LEBANON: MINDEF MURR OUTLINES STRATEGIC VISION FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001660 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MINDEF MURR OUTLINES STRATEGIC VISION FOR ARMY WITH USDP EDELMAN BEIRUT 00001660 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an October 16 meeting with visiting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Edelman and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) Kimmitt, a confident MinDef Murr SIPDIS outlined his views on Nahr al-Barid, border security operations, and his strategic vision for transformation of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Noting that equipment alone is not what the LAF requires, Murr, in describing his strategic vision, emphasized the need for LAF training for a force that he envisioned as being relatively small in size and focused on countering terrorist threats. U/S Edelman proffered, and MinDef Murr accepted, an invitation to form a Bilateral Defense Committee to further deepen and develop the strategic relationship between the USG and Lebanon. AGREEMENT TO FORM BILATERAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE -------------- ¶2. (C) USDP Edelman, DASD Kimmitt, the Ambassador, Defense Attach, USDP Military Assistant King, and OSD Lebanon Desk Officer Dalton met with Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Elias Murr at Ambassador's residence over lunch. USDP Edelman began by conveying Secretary Gates' congratulations for the LAF's victory against Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian camp, an especially heroic undertaking given the urban warfare environment the LAF faced. As a result, the LAF's credibility has increased in the eyes of the U.S. military and U.S. government, Edelman said. ¶3. (S) U/S Edelman told MinDef Murr that the Department of Defense wants a strategic relationship with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Having first met with Murr in April of this year, U/S Edelman recounted how the U.S.-Lebanon military to military relationship has grown quickly and with great success. Whereas there were many skeptics in Washington in April, the LAF's performance in Nahr al-Barid has diminished some of the skepticism. MinDef Murr immediately accepted Edelman's proposal to form a Bilateral Defense Committee (BDC),although he acknowledged that he needs to contemplate who would represent Lebanon in any sub-ministerial talks. MinDef Murr said that a principle aim of the BDC should be to discuss strategy surrounding the Lebanese security situation and how to improve LAF capabilities. Concurring with U/S Edelman's view that the LAF's credibility problem is now answered, Murr stated his interest that there be an assessment of the LAF's performance in Nahr al-Barid. AFTER ACTION REVIEW IS A NECESSARY STEP -------------- ¶4. (S) U/S Edelman related LAF Commander Gen Michel Sleiman's defensive attitude to MinDef Murr about the recently canceled Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) team after action review (AAR) of combat actions in Nahr al-Barid. Edelman explained that the CALL team has a methodology for conducting AARs that shortens the learning cycle and should be used as a tool for the Commander. DASD Kimmitt expounded on this line and explained why this process was important to U.S. forces and how it is the bedrock of a learning organization. Murr responded that an assessment is important so that the USG can help the LAF, "know where we failed, where it cost too much, and where we did well." ¶5. (S) Edelman expressed concern that Gen Sleiman kept calling the AAR an "investigation." Murr responded by relating his own educational history, first in international law, and then as a banker. According to Murr, one of the most important aspects of his training was to learn how to conduct an audit, "so we don't need a policeman inside each company." Murr said that the LAF needs auditors who know how to do this and know how to help. Murr's demeanor turned somber as he recounted the deaths of 170 soldiers and thousands wounded. If another Nahr al-Barid happens again tomorrow, he wants to know if the Lebanese can do this with less loss of life. Exclaiming the criticality of AAR, Murr said "the BEIRUT 00001660 002.2 OF 003 timing for this assessment is critical. I understand that the Maronites are thinking about their targets (an oblique reference to presidential ambitions); thus, this assessment must be covered politically. This is our first and only chance." All parties agreed that the AAR could be accomplished at some time in the future with some modifications to the program to maximize the benefit for the Army Commander. SECURE BORDERS REMAIN A PRIORITY -------------- ¶6. (S) Transitioning to the topic of border security, MinDef Murr made a pitch for a complete technical solution for the border. Stating his desire to minimize the "human aspects of border control," Murr said that a broad set of technical devices that were backed up by the Army would be an optimal solution. Murr's strategy is focused on collecting massive amounts of technical data on border violations so that no one can deny the cross-border activity. Above all, according to Murr, a strong technical border would stop Iran and Syria. Even if this technical system might cost several million dollars, Murr estimated that this cost would be recovered with one interdiction as, "the price of one batch of rockets being stopped will pay for the entire system." ¶7. (S) U/S Edelman said that he shared MinDef Murr's appreciation of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets conducting these types of missions; however, the USG demand for these systems in Iraq and Afghanistan would likely limit our ability to provide such systems. U/S Edelman suggested that the French UAVs in the UNIFIL sector might be an option, or maybe the purchase of the highly visible Aerostat system for surveillance along the border. While all of these technical systems are important, U/S Edelman stressed the need for a mechanism to integrate all of this border data along with data from the ports of entry (POE) into Lebanon. One such mechanism might be an intelligence fusion cell. Murr, recalling his days as Minister of Interior roundly agreed with the need to control POEs and related that no Al Qaeda members had entered the country once visas had become mandatory for all persons entering Lebanon. Although the requirement was dropped for Arab visitors during the period of Rafiq Hariri, Murr said he was trying to get previous visa requirements re-established in Lebanon. FIVE YEAR STRATEGIC VIEW FOR THE ARMY -------------- ¶8. (S) U/S Edelman asked MinDef Murr about his five-year strategic vision for the LAF. Murr responded succinctly saying, "we do not need a traditional army." The primary missions of the army should be 1) internal security to stabilize the country and 2) ten Ranger Regiments to conduct Counter-Terrorism operations. Leaning forward to dramatize his point, Murr said, "an army with tanks and jets is not required." Rather, the Army needs fifty thousand troops to go against terrorists in the country. As if to firmly drive the point home about his priorities, MinDef Murr said that, "one thousand tanks, 500 helicopters and 100 airplanes are a waste of resources." Instead, 10,000 Rangers that were trained in CT and backed up by 20-30 helicopters with close air support capability would ensure that the LAF could handle another Nahr al-Barid. The other 30-40,000 soldiers would be able to handle all of the other internal security tasks assigned to the Army. In this way, Murr opined, the LAF will never interfere with politics because they will only be able to conduct counter-terrorism. (Comment. Taking this analysis to the next level, it would also mean that under Murr's plan, the LAF would not be capable of a coup). ¶9. (S) U/S Edelman asked if this security strategy was written down and Murr responded in the negative. U/S Edelman suggested that Lebanon should possibly consider developing a National Security Strategy and a National Defense Strategy that supports these ideas. (Note: our Defense Attach contacts tell us that the British and the French Embassies are pursuing the idea of assisting Lebanon with the development of a National Security Strategy). Murr, clearly indicating that he thinks he will be MinDef after the BEIRUT 00001660 003.2 OF 003 Presidential elections, said that he was planning on working with "new" people two months from now to develop procedures for developing such a strategy. Reaffirming his commitment to the Bilateral Defense Committee, U/S Edelman said that the BDC could help with the development of a National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and a Defense Review Procedure for Lebanon. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (S) Murr's immediate and warm embrace of the idea of a Bilateral Defense Committee proposed by U/S Edelman was good news. Whereas the LAF command tends to be cautious and hesitant in public dealings with us, Murr has proven time and again to be willing to provide needed political cover. So Murr's patronage will help make certain that the LAF gets the benefits from this committee while being insulated from any potential political fall-out. That said, given that Murr is a one-man-shop in terms of the Ministry of Defense (vice the LAF),it is not clear who on the Lebanese side will be the civilian chair, as the committee will surely be sub-ministerial. ¶11. (S) As those who follow the Lebanese press are no doubt already aware, the proposal for the BDC has been cited in what is a particularly ugly media campaign that erupted after U/S Edelman's visit. According to the conspiracies spread in the pro-Syrian media, the U.S. is offering vastly increased assistance to the LAF in return for permission to establish military bases in Lebanon for forward operations against Syria. As silly as these theories are (and we were quick to work with the GOL and LAF in refuting them),they indicate a success of sorts: that USG assistance to the LAF is starting to be taken seriously by those like Hizballah and Syria who have no interest in a strong Lebanese army. Given the popularity of the LAF, direct media attacks on the army are not possible. But media attacks on alleged U.S. motivations can make it more difficult for the LAF to welcome our partnership. In this context, Murr's willingness to provide political cover to our deepening relationship with the LAF becomes even more important. ¶11. (U) USDP Edelman has cleared this cable. FELTMAN