LEBANON: EU, UN DIPLOMATS AGREE SLEIMAN IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001679 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: EU, UN DIPLOMATS AGREE SLEIMAN IS SYRIA'S CHOICE; DISAGREE ON WHAT THAT MEANS BEIRUT 00001679 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Over a 10/25 dinner hosted by the British Ambassador in honor of visiting UK Middle East envoy Michael Williams, the French Charge, UN Special Coordinator, UK Ambassador, Williams, and Ambassador Feltman all agreed: LAF Commander Michael Sleiman is the top choice of Syria and Hizballah for the presidency. Beyond that, differences emerged among the dinner participants regarding the presidency. Williams defended Sleiman as having proven himself by Nahr al-Barid to be a strong leader; others described him as weak, although not a 100 percent Syrian agent. Pedersen thought a Sleiman presidency would be fine, whereas the French and American guests expressed hope that the constitutional amendment required could be the appropriate tool to stop his presidency. Williams alone of the guests advocated that the international community underscore the need for a "consensus" president, with the other dinner participants -- noting that "consensus" has come to mean a Hizballah/Syria veto -- preferring "a president with the broadest possible support." The participants also agreed that the pro-Syrians in Lebanon as well as General Aoun like the idea of postponing presidential elections until the March 14 majority no longer exists. On another topic, all the dinner guests agreed that UNIIIC Brammertz' reports have been a disappointment, with Brammertz' next report likely to be another chronicle of UNIIIC internal actions aimed at disguising rather than revealing investigative results. End summary. SEMANTIC DISCUSSION: "CONSENSUS" VERSUS "BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT" -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On the occasion of the two-day visit to Lebanon of UK Middle East envoy Michael Williams, UK Ambassador Frances Guy hosted a small working dinner attended by French Charge d'Affaires Andre Parant, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen, and Ambassador Feltman. The focus of the dinner discussion was on the presidency. Asked what his message was for the Lebanese, Williams responded that he is urging that a "consensus president" be identified within the constitutional schedule. The other guests all cautioned Williams that the benevolent-sounding word "consensus" has become a buzzword for a Hizballah/Syria veto over the presidency. All counseled Williams that they preferred that the international community used language along the lines of urging a president "with the broadest possible support." That did not preclude consensus, Pedersen noted, but it did not mandate that people united around unacceptable choices. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST ACCEPT PRESIDENT ELECTED BY PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) All participants agreed that the international community had to be prepared to support any president who receives more than half of the parliamentary vote, while hoping that as many MPs can rally behind a single candidate as possible. Debating the merits of a "half-plus-plus" approach, all agreed as well that the president elected may not reach the two-thirds votes or attendance insisted upon by Parliament Speaker Berri. Parant chided his colleagues for slopping diplomatic language, saying that governments recognize countries, not presidents; "we should not say we will or won't recognize a president," he said. "We will work with presidents or not, but we recognize countries." The general sense was that March 14 would not be able to muster an absolute majority vote without having a candidate that could actually attract some MPs from the opposition, most likely the Aoun bloc. UN PUSHES FOR "ANY PRESIDENT"; OTHERS DISAGREE -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Discussing candidates, the UK, French, and American participants all found it significant that a BEIRUT 00001679 002 OF 003 Syrian-aligned newspaper (ad-Diyyar) and an Iranian-aligned newspaper (al-Akhbar) had published the seven same names as qualified presidential material, in boldface headlines only two days apart. The UK Ambassador chuckled that it was a "service" that the Syrians would be so clear about who is acceptable to them: LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, MP Robert Ghanem, MP Pierre Daccash, former Minister Michel Edde, former Minister Fares Bouez, and former Minister Jean Obeid. ¶5. (C/NF) What's really so wrong with that, Pedersen argued. Any of the seven would be preferable to Emile Lahoud, and some -- like the notoriously corrupt Bouez -- are "not serious" candidates. Pedersen argued that almost any president starts to solve the political crisis, "starts to improve things," so the international community should be as scrupulous in avoiding vetoes as it is in avoiding backing any particular candidates. Parant objected to a field of candidates defined only by Syria and its allies. Why not a field of candidates determined by March 14, he asked. The U.S. ambassador expressed disagreement with Pedersen that any president will start a promising process. If the president is weak and agrees to a "blocking/toppling" pro-Syrian minority in the cabinet, then the cabinet is constantly subject to Hizballah blackmail. If the president is a credible figure who would not abuse the power of approving cabinet assignments, then the "toppling" power of a pro-Syrian minority is no longer so frightening. DEBATING LAF CHIEF MICHEL SLEIMAN: SYRIA'S CHOICE, YES, BUT HOW SYRIAN? -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) The dinner participants agreed, with the UK and French participants quoting reporting from their Damascus counterparts, that Syria's current top choice seems to be LAF Commander Michel Sleiman. So much of the political puzzle falls easily in place when Sleiman is viewed as Syria's candidate. There was a considerable debate about "how Syrian" is Michel Sleiman, with the consensus being that he is not a subsidiary of Syria in the same fashion of Lahoud. The Beirut-based dinner participants agreed that Sleiman's problem is that he is weak and malleable, subject in particular to pressures from Hizballah. He's "a relatively safe choice" for Hizballah, Parant noted. ¶7. (C/NF) Williams, however, argued a divergent view: that Sleiman proved himself a capable leader during the Nahr al-Barid battle. "Obviously," Williams said, Sleiman can rally his troops effectively; otherwise the LAF soldiers and officers would not have continued such a difficult fight with such tremendous loss. "It's not really so obvious," Pedersen laughed, recounting for Williams how difficult it was to get Sleiman to make decisions at the beginning of the fight. Williams disagreed, saying that Sleiman had clearly been in charge, particularly as Siniora and the cabinet "ignored" Nahr al-Barid. The rest of the dinner participants had a far different impression and were not shy in sharing their views of the importance of the roles of Defense Minister Murr, the officers below Sleiman in the LAF, the Sunni political and religious establishment, and the cabinet in providing the political push for the LAF to enter the camp. ¶8. (C/NF) The dinner participants discussed whether one should try actively to discourage a Sleiman presidency. There is a real danger, Parant noted, that the international eagerness to avoid some kind of problem in Lebanon can be manipulated by the pro-Syrians somehow to lead everyone to Sleiman, "if we aren't careful." A Sleiman presidency "might become inevitable before we know it," Guy commented. Parant and Ambassador Feltman noted the delicacy of trying to discourage a Sleiman presidency without alienating the LAF at a key time. The French and U.S. envoys also noted PM Siniora's strong opposition to a constitutional amendment (required to waive the two-year "cooling off" period Sleiman would otherwise need to become president) and expressed hope that the constitutional amendment (requiring two-thirds approval by both the cabinet and the parliament) might provide the convenient tool to prevent a Sleiman presidency. Returning to his earlier arguments, Pedersen argued that "we shouldn't worry" about a Sleiman presidency, that even a weak BEIRUT 00001679 003.2 OF 003 presidency starts Lebanon on the road to political recovery. EXTENDED STATUS QUO OPTION: PROBABLE, IF SLEIMAN DOESN'T WIN NOW -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) The discussion on the possibility of Emile Lahoud staying in Baabda Palace beyond his midnight November 23 term expiration was relatively brief. All participants agreed that many parties in Lebanon and beyond are quite comfortable with finding a way to extend the status quo until the time that the March 14 majority ceases to exist. At that point, it becomes easier, they agreed, for the pro-Syrians to install the president and prime minister of their choice. If Michel Sleiman does not become president now, then the extended status quo option becomes more likely. Pedersen noted that even some March 14 leaders may like the additional time, in the hopes that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon "starts to show some teeth." General Aoun certainly likes the idea, Pedersen said, describing his meeting with Aoun earlier that day. BRAMMERTZ' REPORTS: DISAPPOINTING -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Turning to the subject of UNIIIC, the dinner participants also agreed that UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz has not produced the kind of reports that change the political dynamics in Lebanon. The participants were split as to whether this was a good or bad thing, with the French and U.S. hoping for stronger reports and the UK and UN defending Brammertz slightly (while acknowledging that the reports themselves have been disappointing). The dinner guests also agreed that it is highly unlikely that, whatever Brammertz knows or believes, his November report will cover new ground. The report will probably talk more about internal UNIIIC organizational matters, particularly in light of the need to prepare for the transition to the Special Tribunal, rather than provide insights into the Hariri and other assassinations. FELTMAN