LEBANON: FRENCH CHARGE ADVOCATES TOUGH MESSAGE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001737 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH CHARGE ADVOCATES TOUGH MESSAGE TO SYRIA, STRONGER CHRISTIAN ROLE REF: BEIRUT 1514 BEIRUT 00001737 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) French Charge Andre Parant reported that French officials delivered tough messages to their Syrian counterparts during their November 3-4 meetings in Istanbul, warning that France would hold Syria responsible if Lebanon is unable to elect a president by November 24. Locally, a stronger Christian role was the key to resolving the crisis, he said, though he was doubtful whether the Patriarch would step up to the plate. Parant said March 14 should provide every opportunity for the opposition to agree on a consensus president up until November 24; after that it would have no choice but to go with a half plus one candidate. 14 Parant did not believe Hizballah would turn violent in the event March 14 proceeded with a half plus one vote, though he predicted that it would engage in civil protests such as surrounding key ministries. End summary. FRENCH PLAY TOUGH WITH SYRIANS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with French Charge Andre Parant on November 5 to discuss the November 3-4 Istanbul meetings and the ongoing political stalemate in Lebanon. Parant said he had heard the meeting between French FM Kouchner and Syrian FM Mouallem was "good," as was the expanded "group of seven" meeting with the Secretary, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, and the SIPDIS FMs from the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and France. The problem, he said, was that telling the Syrians not to interfere in Lebanon's presidential election was not enough, since it was too easy for them to agree. Therefore, Sarkozy senior advisors Jean-David Levitte and Claude Gueant told President Asad that not only could Syria not impose a candidate or prevent the election from taking place, it must play a positive role, given that Syrian proxies in Lebanon could thwart the elections while Syria appeared to be keeping its hands off. If no president is elected by November 24, they reportedly warned, France would hold Syria responsible. ¶3. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's inquiry as to whether Levitte had discussed names with Asad, Parant said he did not believe that was part of the Gueant-Levitte's message. Parant confirmed, however, that the Syrians were trying to get names out of the French, adding that this was Cousseran's impression from his recent visit to Damascus. Vice President Shara and FM Mouallem reportedly seemed frustrated that Cousseran did not provide any names. ¶4. (C) Instead, Parant explained, the French approach was to tell the Syrians to live by their words in terms of encouraging a purely Lebanese dialogue and consensus. Syria has strong influence in Lebanon, the French envoys reportedly told their Syrian interlocutors, and has the ability to play an obstructionist role. But it must not, and November 24 is the test: if there a new Lebanese president, France implicitly will assume Syria has played a constructive role; if not, France will draw the opposite conclusion. ¶5. (C) Parant conceded, however, that there may have been a strategic discussion about compiling a short-list of candidates to present to the Patriarch to decide on one name, which Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri would then have no choice but to accept. Noting that Levitte had spoken to majority leader Saad Hariri in Paris before traveling to Istanbul, Parant said Saad, after meeting with Saudi King Abdallah in Geneva, was back in Paris to hear Levitte's briefing on meetings with the Syrians. Levitte and Saad might discuss names, he said, adding that Saad needed to get Berri's blessing to preserve the Lebanese aspect of any agreement. ¶6. (C) Regarding Syria's refusal to accept the "group of seven's" communique from anyone but the French, Parant said he, too, was furious at FM Mouallem's attempts to spin his own message. First, Parant said, Mouallem came out of his BEIRUT 00001737 002.2 OF 003 bilateral meeting with Kouchner with a six-point document he claimed represented the discussion, but which in reality did not reflect the sprit of the meeting. Instead, the idea was to lay out France's expectations more precisely. The actual communique (which Mouallem skipped out of town to avoid receiving, but which the French were finally able to deliver in Damascus) contained seven points, Parant noted. ¶7. (C) France's next step would be a return visit to Lebanon by Kouchner, Parant confirmed, probably following his trip to the U.S. with President Sarkozy, and possibly as early as November 8 or 9. Expressing his opinion that there would be no solution to Lebanon's presidency by November 12, Parant nevertheless confirmed that Kouchner would return regardless of whether there was a solution. Levitte and Gueant had discussed in Istanbul with French Special Envoy Cousseran the possibility of the latter traveling to Tehran in the near future. Levitte, Parant note, was increasing calling the shots on France's Lebanon policy, rather than Kouchner or Cousseran. CHRISTIANS MUST PLAY A STRONGER ROLE -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the local scene, Parant said the key to resolving the impasse over the presidency was convincing the Christian to play a stronger role. Noting that he would deliver this message in a meeting with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea later that afternoon, and again with Patriarch Sfeir the next day, he said failure was preferable to the Patriarch not taking any action. The Patriarch needs to convene the Christians to force them to come up with a name, or pick one himself and give it to Berri and Hariri, Parant said. That way, whether or not it works, he can at least say he's done his duty. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador suggested that another approach would be for the Patriarch, referencing the Bishops' statement (reftel),to urge MPs to go to parliament to vote, in effect shaming them into going, and to attend himself. This way, the Patriarch could avoid giving names himself (something the Patriarch is known to be loathe to do). The Patriarch should also engage other Christian religious leaders, like Archbishop Audi. Unfortunately, the Patriarch is not a political animal, Parant responded, and he always shies away from politics. Perhaps, he suggested, a combination of strong words to the MPs along with a statement that Sfeir himself would come up with a list based on the qualities outlined in the Bishops' statement would work. "I am not very confident" in the Patriarch, Parant admitted, unless we "shake" him. ¶10. (C) What if, the Ambassador asked, the Patriarch comes up with weak candidates, like Demianos Kattar, Joseph Torbey, Shakib Qortbawi, or Michel Edde (candidates rumored to be on the Patriarch's short-list)? It's a problem, Parant agreed; if I were him I'd name one of the two March 14 candidates (Boutros Harb or Nassib Lahoud),Aoun, and two others. It's a risky strategy, he admitted, if the two others are not quality candidates. If I had instructions to give the Patriarch names, I would, he said. ¶11. (C) Speaking for himself, Parant said he believed that Syria wanted Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman or no one as president. He said March 14 should test Syria until November 24 by providing every opportunity to find a solution. After that, March 14 would have no choice but to go with a half plus one vote. This would exert the maximum pressure on the Syrians, by testing their claims that they are in favor of dialogue and consensus. We need to convince March 14 to enter into "true" negotiations until the 24th, he argued, to demonstrate the majority's good faith efforts. At the same time, Syria must realize that there will be consequences if it doesn't play the game. ¶12. (C) Parant also revealed that in a recent meeting with Kouchner, Saudi FM Faisal had proposed Nassib Lahoud as president with Najib Mikati as a transitional prime minister. What's interesting, he noted, is that this confirms Faisal does not favor Hariri as prime minister. However, Lahoud has little chance of succeeding, Parant said, because he is too good and "too March 14". Hizballah would never accept him BEIRUT 00001737 003.2 OF 003 simply because it would mean losing face. HIZBALLAH WILL REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE -------------- ¶13. (C) Parant did not believe Hizballah would respond with violence to a half plus one vote, arguing that going too far would be political suicide. Hizballah did not want to implicate itself directly in a conflict with the LAF, Internal Security Forces, or Sunnis, he said, agreeing with the Ambassador that Commander Sleiman recently had given assurances that he would protect state institutions in the event Hizballah did become violent. Parant did, however, envision that Hizballah would engage in civil protests by surrounding the Grand Serail and other ministries. They can't not react, he explained; again, it's a question of face. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Subsequent to our meeting with Parant, rumors about what actually happened in the Damascus meetings during the Gueant-Levitte mission have begun circulating. Two sources of the rumors are Basile Yarid, the Hariri lawyer who reportedly joined Saad Hariri in getting a direct read-out from Levitte in Paris, and Randa Takieddine, the well-connected al-Hayet correspondent in Paris. Yarid and Takieddine are telling their March 14 and GOL contacts that the Syrians got the French to agree to push Patriarch Sfeir into coming up with a list of acceptable candidates. The French will then take the list to Berri and Hariri for a decision on one name that would then be presented as the consensus candidate to the Parliament. This approach, if it is truly what the French are pursuing, dismays our March 14 contacts, who believe that it will result in a weak candidate (i.e., the least objectionable name on the list) susceptible to Syrian manipulation. We will explore with Andre Parant whether this is really the approach the French are pursuing and, if so, how it might be improved: for example, if the list went directly to Parliament, there is a higher probability of a stronger candidate emerging the winner. FELTMAN