LEBANON: PREVIEWING U.S. RESPONSE TO AN ILLEGAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001728

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PREVIEWING U.S. RESPONSE TO AN ILLEGAL
SECOND GOVERNMENT

REF: A. STATE 148539

B. BEIRUT 1712

C. BEIRUT 1713

D. BEIRUT 1678

E. BEIRUT 1723

BEIRUT 00001728 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Representatives from the opposition,
predictably, protested what they view as U.S. interference in
internal Lebanese affairs in response to Ref A demarche
regarding economic and travel ramifications for those who
participate in an unconstitutional government in Lebanon.
Many viewed it as the U.S. siding with the "illegitimate"
Siniora government when instead, they argued, the U.S. should
be encouraging consensus on a president. Few, however,
actually envisioned a second cabinet, in part due to the
threat of U.S. sanctions. End summary.


2. (C) Post delivered Ref A demarche to the following:
informal advisor to President Emile Lahoud Wadih al-Khazen,
Lahoud lawyer Selim Jeressaiti, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
Commander Michel Sleiman, Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh,
former PM Najib Mikati, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel
Aoun, Aoun bloc MPs Ibrahim Kanaan, Salim Salhab, Walid
Khoury, Elie Skaff and Hagop Pakrudunian, Suleiman Franjieh
advisors Raymond J. Araygi and Richard Haykal (AmCit),
Parliament Speaker Berri's advisor Ali Hamdan, and would-be
(mostly in his own mind) alternative Prime Minister Fouad
Makhzoumi. We are certain that these contacts will
disseminate the message further.


3. (C) On October 29, the Ambassador met with former Minister
Wadih al-Khazen, who serves as an informal advisor to
President Emile Lahoud, to discuss steps the U.S. will take
Ref A in case Lahoud appoints an illegal cabinet or extends
his term beyond his midnight on November 23 mandate. Khazen
stated that he understood the message and that he already
knew Lahoud would not appoint a second cabinet, in part
because of the threat of U.S. sanctions. Khazen wanted
confirmation that the U.S. would not pursue Lahoud legally
should he exit Baabda Palace on time. Khazen also used the
occasion to pitch that the USG not support "half-plus-one"
presidential elections, a step he said would lead to violence
in the streets. Instead, he argued, the USG should help
broker a consensus choice. Revealing his true Maronite
heart, he suggested that he might be able to fit the bill of
a president who could satisfy both March 8 and March 14.


4. (C) The Ambassador met with Selim Jeressaiti, Lebanese
President Emile Lahoud's affable lawyer, on October 27.
Jeressaiti expressed consternation, noting that it was in
part because of the U.S. visa ban and Executive Order that
Lahoud had defied Syrian and Hizballah demands that he
appoint a second cabinet before leaving office. But Lahoud
cannot simply allow the "non-existent and illegal" (by virtue
of the lack of Shia representation) Siniora cabinet to assume
the powers of the presidency. If there is no president-elect
and no 'legal' cabinet to which presidential powers would
pass, then Lahoud has no choice but to stay in Baabda Palace
to prevent a constitutional vacuum. The Ambassador repeated
the probable implications of such a decision and urged
Jeressaiti to help prevent such a scenario by seeing a
credible, made-in-Lebanon president elected before November

23.


5. (C) On October 30, the Ambassador met one-on-one with LAF
Commander Michel Sleiman (ref E). Sleiman agreed the LAF
cannot stay in the barracks should trouble break out.
Staying on the sidelines risks breaking LAF unity perhaps
even more than trying to take action, he said, adding that
the LAF would try to "freeze" the situation on the ground as
it is now, taking action against any force that moves,
whether from March 8 or March 14. He expressed hope that the
LAF would be able to prevent any violence by making it clear
that it will react against any party, no matter what the
political allegiance, that tries to commit violence.
(Comment: This is an improvement in his stated position
compared to his earlier vows to withdraw the LAF to the
barracks in the case of violence. We believe that Walid
Jumblatt deserves some credit in stiffening Sleiman's spine,

BEIRUT 00001728 002.2 OF 003


since Jumblatt told Sleiman that the Druse officers and
soldiers would quit the LAF, should the army be inactive in
the face of violence. End comment.)


6. (C) Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh told the Ambassador
on October 31 (Ref C) that the CBL would remain on the side
of "legitimacy." He said he understood the ramifications of
backing a "rogue" government, and he would not permit the
bank to do so. He noted, however, a problem related to his
own personal security: if he is killed, the CBL's First Vice
President -- a Shia linked to Nabih Berri and Hizballah --
would automatically become governor and likely not be as firm
as Salameh about remaining on the side of legitimacy. If
there is a lingering crisis over the presidency, cabinet
formation, and government program, Salameh estimated the CBL
would need USD four billion in 2008 in deposits to maintain
financial stability. If there is a quick end to the current
political crisis, he thought that the current dollarization
rate of 76 percent would drop to somewhere between 65 and 70
percent, making the additional dollar deposits unnecessary.
As for his own presidential prospects, Salameh assessed them
at around "30 percent."


7. (S) The Ambassador met former Prime Minister Najib Mikati
on October 31 (Ref B),given Mikati's once (and perhaps
ongoing) close ties to Syria's al-Asad family and the Mikati
family's extensive wealth. Mikati listened with interest,
telling the Ambassador that the Mikatis had no intention of
opposing the legitimate cabinet, and calling his perpetually
unkempt but reportedly brilliant nephew Azmi (who runs the
Mikati business empire and is rumored to have increased his
links with Bashar al-Asad to compensate for Uncle Najib's
tactical retreat from contact with Bashar) to join the
meeting to hear the message repeated. While making it clear
that the Mikatis would not risk their fortune, Azmi grumpily
accused the USG of interfering in domestic politics. How,
he asked, is the national security interests of the United
States harmed if Lahoud stays in Baabda Palace an extra week
while the Lebanese try to work out their differences?


8. (C) The Ambassador met with Free Patriotic Movement leader
General Michel Aoun on October 26 (Ref D). When the
Ambassador brought up Ref A points, an otherwise cordial Aoun
became noticably upset, stating, "You are interfering." No,
the Ambassador said, we are supporting the single, legitimate
state of Lebanon. Please, the Ambassador said, do not allow
yourself or your movement to be involved with a second
cabinet, the prolongation of Lahoud's residence in Baabda, or
street violence aimed at taking over GOL institutions. There
will be consequences. "O.k, o.k," Aoun said. "But don't
threaten me."


9. (C) Aounist MP Ibrahim Kanaan, meeting with the DCM on
October 28, deemed the U.S. message ill-advised, arguing that
it will provide cover for Syria to interfere in Lebanon "in
its way" because the U.S. is interfering in our way. It
would be better for the U.S. to promote adherence to UNSCRs,
including 1559 and 1701, and encourage parties to compromise
on the presidency. Both he and Aounist MP Farid Kazen
promoted variations of an interim presidency (six months or
three years).


10. (C) DCM also conveyed message to MPs from the Greek
Catholic and Armenian parties allied with Aoun, to reach
those communities. Meeting with PolEcon chief, Aoun MP
Salim Salhab rejected the idea of a second cabinet, saying it
would be a "catastrophe" for Lebanon, and he would not
participate in it. He also claimed that enough Aoun MPs
would support a consensus candidate to make the election of a
new president possible. Aoun MP Walid Khoury was less
optimistic, noting the possibility that, while Lahoud might
step down, he might declare a state of emergency that would
leave the military in charge indefinitely. He criticized the
U.S. for taking sides with one party, noting that the E.O.
benefits a government that is lacking in legitimacy.
Instead, he said, the U.S. should encourage dialogue among
the various parties to find a consensus candidate.


11. (C) Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh's advisors, Raymond
Araygi and Richard Haykal (an Amcit, who called us the day
before the meeting to ask whether his name would be on the
list after local press announced that a new list was

BEIRUT 00001728 003.2 OF 003


forthcoming),whom we had met with to discuss Ref A E.O. when
it was announced in August, continued to protest U.S.
interference in Lebanon's affairs. Haykal wondered how the
U.S. would apply the E.O. if the American University Hospital
receives payment from the Ministry of Health, which is under
control of the opposition. Franjieh was trying to play a
productive role in reaching a consensus candidate and had
nearly been successful in convincing Aoun to renounce his own
presidential aspirations, they claimed, a lost opportunity.
Haykal denied reports that the Marada party is rearming,
adding that it is common for people to have guns at home for
their personal protection.


12. (C) Amal leader Nabih Berri's advisor Ali Hamdan
criticized the E.O. for supporting the "undemocratic" Siniora
government. He asked if the U.S. was intent on punishing
those who create a second government, it would "reward"
those, like his boss Speaker Berri, who were working to find
a solution to the crisis.


13. (C) On November 4, the Ambassador also conveyed the
message to National Dialogue Party chief Fouad Makhzoumi,
occasionally mentioned as a possible prime minister in a
second cabinet. Makhzoumi, while not pleased with the
message, said that he took it seriously and would not join a
second cabinet. He attempted instead to convince the
Ambassador that he would be a most appropriate replacement
for Fouad Siniora as head of a legitimate cabinet.
FELTMAN