LEBANON: SCENARIOS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001650 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENARIOS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BEIRUT 00001650 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) With one month remaining before the end of President Lahoud's mandate on November 23, the opposing parties are no closer to reaching consensus on his successor or on the correct procedure for choosing one. Speaker Berri has again postponed the parliamentary voting session, this time until November 12, allegedly to allow more time to reach a consensus. We see several possible scenarios for the election, described below, none of which is ideal for U.S. interests. The opposition's strategy now seems to be one of delay, hoping that by postponing the election as long as possible beyond November 23, it can gain time to ensure that a candidate of its liking wins the post. End summary. SCENARIO 1: STATUS QUO--PRESIDENT LAHOUD AND PM SINIORA REMAIN IN OFFICE -------------- ¶2. (C) Having been unable to agree on a candidate, and in order to avoid a vacuum, both sides agree (or Lahoud seeks to decide unilaterally) to keep President Lahoud in Baabda Palace and PM Siniora at the Grand Serail. ADVANTAGE: the security and economic situations do not worsen appreciably. DISADVANTAGES: Berri, still refusing to recognize the Siniora government, would be unlikely to convene parliament with the current cabinet ministers (who attend parliament sessions when issues in the cabinet domain are discussed), perpetuating the GOL's inability to pass laws (including the 2008 budget law, which contains funding provisions for the Special Tribunal, and a new electoral law). The underlying confessional and power-sharing issues provoking the year-long political impasse remain unresolved, and the six opposition ministers continue to boycott the Siniora cabinet. Avoiding the election also would prolong the inevitable confrontation, allowing pro-Syrian forces to chip away at the March 14 majority through pressure, bribes, assassinations, and the election of a friendlier MP to replace assassinated March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem. SCENARIO 2: INTERIM PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶3. (C) The two sides agree on a president for some interim period, from as little as a few months to as long as the �0A;16-17 months until the next parliamentary elections. Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman is a likely candidate in this scenario; as the hero of the LAF's three-month battle against Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp, he is seen by the Patriarch and others as someone who can "save the country." An interim presidency would appeal to the many presidential candidates who would feel their chances for election are preserved, but in particular to Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, whose current chances of fulfilling his burning ambition to be president are seen as nil by all but him. ADVANTAGE: an interim president would avoid chaos or a vacuum and resolve the immediate crisis. DISADVANTAGE: as with the status quo scenario, an interim presidency would allow the opposition to consolidate its support in hopes of faring better in the spring 2009 parliamentary elections. It would also be cited by Christian leaders as another example of the marginalization of the Christian role, as a two-year president would be considered weaker than a six-year president. In addition, the two-year president may focus entirely on how to keep his job for a follow-on full term. SCENARIO 3: MARCH 14 AND MARCH 8 AGREE ON CONSENSUS CANDIDATE -------------- ¶4. (C) "Consensus" is the opposition's euphemism for a March 8 veto over the choice of president. Berri and others have cleverly advanced the concept of a consensus candidate in their assertion that Lebanon's parliament must elect a president with a two-thirds quorum to ensure broad-based support. A consensus scenario would eliminate the chance of the March 14 majority electing its preferred candidate, either Nassib Lahoud or Boutros Harb. ADVANTAGE: a BEIRUT 00001650 002.2 OF 004 consensus candidate would avoid chaos and resolve the immediate crisis. DISADVANTAGE: any candidate who would enjoy consensus support from all quarters is likely to be as malleable by the pro-Syrians as Emile Lahoud. Choosing such a candidate threatens progress on our interests such as enhanced border control, disarming Hizballah, implementing UNSCRs 1559 and 1701, and potentially even the Lebanese financial support for, and cooperation with, the Special Tribunal. Most likely, a consensus candidate would simply postpone the crisis, with the same political divisions as exist now plaguing the selection of a prime minister, the cabinet formation, and development of a cabinet program. SCENARIO 4: CHRISTIANS UNITE, PATRIARCH BLESSES CANDIDATE -------------- ¶5. (C) Should Lebanon's Christian leaders (Aoun, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Phalange party leader Amine Gemayel, Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh) be able to overcome their long-standing differences and present a common Maronite candidate to Patriarch Sfeir, it would be nearly impossible for any party to oppose their choice. ADVANTAGES: the role of Lebanon's Christians in the government is strengthened, and chaos is avoided. DISADVANTAGES: this scenario requires our suspending our skepticism that the Christian leaders could agree on a single candidate (who is not Aoun),but if they did, the agreed-upon candidates probably will not be strong presidents, including the likes of Demianos Kattar and Simon Karam. SCENARIO 5: MARCH 14 GOES AHEAD WITH HALF PLUS ONE VOTE -------------- ¶6. (C) If Berri prevents the election of a president by refusing to convene parliament for lack of prior agreement on a consensus candidate, or by declaring the session void because two-thirds of the MPs do not attend, March 14 could move to elect a president with its majority of 68 MPs. In theory, March 14 could do this as early as November 12, when parliament is next scheduled to convene to vote on a president. More likely, it would wait until the last ten days of President Lahoud's term, November 14-23, when, according to the constitution, parliamentarians must convene for the sole purpose of electing a president. (Berri would likely argue that he took the necessary step to nullify that provision by convening parliament). ADVANTAGE: this scenario is the most likely to produce a president supportive of USG interests. DISADVANTAGES: the opposition has threatened a presidential vacuum, a second government, chaos, or even civil war if March 14 forces its candidate upon the opposition without two-thirds support. Hizballah and others in the opposition likely would take to the streets and might seek to take over government installations located in areas they control, on the argument that March 14 had "unconstitutionally" elected a president. While our international partners would surely condemn such actions, they might not join us in supporting the half plus one president. The Lebanese public might blame March 14 for any negative results of what would be seen as a very provocative step. ¶7. (C) It also is doubtful whether March 14 could count on 68 votes or even the 65 needed for half plus one. Too many March 14 MPs have expressed sympathy for the two-thirds majority argument, including Boutros Harb, Mohammed Safadi, who leads the five-MP Tripoli bloc, Ghassan Tueni and Bahije Tabarah. Furthermore, the formation of a new cabinet probably will take at least a month following the inauguration of the new president, who will not have time to make badly needed leadership changes in the still heavily Syrian-infiltrated Lebanese Armed Forces to bring the army on its side. Should the opposition make good on its threats to form a second government, it is not clear whether the LAF would act in support of only the legitimate government, stay neutral, retreating to their barracks (most likely) or split. It is not known whether Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh would support the second government by disbursing funds. Several key government ministries lie in Hizballah-controlled areas of Beirut, putting them at immediate risk. In short, March 14 could win the battle but lose the war. BEIRUT 00001650 003.2 OF 004 SCENARIO 6: "HALF PLUS PLUS" CANDIDATE -------------- ¶8. (C) In contrast to half plus one, "half plus plus" refers to a candidate who can muster more than the 64 votes needed for an absolute majority of the 127 living MPs but not the 85 needed for a two-thirds majority. DPM Elias Murr first brought this idea to our attention. To be chosen, a candidate would have to attract votes from the Aoun bloc or Berri's Amal party, but not from Hizballah. Attracting enough of such votes would offset any losses of wavering March 14 MPs like Safadi. Under this scenario, the candidate chosen would not be as attractive to us as, say Nassib Lahoud, but could be someone acceptable to us such as Charles Rizk, a champion of the Tribunal, who is not seen as strongly March 14. Revealed at the right moment, i.e., when consensus seems impossible, March 14 would be seen as reasonably trying to meet March 8 halfway (i.e., proposing a candidate who could secure at least 75 votes) leaving March 8 on the defensive should it refuse. ¶9. (C) ADVANTAGE: This is a way of avoiding a weak "consensus" president beholden to the opposition without the almost certain backlash that electing a half plus one candidate would provoke. March 14 can argue that it met Berri halfway between a half plus one and a two-thirds majority, putting him on the defensive should he not help build momentum for the consensus he claims to be seeking. DISADVANTAGES: March 14 would probably have to drop its own candidates, Boutros Harb and Nassib Lahoud (although Harb believes he might succeed under this strategy). March 14 would have to work to identify and persuade some opposition MPs to support a half plus plus candidate. This strategy would have to be timed carefully so that potential candidates are not "burned", and it is not clear how the opposition would react if a "half plus plus" candidate" is elected. OTHER SCENARIOS -------------- ¶10. (C) There are other potential scenarios and while we rule nothing out, it seems less likely that any of the following will occur: -- Lahoud (employing a constitutional fig leaf of one sort or another) dissolves parliament and appoints a caretaker or military government. -- The Siniora cabinet takes on presidential powers in the absence of a new president. The Constitution is clear in Article 62 that this is what should happen, but it brings too many obvious downsides. The opposition's dislike for Siniora is strong and they are unlikely to peacefully accept his having powers of both the PM and President. Opposition Christians (Aoun) would have a field day with the charge that the Sunni PM is usurping the prerogatives of the Christian presidency, and some pro-government Christians likely would be uncomfortble about it too. -- Parliament decides to amend the constitution to make way for a Sleiman or Salameh presidency. This is a complicated process that requires a two-thirds vote of MPS, difficult to obtain since it requires support from MPs from both camps. It also requires at least two-thirds of the cabinet to approve. PM Siniora adamantly opposes this. We believe, however, that if March 8 believed it could overcome the constitutional obstacle to elect LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, it would do so. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The opposition's strategy seems clear: delay, delay, delay. Pushing off the decision on a president has the advantage of providing March 8 with more time to weaken the March 14 majority and increasing the chance of electing a more pro-Syrian candidate, a better bet than compromising now. Many observers, including some of our March 14 contacts, believe the March 14 will lose its majority in the spring 2009 parliamentary elections, paving the way for an opposition PM and change of majority we suspect is Hizballah's ultimate goal. The longer the GOL remains blocked, the more difficult it will be to confront BEIRUT 00001650 004.2 OF 004 Hizballah's arms and implement UNSCRs 1559 and 1701, as well as to enact legislation to move the Special Tribunal forward. Finally, delay means a new administration in Washington that, in the eyes of the opposition, could lead to a less anti-Syrian stance. ¶12. (C) Legally, the governing majority should face no difficulty in electing the candidate of its choice. However, this is Lebanon, a country deeply divided along confessional and political lines. While we would prefer a half plus one president, this scenario almost certainly would only aggravate an already tense situation. The "half plus plus" scenario is, in our view, the only way to avoid the election of a president who would be a Syrian pawn like Emile Lahoud, while at the same time creating enough support to turn back the opposition's accusation that March 14 is acting unconstitutionally. But the timing is tricky, and the results of this strategy are not guaranteed. For now, however, it strikes us as the most reasonable solution to lessen tension in Lebanon and obtain an outcome favorable to USG interests. FELTMAN