LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR OPPOSED TO "HALF PLUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001724

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR
ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR OPPOSED TO "HALF PLUS
ONE" BUT SEEKS MARCH 14 PRESIDENT


BEIRUT 00001724 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Describing Hizballah as "evil," SAUDI Ambassador
Abdulaziz Khoja said that Syria and Hizballah want to
postpone presidential elections indefinitely. But a March
14-provoked absolute majority ("half plus one") election
would also be destructive for Lebanon, he argued, and SAUDI
Arabia opposes this approach. Conceding this his friend Jean
Obeid has no chance at Lebanon's highest office, Khoja
revived what is jokingly called the "N-and-N deal" -- Nassib
Lahoud (March 14's top choice) would become president in
return for a deal on a transitional, technocratic cabinet
headed by Najib Mikati (associated with March 8). The
cabinet's job would be to oversee legislative elections
within a year. To protect its interest, the March 14 bloc,
by controlling the parliamentary and cabinet majority, could
topple the Mikati cabinet anytime it veered in the wrong
direction.


2. (S) Selling such an idea to Saad Hariri will not be
easy, Khoja noted: while SAUDI King Abdullah counseled
Hariri to wait until after legislative elections before
becoming prime minister, Hariri does not yet see that
assuming the premiership now is a trap that will destroy him
politically and perhaps literally. Moreover, Khoja said
(alluding to certain MPs),March 14 no longer has the votes
for a half-plus-one presidency and thus needs a fall-back.
Meeting with the Ambassador separately, Walid Jumblatt said
that he liked Khoja's approach, but only if Hariri were
convinced. Nassib Lahoud said that he cannot play any role
in determining who is prime minister, but, should he be
president with Mikati as premier, "we can make it work."
Khoja also claimed that the threat information announced by
Hariri in Cairo is serious: SAUDI ARABIA is convinced that
Bashar al-Asad's brother-in-law Assaf Shawkat is plotting to
murder both Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. End
summary.

THREATS AGAINST HARIRI, SINIORA,
KHOJA: SERIOUS INFORMATION
--------------


3. (S) On 11/3, the Ambassador met with SAUDI Ambassador
Abdulaziz Khoja. Khoja, who since receiving threat
information in summer has been mostly absent from Lebanon,
said that the Saudis are convinced that the dangers are real.
Khoja said that he found March 8 politician Wi'am Wihab's
condemnations of him to be particularly alarming, since
Wihab's slander is often followed by physical attacks. For
that reason, Khoja expected that he would continue to spend
most of his time in SAUDI Arabia. As for the threats
announced by Saad Hariri when visiting Egypt last week, Khoja
insisted that they, too, are serious. SAUDI ARABIA is
convinced that Assaf Shawkat, Bashar al-Asad's
brother-in-law, is indeed plotting to kill both Hariri and
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. "The king is very
worried," Khoja said.

SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSES VACUUM,
AND OPPOSES HALF-PLUS-ONE PRESIDENT
--------------


4. (S) Turning to Lebanese political developments, Khoja
used uncharacteristically harsh language in describing
Hizballah as "evil." Syria and Hizballah do not want
presidential elections, Khoja insisted, and Michel Aoun is
happy to go along with a delay in the hopes his prospects for
elections improve. While Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
prefers elections, he has very little flexibility,
constrained by Hizballah and Syria. SAUDI ARABIA wants
elections to happen on time.


5. (S) At the same time, SAUDI ARABIA is adamantly opposed
to March 14's proposal to prevent an extension of the status
quo by holding an absolute majority ("half plus one")
presidential election. Such an approach will also be
destructive to Lebanon and will permit Syrian-backed thugs
and gangs to wreck havoc. King Abdullah has instructed Saad
Hariri not to move in the direction of absolute majority

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votin. A formula has to be found by which Lebanon avoid
both catastrophes, a presidential void or a hal-plus-one
presidency. While he believes that hi personal friend Jean
Obeid would have been a god consensus choice, Khoja said
that he now recogizes that neither March 14 leaders nor the
Maronies accept Obeid. "I don't know why," Khoja saidsadly; "Jean is good." The Ambassador did not coment.

MUSING ABOUT DEAL: NASSIB LAHOUD
AS PREIDENT, AND NAJIB MIKATI AS PM
--------------


6. (C) Claiming that it was hopeless" to wait for the
Maronites to solve theproblem of the presidency, Khoja said
that he wa thinking about reviving what has been jokingly
escribed as the "N-and-N" proposal: Persuade Marc 8-Aoun
MPs to participate in a vote that elects assib Lahoud, March
14's top candidate, to the pesidency for six years, and
persuade March 14 toselect Najib Mikati (close to March 8)
as prime inister for a transitional period. Each side then
gets something. The transitional Mikati cabinet ould be
charged with overhauling the legislativeelection law and
process, with legislative electons to take place within a
year. The cabinet wold be technocratic in nature, similar
to the sprng 2005 Mikati cabinet. After the legislative
elctions, a more normal political cabinet would comeinto
office, under a PM from the side that won te most seats in
the legislative elections.

COSTRAINTS ON MIKATI SERVE
AS ASSURANCES TO MARCH 4
--------------


7. (C) March 1 would have certain assurances, Khoja
argued. B retaining the parliamentary majority prior to
lgislative elections, March 14 could strip the cabiet of
its vote of confidence at any moment. By aving well over
half the ministers (who, even if echnocratic, will have
political masters),March14 can also topple the cabinet
through mass miniterial resignations. The combination of
the pariamentary majority and the March 14 presidency woud
then ensure that the replacement cabinet would derive more
fully from March 14.


8. (C) Mikati would know this and thus not push a
pro-Syrian agenda, Khoja argued. Moreover, the Mikati
family's considerable financial empire, worth billions,
imposes a moderating influence on Mikati's political
behavior, since the notoriously tight-fisted Mikati would be
unlikely to risk potential financial sanctions or property
freezes. As a Sunni from Tripoli, Mikati would also be
sensitive to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for fear that
merely lukewarm support would destroy his political prospects
forever.

WHILE WARY OF MIKATI, HARIRI
SHOULD SEE PREMIERSHIP NOW AS A TRAP
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador said that there was one key problem
to Khoja's proposal: Saad Hariri would understandably be
wary of conceding the premiership to someone who could use
the billions available to him and the powers of the office to
supplant Hariri as Lebanon's rimary Sunni political leader.
Mikati could destry Hariri's power base in Tripoli
permanently. Koja accepted the point, but he argued that
Hariri needed to wake up to the fact that accepting the
premiership now, in advance of legislative elections, was a
trap. The Syrians and Hizballah would block and cripple any
Hariri cabinet in ways that the voters would turn away from
the ineffective Hariri cabinet. Hariri's political power
could be permanently destroyed, and perhaps Hariri himself
would be eliminated physically. It is far better for Hariri
to allow someone else to be prime minister until after power
is consolidated in the next legislative elections and until
some equilibrium is restored in the Syrian-Lebanese
relationship. Hariri should spend the next year
concentrating on how to win the legislative elections.


10. (S) Already, Khoja said, King Abdullah has counseled
Hariri to wait until after legislative elections before
becoming premier. While Hariri had no choice but to say,

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"yes, sir," he then went to Khoja to plead for help in
convincing the king to change his mind. It will not be easy
to persuade Hariri, Khoja conceded, who compared Saad as
potential "kingmaker rather than king" with the role some
hoped, in vain, Michel Aoun might agree to play.

MIKATI AS PM IN 2005: NOT NECESSARILY
GUIDE TO HOW MIKATI WOULD BE AS PM IN 2008
--------------


11. (S) The Ambassador told Khoja he had a few concerns
with the "N-and-N" proposal. First, while Mikati was
extremely easy to work with during the spring 2005
transitional, technocratic cabinet phase, Mikati was then
operating under the illusion that, if he performed well, the
Hariris might bring him back as PM. They did not, and thus
he might try to consolidate pro-Syrian positions now, in the
belief that his political future rested only with that side.
Second, there is the risk that the March 8 leaders will take
only half of Khoja's idea -- Mikati as PM -- and try to
negotiate another candidate for the president. Third, Mikati
might use the premiership to distort the electoral process in
ways that reversed all of the pro-independence gains since

2005. Khoja agreed that there were potential dangers, but he
maintained that sufficient checks and balances would
constrain Mikati. March 14, by having the presidency, the
parliamentary majority, and the cabinet majority, has the
primary power, he said.

NO HALF-PLUS-ONE PRESIDENT POSSIBLE;
MARCH 14 NO LONGER HAS THE VOTES
--------------


12. (S) Almost as an afterthought, Khoja then said that
March 14 no longer can pull off a half-plus-one presidential
elections in any case, as the bloc does not have sufficient
votes for that approach. Even if Saad Hariri defies King
Abdullah's wishes and goes with his allies for an absolute
majorit vote, March 14 will not have 64 votes, Khoja
decared. March 14 needs a fall-back approach, and th
"N-and-N" proposal is better than many others uder
discussion. The Ambassador noted that March 14 actually has
68 MPs. Khoja expressed confidence that those 68 would vote
as a bloc if the "two-thirds quorum" of all MPs was attained.
But not all March 14 MPs will vote in the absence of any
March 8-Aoun MPs and be seen as provoking a political and
security crisis. Khoja used the example of MP Mohammed
Safadi. SAUDI ARABIA theoretically could ask him to go to
parliament, given Safadi's business ties with Prince Turki
bin Nasser. But since King Abdullah is opposed to a
half-plus-one election anyway, SAUDI ARABIA would not ask
Safadi to participate.

JUMBLATT: IF SAAD CAN BE CONVINCED,
KHOJA HAS A GOOD IDEA
--------------


13. (C) In a separate meeting, the Ambassador briefed MP
Walid Jumblatt about Khoja's thinking. Jumblatt (who earlier
in the week had hosted Khoja to dinner, when Khoja was still
touting Jean Obeid as president) said that he liked the idea,
as "we have to give them (the March 8 opposition) something."
From Jumblatt's perspective, this accomplished three goals:
First, March 14 secured the presidency for six years.
Second, Hariri delayed taking the premiership pending a more
favorable political and security climate. Third, the
compromise March 14 would have to make regarding the PM was
far less painful than making a compromise on the president,
since the cabinet could always be changed and "improved"
later. But Saad Hariri will have to be convinced, Jumblatt
said, noting that he would not risk splitting March 14 if
Hariri did not approve.

NASSIB LAHOUD: CAN MAKE IT WORK
--------------


14. (C) In a subsequent meeting with the Ambassador, Nassib
Lahoud distanced himself from any deal-making over the
premiership. The president, he noted, has no discretion on
choosing the PM, who is selected by a binding consultative
process by the MPs. Lahoud said that he wanted to avoid any
appearance of violating constitutional practices. But if

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Najib Mikati would become a transitional PM, Lahoud said that
"we can make it work." Besides getting Saad Hariri on board,
Lahoud noted that Khoja would have to work very hard to
convince the March 14 MPs from northern Lebanon, who would
fear that Mikati would find ways to erode their 2005 gains
against pro-Syrian politicians.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Given their razor-thin but surviving parliamentary
majority, March 14 MPs should theoretically be able to elect
a president, select a prime minister, and form a cabinet, all
from March 14 ranks. That is obviously the scenario we would
like to see. That is the outcome we continue to do all we
can to help produce.


16. (C) But the sky-is-falling stories of potential chaos
and catastrophe have eroded both March 14 bloc discipline and
international solidarity. We suspect Khoja is correct that
March 14 would have trouble mustering 64 MPs (the minimum
needed for an absolute majority election),and anything less
than 68 MPs would be deeply embarrassing to March 14. We
know from our diplomatic colleagues that, at best, some
countries will reluctantly accept a half-plus-one election as
a last resort, but it seems that all except the United States
are actively working to find a compromise solution instead,
some (maybe even SAUDI Arabia) at almost any cost. It is
important to note that one essential factor for the success
of an absolute majority president -- Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir's blessing -- remains uncertain.


17. (C) It is still possible that a genuine consensus
candidate (or "half-plus-plus" candidate) committed to March
14 ideals might emerge. Sheikh Michel Khoury's name, for
example, has circulated with increasing frequency; he, in our
view, would be fine. And perhaps Vatican and Maronite
pressure might yet result in sufficient attendance at the
parliamentary session to give sufficient credibility to the
elections of a March 14 president. But we recommend keeping
Khoja's proposed linkage in mind. If a compromise is needed
somewhere at this time, we'd rather see it in the premiership
than the presidency. March 14 will still have the
parliamentary majority, meaning the cabinet could be changed
at any time. A new legislative election law will have to be
approved in the parliament, meaning March 14 (as long as it
has a majority and maintains solidarity) has final say over
the organization for legislative elections.


18. (C) The danger is that a compromise over the presidency
combined with the "blocking/toppling third" in the cabinet
that the pro-Syrians will insist upon puts March 14 in
potentially a worse position than it is today, no matter how
stellar a good PM's March 14 credentials might be. The
pro-Syrian ministers could not topple Siniora's cabinet a
year ago because they did not have sufficient numbers to do
so. In a new cabinet, they are likely to have that third,
meaning that they can topple the cabinet at will. This is
not an insurmountable problem if the president is March 14:
he can work with the parliamentary majority to see that the
replacement cabinet is an improvement, without a toppling
third given again to the pro-Syrians. But if the president
is weak or under Syrian influence, he will likely use his
signatory power over the cabinet formation -- signatory power
that cannot be overridden -- to insist again that the
pro-Syrians have the toppling third, continuing the cycle of
pro-Syrian vetoes over cabinet action.


19. (C) All of this argues, of course, for a credible
president committed to March 14 principles as the first step
to resolving Lebanon's political crisis. Even though in our
view there is no presidential candidate better than Nassib
Lahoud, elevating Nassib via Khoja's "N-and-N" proposal is
not ideal. Saad Hariri in particular can cite many reasons
in rejecting this approach. This proposal, in fact, would
not be worth a moment's consideration under any other
combination of names: it wouldn't work if wheeler-dealer
Boutros Harb were substituted for Nassib Lahoud, or if Omar
Karami (impervious to modern thinking and insouciant about
his international reputation) filled in for Mikati. The
combination of the strong character of Nassib Lahoud and
Lebanon's experience with PM Mikati during a transition

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period is what intrigues us, and probably Jumblatt. While we
won't pursue this as we concentrate on how to promote a
president, PM, and cabinet all committed to March 14
principles, we will monitor Khoja's progress in trying to
find ways to sell a Nassib Lahoud presidency that we, too,
would support.
FELTMAN