LEBANON: OPPOSING THE "STATUS QUO" DELAY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001652 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: OPPOSING THE "STATUS QUO" DELAY OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REF: BEIRUT 1650 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Reftel discusses possible scenarios for Lebanon's upcoming presidential elections. But increasing evidence suggests that -- if the pro-Syrians can't impose their own candidate through pressure for "consensus" -- the "second government" option is no longer the pro-Syrians' weapon of choice. In part, the U.S. visa ban and Executive Order deter participation in a second cabinet. Instead, March 8-Aoun forces seem to prefer extending the current status quo beyond the expiration of Emile Lahoud's term. By retaining both Lahoud and the Siniora cabinet indefinitely, the March 8-Aoun bloc may calculate that, at some point, March 14 will decline from majority to minority through attrition and murder. It will be easier to win a pro-Syrian president and a pro-Syrian PM once the March 8-Aoun bloc controls parliament. With the exception of the Special Tribunal, time does not seem to be on March 14's side. ¶2. (C) For March 14 leaders to prevent the drift and public discontent of an extended status quo that works against them, they need presidential elections before November 24. But most of the scenarios appear unpalatable. Agreeing to the March 8-Aoun demand for a two-thirds quorum means, in effect, giving Hizballah and its allies a veto. Going for "half-plus-one" -- a scenario that many March 14 MPs dislike -- risks destabilizing Lebanon, if pro-Syrians implement threats to seize the streets in protest. Moreover, Europeans (fearful of UNIFIL's safety) and Arabs (worried about Sunni-Shia clashes) advise March 14 against absolute majority voting, and would hold March 14 accountable for resulting problems. ¶3. (C) Thus, we are intrigued by an idea first raised to us by Elias Murr, dubbed "half-plus-plus": that March 14 leaders find a candidate who, while perhaps unable (at least at first) to garner the two-thirds' vote demanded by March 8-Aoun, can win more than March 14 votes alone. If someone can attract additional deputies from Aoun's bloc, then charges of a March 14 coup d'etat have less resonance. Europeans and Arabs would feel that March 14 is acting responsibly. And, as Nabih Berri himself suggested, once a candidate starts gaining support beyond March 14, then momentum could take off, making more MPs wish to join the solution. Perhaps even the two-thirds vote becomes possible, but under a scenario initiated and led by March 14. Credible candidates like Charles Rizk may be able to win under such an approach. End summary and comment. DELAY AND EXTEND STATUS QUO SEEMS TO BE PRO-SYRIAN PLAN TODAY -------------- ¶4. (C) In reftel, we provided analysis and discussion of possible scenarios regarding Lebanon's presidential elections, which should take place before midnight on 11/23 (when Emile Lahoud's extended term expires). As the pro-Syrians attempt to find the right formula for preventing March 14 MPs from electing a president, they float various ideas. The preferred option, we believe, remains using the pressure of consensus to impose a candidate actually of Syria's choosing. (The pro-Syrian newspaper ad-Diyyar on 10/21 helpfully clued us in via screaming front-page headlines of six acceptable "consensus" choices -- Michel Sleiman, Riad Salameh, Jean Obeid, Fares Bouez, Michel Edde, and Pierre Daccache.) ¶5. (C) Recognizing that March 14 may not go along with the consensus approach no matter how much pressure is applied, the pro-Syrians have fall-back strategies. But one scenario that seemed the most likely a few months ago -- a second cabinet, illegally appointed by Lahoud -- now appears to have fallen in favor, in part because the U.S. visa ban and Executive Order had the desired impact of dampening enthusiasm for participation. ¶6. (C) Today, if their idea of consensus choices are not accepted, we believe that the pro-Syrians hope to extend the BEIRUT 00001652 002 OF 004 status quo by finding a way to keep Lahoud in Baabda and permit PM Fouad Siniora to remain in the Grand Serail indefinitely. If our hunches are correct, the pro-Syrians calculate that, at some point weeks, months, or even years from now, the March 14 majority will have become the March 14 minority, through intimidation, attrition, assassinations, and defections. At the point the March 14 movement becomes the opposition, then the pro-Syrians will proceed to presidential elections, firmly in control. Moreover, with the constitutional resignation of the cabinet occurring on the first day of the new president's term, the pro-Syrians will also be in the driver's seat in determining the next prime minister, cabinet composition, and cabinet program. TO REJECT STATUS QUO INITIATIVE, MAKE ELECTIONS APPEAR INEVITABLE -------------- ¶7. (C) With the possible exception of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, time does not seem to be on March 14's side: consider the drop in its majority from 72 two years ago to 68 today, with half a dozen or so of those wavering in their commitment to a movement that puts them at risk of death. Thus, as a first step, we believe strongly that we need to engage all of our international partners into making it appear that presidential elections before 11/24 are inevitable. ¶8. (C) Keying off Maronite Patriarch Sfeir's uncharacteristically clear statement that "boycotting presidential elections is boycotting Lebanon," we recommend encouraging strong public and private messages from Arab, European, and Vatican officials that it is not acceptable to delay presidential elections. In the same vein, we should encourage our partners to reject the use of quorum arguments in order to create a vacuum (as the excuse for the extension of the status quo); it should be made clear to all that those who do not go to parliament are considered by the international community -- not just the U.S. -- responsible for having a president elected with less than two-thirds of the MPs present. Once the Lebanese and their Syrian and Iranian backers recognize that presidential elections are going to happen one way or another, they will then start dealing seriously with the issue of candidates. ABSOLUTE MAJORITY ELECTIONS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE -------------- ¶9. (C) It is already clear that March 14 does not have the 85 votes (two-thirds of the parliament) needed to elect its own candidate on the first vote. If March 14 pulled off an absolute majority election in the second round, we would recognize the winner. But we wonder if 64 of March 14's MPs would really defy the security threats and the chorus of appeals against this option (from Patriarch Sfeir, the Europeans, other Arabs, etc.). Moreover, multiple opinion polls demonstrate that the Lebanese public yearns for consensus: if the March 8-Aoun forces would react to an absolute majority election by taking to the streets or declaring a second cabinet, March 14 will receive a large share of the blame for "bullying" tactics. March 14 seems to be stuck between attempting a provocative "absolute majority" election that might not succeed and conceding to the two-thirds quorum demands that gives the pro-Syrians an effective veto over the candidate. MEETING ARABS, EUROPEANS, PATRIARCH HALFWAY -- BY "HALF PLUS PLUS" -------------- ¶10. (C) Given these unpalatable options, we are increasingly intrigued by an idea first raised to us by Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, which he dubbed "half plus plus." Under this scenario, March 14 leaders would back a candidate who, first of all, had the confidence of March 14 but may not be from March 14. Then, the candidate and March 14 would work to peel off MPs from other blocs, likely starting with Michel Aoun's allies. If any particular candidate could get, say, backing from 75 MPs, he would be beyond the halfway point between an absolute (64 MPs) and a two-thirds (85) majority in what is now (with Antoine Ghanem's murder) a 127-member house. That candidate would no BEIRUT 00001652 003 OF 004 longer appear to be exclusively a March 14 president, making it less likely that March 8-Aoun forces could claim a March 14 coup d'etat. ¶11. (C) Based on our local contacts, we believe that a "half plus plus" option would relieve the Europeans, the Arabs, and Vatican officials, who believe that we are pushing March 14 into needless confrontation. If the "half plus plus" candidate were able to attract the support of all the pro-government Christians and a good number of opposition Christians, such as some Aounists, it would be difficult for the Patriarch or anyone else to dismiss that person. Moreover, the Patriarch would surely support March 14's efforts in this scenario to reach a broader consensus rather than risk further undermining the Christians' role or even civil war. ¶12. (C) There is an additional advantage to "half plus plus" -- momentum behind such a candidate might lead to increasing levels of support. Opportunistic MPs (Michel Murr comes to mind) will not want to be left outside a solution. Once it is seen as inevitable that elections are happening and that a candidate has support beyond March 14, others will join. Given that Nabih Berri told us that he would work to acquire two-thirds of the MPs if a candidate emerged with 70-some votes, we wonder if some Shia deputies might show up for the electoral session, conferring more legitimacy on the process. Berri, for example, might tell his Syrian friends that he has no choice but to chair the session, in order to keep the new president from turning against Shia interests. ¶13. (C) It is possible, in fact, that two-thirds of the MPs could eventually come on board, but in a process initiated and led by the March 14 movement, not the March 8-Aoun insistence on a two-thirds quorum. As to who might emerge successful under such a strategy, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk -- who has the support of March 14, despite not being part of it -- comes to mind. March 14 candidate Boutros Harb undoubtedly believes that he can prevail, too, through his friendship with Aoun ally Ily Skaff, to have more than simply March 14 votes. What is important is not so much the name of the candidate but the fact that he (or she) attracts all of March 14's votes and then adds to them. The March 14 support ensures that our basic interests are addressed. ELEMENTS OF A U.S. STRATEGY -------------- ¶14. (C) Based on our current analysis, we recommend the following course of action: -- Persuade the Europeans, Arabs, Vatican, and others to back away from the language and pressure of compromise, which implies a Hizballah-Amal veto via the two-thirds quorum, and to accept a "half plus plus" candidate. The candidates themselves would have an incentive to try to acquire the additional votes beyond the March 14 bloc. In advocating this approach, we note to the Europeans that we have met them halfway, in agreeing to help secure a candidate who can win more than simply the March 14 bloc. However, such discussions must be kept confidential for two reasons: 1) to avoid giving the appearance that there is disagreement between us and the Europeans, and 2) to avoid weakening March 14's stance going into the negotiation (i.e., the right to elect a president by absolute majority) by letting it be known publicly that we are advocating a type of consensus. -- Continue to build support among our partners to back any president who is elected by the parliamentary majority. Specifically, we should reinforce the idea that, if no "half plus plus" candidate emerges, we still accept as legitimate the fall back option of a president elected by absolute majority. We recommend working with our partners on ways to strengthen and protect any president elected. -- Work with all of our regional and international partners in underscoring the inevitability of elections. Make it appear to be certain that elections will happen within the constitutional time frame (i.e., before midnight on 11/23). At the same time, encourage our partners to pass word about the inadmissibility of MPs declining to participate, when such inaction can contributes to vacuum and crisis. BEIRUT 00001652 004 OF 004 -- Reinforce with our partners that the international community is not picking candidates. The idea is for the Lebanese themselves to choose the next president. (The strong impression left on some Lebanese leaders by the three EU foreign ministers who visited 10/19-20 is that the EU backs Michel Sleiman.) -- Work with our partners to find collective, punitive means to prevent, or if needed respond to, the formation of a second cabinet or a prolongation of Emile Lahoud's time in Baabda Palace. Privately, we can let our contacts know that any persons supporting a second government will be subject to our new Executive Order 12958 and the Presidential Proclamation regarding travel to the United States. -- Engage the UN Security Council to adopt strong presidential statements on the upcoming reports of UNSCRs 1559 and 1701. In particular, the statements should be clear that presidential elections should be held but that in no way leads to the conclusion that all the requirements of 1559 have been met, or that it can be replaced by 1701. -- Encourage March 14 to maintain a unified front on need to hold elections and the right to elect a president with half plus one, to prevent the opposition from taking advantage of perceived divisions to undermine March 14's efforts. In addition, engage Saudi Arabia to keep Saad Hariri on board. -- Encourage March 14 to maintain a positive public image and avoid looking obstructionist. Discourage March 14 from using "bullying" or threatening language that the opposition could use to portray it the side that is threatening Lebanon's stability. The goal should be to expose March 8 as the problem and dissuade March 14 from taking actions that make it appear to be the obstructionist party. FELTMAN