sync and that France does not inadvertently fall into what may well be a Syrian trap, either to blame international interference (i.e., France and the U.S.) should the efforts fail, or to elect a president who would easily succumb to Syrian pressures. End comment. FELTMAN

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