LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR OPPOSED TO "HALF PLUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001724 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY SA SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR OPPOSED TO "HALF PLUS ONE" BUT SEEKS MARCH 14 PRESIDENT BEIRUT 00001724 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Describing Hizballah as "evil," Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja said that Syria and Hizballah want to postpone presidential elections indefinitely. But a March 14-provoked absolute majority ("half plus one") election would also be destructive for Lebanon, he argued, and Saudi Arabia opposes this approach. Conceding this his friend Jean Obeid has no chance at Lebanon's highest office, Khoja revived what is jokingly called the "N-and-N deal" -- Nassib Lahoud (March 14's top choice) would become president in return for a deal on a transitional, technocratic cabinet headed by Najib Mikati (associated with March 8). The cabinet's job would be to oversee legislative elections within a year. To protect its interest, the March 14 bloc, by controlling the parliamentary and cabinet majority, could topple the Mikati cabinet anytime it veered in the wrong direction. ¶2. (S) Selling such an idea to Saad Hariri will not be easy, Khoja noted: while Saudi King Abdullah counseled Hariri to wait until after legislative elections before becoming prime minister, Hariri does not yet see that assuming the premiership now is a trap that will destroy him politically and perhaps literally. Moreover, Khoja said (alluding to certain MPs),March 14 no longer has the votes for a half-plus-one presidency and thus needs a fall-back. Meeting with the Ambassador separately, Walid Jumblatt said that he liked Khoja's approach, but only if Hariri were convinced. Nassib Lahoud said that he cannot play any role in determining who is prime minister, but, should he be president with Mikati as premier, "we can make it work." Khoja also claimed that the threat information announced by Hariri in Cairo is serious: Saudi Arabia is convinced that Bashar al-Asad's brother-in-law Assaf Shawkat is plotting to murder both Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. End summary. THREATS AGAINST HARIRI, SINIORA, KHOJA: SERIOUS INFORMATION -------------- ¶3. (S) On 11/3, the Ambassador met with Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja. Khoja, who since receiving threat information in summer has been mostly absent from Lebanon, said that the Saudis are convinced that the dangers are real. Khoja said that he found March 8 politician Wi'am Wihab's condemnations of him to be particularly alarming, since Wihab's slander is often followed by physical attacks. For that reason, Khoja expected that he would continue to spend most of his time in Saudi Arabia. As for the threats announced by Saad Hariri when visiting Egypt last week, Khoja insisted that they, too, are serious. Saudi Arabia is convinced that Assaf Shawkat, Bashar al-Asad's brother-in-law, is indeed plotting to kill both Hariri and Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. "The king is very worried," Khoja said. SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSES VACUUM, AND OPPOSES HALF-PLUS-ONE PRESIDENT -------------- ¶4. (S) Turning to Lebanese political developments, Khoja used uncharacteristically harsh language in describing Hizballah as "evil." Syria and Hizballah do not want presidential elections, Khoja insisted, and Michel Aoun is happy to go along with a delay in the hopes his prospects for elections improve. While Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri prefers elections, he has very little flexibility, constrained by Hizballah and Syria. Saudi Arabia wants elections to happen on time. ¶5. (S) At the same time, Saudi Arabia is adamantly opposed to March 14's proposal to prevent an extension of the status quo by holding an absolute majority ("half plus one") presidential election. Such an approach will also be destructive to Lebanon and will permit Syrian-backed thugs and gangs to wreck havoc. King Abdullah has instructed Saad Hariri not to move in the direction of absolute majority BEIRUT 00001724 002.2 OF 005 votin. A formula has to be found by which Lebanon avoid both catastrophes, a presidential void or a hal-plus-one presidency. While he believes that hi personal friend Jean Obeid would have been a god consensus choice, Khoja said that he now recogizes that neither March 14 leaders nor the Maronies accept Obeid. "I don't know why," Khoja saidsadly; "Jean is good." The Ambassador did not coment. MUSING ABOUT DEAL: NASSIB LAHOUD AS PREIDENT, AND NAJIB MIKATI AS PM -------------- ¶6. (C) Claiming that it was hopeless" to wait for the Maronites to solve theproblem of the presidency, Khoja said that he wa thinking about reviving what has been jokingly escribed as the "N-and-N" proposal: Persuade Marc 8-Aoun MPs to participate in a vote that elects assib Lahoud, March 14's top candidate, to the pesidency for six years, and persuade March 14 toselect Najib Mikati (close to March 8) as prime inister for a transitional period. Each side then gets something. The transitional Mikati cabinet ould be charged with overhauling the legislativeelection law and process, with legislative electons to take place within a year. The cabinet wold be technocratic in nature, similar to the sprng 2005 Mikati cabinet. After the legislative elctions, a more normal political cabinet would comeinto office, under a PM from the side that won te most seats in the legislative elections. COSTRAINTS ON MIKATI SERVE AS ASSURANCES TO MARCH 4 -------------- ¶7. (C) March 1 would have certain assurances, Khoja argued. B retaining the parliamentary majority prior to lgislative elections, March 14 could strip the cabiet of its vote of confidence at any moment. By aving well over half the ministers (who, even if echnocratic, will have political masters),March14 can also topple the cabinet through mass miniterial resignations. The combination of the pariamentary majority and the March 14 presidency woud then ensure that the replacement cabinet would derive more fully from March 14. ¶8. (C) Mikati would know this and thus not push a pro-Syrian agenda, Khoja argued. Moreover, the Mikati family's considerable financial empire, worth billions, imposes a moderating influence on Mikati's political behavior, since the notoriously tight-fisted Mikati would be unlikely to risk potential financial sanctions or property freezes. As a Sunni from Tripoli, Mikati would also be sensitive to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for fear that merely lukewarm support would destroy his political prospects forever. WHILE WARY OF MIKATI, HARIRI SHOULD SEE PREMIERSHIP NOW AS A TRAP -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said that there was one key problem to Khoja's proposal: Saad Hariri would understandably be wary of conceding the premiership to someone who could use the billions available to him and the powers of the office to supplant Hariri as Lebanon's rimary Sunni political leader. Mikati could destry Hariri's power base in Tripoli permanently. Koja accepted the point, but he argued that Hariri needed to wake up to the fact that accepting the premiership now, in advance of legislative elections, was a trap. The Syrians and Hizballah would block and cripple any Hariri cabinet in ways that the voters would turn away from the ineffective Hariri cabinet. Hariri's political power could be permanently destroyed, and perhaps Hariri himself would be eliminated physically. It is far better for Hariri to allow someone else to be prime minister until after power is consolidated in the next legislative elections and until some equilibrium is restored in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship. Hariri should spend the next year concentrating on how to win the legislative elections. ¶10. (S) Already, Khoja said, King Abdullah has counseled Hariri to wait until after legislative elections before becoming premier. While Hariri had no choice but to say, BEIRUT 00001724 003.2 OF 005 "yes, sir," he then went to Khoja to plead for help in convincing the king to change his mind. It will not be easy to persuade Hariri, Khoja conceded, who compared Saad as potential "kingmaker rather than king" with the role some hoped, in vain, Michel Aoun might agree to play. MIKATI AS PM IN 2005: NOT NECESSARILY GUIDE TO HOW MIKATI WOULD BE AS PM IN 2008 -------------- ¶11. (S) The Ambassador told Khoja he had a few concerns with the "N-and-N" proposal. First, while Mikati was extremely easy to work with during the spring 2005 transitional, technocratic cabinet phase, Mikati was then operating under the illusion that, if he performed well, the Hariris might bring him back as PM. They did not, and thus he might try to consolidate pro-Syrian positions now, in the belief that his political future rested only with that side. Second, there is the risk that the March 8 leaders will take only half of Khoja's idea -- Mikati as PM -- and try to negotiate another candidate for the president. Third, Mikati might use the premiership to distort the electoral process in ways that reversed all of the pro-independence gains since ¶2005. Khoja agreed that there were potential dangers, but he maintained that sufficient checks and balances would constrain Mikati. March 14, by having the presidency, the parliamentary majority, and the cabinet majority, has the primary power, he said. NO HALF-PLUS-ONE PRESIDENT POSSIBLE; MARCH 14 NO LONGER HAS THE VOTES -------------- ¶12. (S) Almost as an afterthought, Khoja then said that March 14 no longer can pull off a half-plus-one presidential elections in any case, as the bloc does not have sufficient votes for that approach. Even if Saad Hariri defies King Abdullah's wishes and goes with his allies for an absolute majorit vote, March 14 will not have 64 votes, Khoja decared. March 14 needs a fall-back approach, and th "N-and-N" proposal is better than many others uder discussion. The Ambassador noted that March 14 actually has 68 MPs. Khoja expressed confidence that those 68 would vote as a bloc if the "two-thirds quorum" of all MPs was attained. But not all March 14 MPs will vote in the absence of any March 8-Aoun MPs and be seen as provoking a political and security crisis. Khoja used the example of MP Mohammed Safadi. Saudi Arabia theoretically could ask him to go to parliament, given Safadi's business ties with Prince Turki bin Nasser. But since King Abdullah is opposed to a half-plus-one election anyway, Saudi Arabia would not ask Safadi to participate. JUMBLATT: IF SAAD CAN BE CONVINCED, KHOJA HAS A GOOD IDEA -------------- ¶13. (C) In a separate meeting, the Ambassador briefed MP Walid Jumblatt about Khoja's thinking. Jumblatt (who earlier in the week had hosted Khoja to dinner, when Khoja was still touting Jean Obeid as president) said that he liked the idea, as "we have to give them (the March 8 opposition) something." From Jumblatt's perspective, this accomplished three goals: First, March 14 secured the presidency for six years. Second, Hariri delayed taking the premiership pending a more favorable political and security climate. Third, the compromise March 14 would have to make regarding the PM was far less painful than making a compromise on the president, since the cabinet could always be changed and "improved" later. But Saad Hariri will have to be convinced, Jumblatt said, noting that he would not risk splitting March 14 if Hariri did not approve. NASSIB LAHOUD: CAN MAKE IT WORK -------------- ¶14. (C) In a subsequent meeting with the Ambassador, Nassib Lahoud distanced himself from any deal-making over the premiership. The president, he noted, has no discretion on choosing the PM, who is selected by a binding consultative process by the MPs. Lahoud said that he wanted to avoid any appearance of violating constitutional practices. But if BEIRUT 00001724 004.2 OF 005 Najib Mikati would become a transitional PM, Lahoud said that "we can make it work." Besides getting Saad Hariri on board, Lahoud noted that Khoja would have to work very hard to convince the March 14 MPs from northern Lebanon, who would fear that Mikati would find ways to erode their 2005 gains against pro-Syrian politicians. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Given their razor-thin but surviving parliamentary majority, March 14 MPs should theoretically be able to elect a president, select a prime minister, and form a cabinet, all from March 14 ranks. That is obviously the scenario we would like to see. That is the outcome we continue to do all we can to help produce. ¶16. (C) But the sky-is-falling stories of potential chaos and catastrophe have eroded both March 14 bloc discipline and international solidarity. We suspect Khoja is correct that March 14 would have trouble mustering 64 MPs (the minimum needed for an absolute majority election),and anything less than 68 MPs would be deeply embarrassing to March 14. We know from our diplomatic colleagues that, at best, some countries will reluctantly accept a half-plus-one election as a last resort, but it seems that all except the United States are actively working to find a compromise solution instead, some (maybe even Saudi Arabia) at almost any cost. It is important to note that one essential factor for the success of an absolute majority president -- Maronite Patriarch Sfeir's blessing -- remains uncertain. ¶17. (C) It is still possible that a genuine consensus candidate (or "half-plus-plus" candidate) committed to March 14 ideals might emerge. Sheikh Michel Khoury's name, for example, has circulated with increasing frequency; he, in our view, would be fine. And perhaps Vatican and Maronite pressure might yet result in sufficient attendance at the parliamentary session to give sufficient credibility to the elections of a March 14 president. But we recommend keeping Khoja's proposed linkage in mind. If a compromise is needed somewhere at this time, we'd rather see it in the premiership than the presidency. March 14 will still have the parliamentary majority, meaning the cabinet could be changed at any time. A new legislative election law will have to be approved in the parliament, meaning March 14 (as long as it has a majority and maintains solidarity) has final say over the organization for legislative elections. ¶18. (C) The danger is that a compromise over the presidency combined with the "blocking/toppling third" in the cabinet that the pro-Syrians will insist upon puts March 14 in potentially a worse position than it is today, no matter how stellar a good PM's March 14 credentials might be. The pro-Syrian ministers could not topple Siniora's cabinet a year ago because they did not have sufficient numbers to do so. In a new cabinet, they are likely to have that third, meaning that they can topple the cabinet at will. This is not an insurmountable problem if the president is March 14: he can work with the parliamentary majority to see that the replacement cabinet is an improvement, without a toppling third given again to the pro-Syrians. But if the president is weak or under Syrian influence, he will likely use his signatory power over the cabinet formation -- signatory power that cannot be overridden -- to insist again that the pro-Syrians have the toppling third, continuing the cycle of pro-Syrian vetoes over cabinet action. ¶19. (C) All of this argues, of course, for a credible president committed to March 14 principles as the first step to resolving Lebanon's political crisis. Even though in our view there is no presidential candidate better than Nassib Lahoud, elevating Nassib via Khoja's "N-and-N" proposal is not ideal. Saad Hariri in particular can cite many reasons in rejecting this approach. This proposal, in fact, would not be worth a moment's consideration under any other combination of names: it wouldn't work if wheeler-dealer Boutros Harb were substituted for Nassib Lahoud, or if Omar Karami (impervious to modern thinking and insouciant about his international reputation) filled in for Mikati. The combination of the strong character of Nassib Lahoud and Lebanon's experience with PM Mikati during a transition BEIRUT 00001724 005.2 OF 005 period is what intrigues us, and probably Jumblatt. While we won't pursue this as we concentrate on how to promote a president, PM, and cabinet all committed to March 14 principles, we will monitor Khoja's progress in trying to find ways to sell a Nassib Lahoud presidency that we, too, would support. FELTMAN