LEBANON: HARIRI RETURNS TO LEBANON, PURPORTS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001661 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI RETURNS TO LEBANON, PURPORTS TO BE DISAPPOINTED WITH U.S. RESPONSE BEIRUT 00001661 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) An alarmist Saad Hariri accused the U.S. of not doing enough to prevent Syrian interference in Lebanon, claiming the Europeans and Saudis are willing to follow a more aggressive U.S. lead. Now is the time to exert the utmost pressure to get Emile Lahoud out, Hariri argued, and March 14 needs strong U.S. backing if it proceeds with a half plus one president. If instead a compromise candidate is elected, Washington and other capitals should roll out the red carpets to win his loyalty. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with majority leader Saad Hariri at his offices in Qoreitem on October 22, following his extended trip abroad to the U.S., France, and SAUDI Arabia. Hariri's advisor (and cousin) Nadr Hariri and notetaker also attended the meeting. FRANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA WILL FOLLOW U.S. LEAD -------------- ¶3. (C) Referring to his recent trip to France, Hariri said President Sarkozy had been very strong, pledging to warn the Syrians that they should let Lebanon's election proceed without interference or it would be France's job to "undermine the regime." If the assassinations stop and the elections take place, France will send a high level official to Damascus, Sarkozy reportedly told Hariri. For the first time, Hariri commented, France is dead serious and ready to act against Syria, but it needs to see the U.S. is on its side. ¶4. (C) Regarding his discussions in SAUDI Arabia, Hariri claimed the Saudis also were waiting to follow the U.S. lead, adding that he had told King Abdallah he was still waiting for a response from the U.S. "Everyone sees you as tough but loose," he accused. WAITING FOR U.S. TO ACT -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to his U.S. trip, Hariri said he received a positive response from Congress, both in terms of bills passed in the House and Senate condemning Syria's interference in Lebanon, and of additional promises of military aid. Congressional representatives like Tom Lantos now realize they and Speaker Pelosi made a mistake in visiting Syria, he claimed. ¶6. (C) While pleased with the level of reception and the interest shown in Lebanon, Hariri complained that, nevertheless, he was still waiting to hear from the U.S. administration regarding his proposals (NFI). So far, he said, he had been disappointed. It boils down to this, he said: Bashar has killed Lebanese political figures, sent Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants to Lebanon, convinced Iran and Hizballah to kidnap Israeli soldiers, unleashed a bombing campaign in and around Beirut, destabilized Gaza, sent mujahideens to Iraq, and killed March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem four days after ISRAEL struck Syria . . . and the international community has done nothing. This was the message he gave to President Bush, he said, adding, "I won't give in, but at the end of the day it is up to you." If Washington does not act, he warned, it might as well "scrap Lebanon off the list." "Like Walid (Jumblatt) said on CNN," Hariri said, unless there are car bombs in Damascus or the Sixth Fleet on their shores, the Syrians won't be frightened. We need to know the "minimum and the maximum" the U.S. will do, he stressed; other possible actions including closing the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, more sanctions, and financial assistance. ¶7. (C) Hariri argued that Syria was building a case for possible action against Lebanon, using the PKK incursion into Turkey as an excuse to free its hands in the Biqa and accusing anti-Syrian Druse leader Jumblatt of conspiring with Israeli Defense Minister Barak to topple the Syrian regime. Syria can easily send 10 to 15,000 troops back into Lebanon, BEIRUT 00001661 002.2 OF 003 and its agents were infiltrating the country posing as foreign workers, he claimed. STRATEGIES FOR THE PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador, noting that Lebanon indeed remains high on U.S. priorities, stressed that Washington was trying to build regional cooperation. In particular, the U.S. was trying to convince the Europeans not to give in to calls for a weak consensus president and to accept a half plus one president if it comes to that. The Europeans liked to play good cop to the U.S. bad cop, he noted, citing Spanish FM Moratinos flirtations with Damascus. Perhaps, the Ambassador noted, Hariri should be pressuring the Europeans to take the sorts of steps the U.S. has already taken to isolate Syria. Hariri argued that the Europeans are finally ready to act, but they need the U.S. to lead. If the U.S. wants March 14 to be serious about a half plus one president, Hariri countered, it needed to show some teeth; otherwise the Syrians will "raise hell in the country without impunity, and we'll pay the price." ¶9. (C) Commenting that Italian FM Massimo D'Alema had been especially supportive during his October 19-20 visit to Lebanon compared with his French and Spanish counterparts, Hariri said he had discussed financial measures against Syria with the Europeans. Hariri further stated that he had asked whether they wanted to see 1701 implemented. A weak president, he reportedly told them, would leave Lebanon with all the same problems. Arguing that everyone should channel all their energy into a "caliber" president, Hariri said the Europeans were now convinced, including French FM Kouchner and D'Alema, but they were waiting to see what the U.S will do. Dismissing the Ambassador's repeated comment that the U.S. had done more than anyone else in trying to isolate Syria and help Lebanon, Hariri retorted, "You're the superpower." ¶10. (C) The Ambassador noted that pro-Syrian ad-Diyyar newspaper had listed seven compromise candidates in its October 22 headline: Michel Sleiman, Riad Salameh, Jean Obeid, Robert Ghanem, Pierre Daccash, Fares Boueiz and Michel Edde. Hariri, noting that the first two, as sitting government officials, would need a constitutional amendment to be eligible, said Sleiman's name had only been included because of Nabih Berri. He agreed that the opposition would be content to wait things out if no consensus was reached. We now have an opportunity to put as much pressure as we can to oust Lahoud, he said. If in the end we must compromise on a consensus president, the first thing Washington and other capitals should due is "sweep him off his feet." Then, after such a flattering reception, he'll no longer be a compromise candidate, he'll be one of us, Hariri concluded. He listed Michel Khoury, Joseph Torbey, Robert Ghanem, and banker Farid Raphael as possible consensus candidates. ¶11. (C) Hariri agreed that there was some uncertainty brewing within Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, and that Aoun was stepping back his efforts to rearm. Hariri had discussed with his March 14 ally Deputy Speaker Farid Mekkari a strategy to court FPM MPs, noting that while they were unlikely to jump ship in favor of an Obeid or Boueiz candidacy, they might be tempted to do so for Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, Charles Rizk or Michel Sleiman. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite the VIP treatment he received in Washington, a slimmer, post-Ramadan Hariri was no lighter in his message. Other March 14 contacts have delivered equally weighty warnings. At least on the surface, March 14, with Hariri apparently on board, appears determined to go ahead with a half plus one vote if necessary and is seeking a tougher U.S. stance to support this strategy. While we do not underestimate Hariri's concerns about Syria, we believe that strong international -- and not just U.S. -- support is necessary to avoid the perception that the U.S. is interfering in the election and to demonstrate to Damascus that the international community will be watching its actions. BEIRUT 00001661 003.2 OF 003 ¶13. (C) We have to wonder, however, how much of Hariri's alarmist rhetoric was performance. At one point, he said to us that the United States, by thundering from on high and exercising proper leadership, could create the conditions for Nassib Lahoud (widely acknowledged to be the superior candidate, meaning he is unacceptable to Syria and Hizballah) to become president. Instead of telling us that Nassib Lahoud was his candidate so that we could prepare accordingly, he reversed the responsibility: if Nassib Lahoud does not become president, so he seemed to reason, it is because the U.S. did not impose the right conditions on Syria. ¶14. (C) We suspect, therefore, that Hariri is subtly putting in place the argument for a fall-back compromise to explain to his more hard-line allies -- primarily Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea -- why he has no choice but to agree to a consensus candidate with Nabih Berri. Mind you, there was little hint in this MEETING that Hariri was considering a consensus fall-back. But by saying that U.S. actions or inaction would define whether a March 14 candidate could achieve the presidency, he may have been establishing the arguments for doing so later. End comment. FELTMAN