LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN POSTURES AS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001641 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PARM LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN POSTURES AS LEBANESE NATIONALIST REF: BEIRUT 1626 BEIRUT 00001641 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Over an extended one-on-one dinner with the Ambassador on 10/18, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman (whose dinner invitation, we believe, stemmed from recognition of the abysmal impression he made on Under Secretary of Defense Edelman two days earlier, reftel) SIPDIS expressed frustration at being suspected as a Syrian agent. He claimed that his primary motivation was preserving the LAF's unity, and he expressed gratitude for USG support for the army. Sleiman spoke with bitterness of petty humiliations inflicted by President Emile Lahoud, whose orders he claimed to have defied when Lahoud operated against Lebanese national interest. While Sleiman claimed not to be driven by presidential ambition, his frequent praise of Saad Hariri (presumed to be the next prime minister) suggested that he was subtly reassuring us about how he would behave as head of state. Sleiman expressed worry about Syrian designs on Lebanon, and he hoped that March 14 would not fall into the Syrian trap by electing a "half-plus-one" president. While understanding the Ambassador's point about the army needing to protect the legitimate national institutions and adamant that the LAF would never protect a constitutionally illegal government, Sleiman thought that, in a confrontational situation, the LAF would likely be forced to remain neutral, on the sidelines. Sleiman also fretted about the neglected Akkar region in north Lebanon, hoping that the LAF and Saad Hariri develop an informal partnership to keep Akkar from falling under Sunni extremist or Syrian interference. End summary. MEDIA ALLEGATIONS ABOUT U.S. MILITARY BASES: LAF, NOT USG, IS THE REAL TARGET -------------- ¶2. (S) Late on 10/17, LAF Commander Sleiman invited the Ambassador to a one-on-one dinner the following night at the Yarze Officers Club. We believe that the 10/18 dinner, which lasted three and a half hours, stemmed from Sleiman's recognition that he had to do something to make up for his poor performance in his 10/16 meeting with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Edelman (reftel). Despite the uproar in the pro-Syrian media alleging that Edelman's visit was putting the finishing touches on U.S. plans to establish military bases in Lebanon from which we would attack Syria, over dinner Sleiman confidently exuded praise for U.S. assistance to Lebanon and U/S Edelman's offer to establish a bilateral defense committee. Sleiman and the Ambassador compared notes on how to counter the media campaign against the U.S. military assistance, which Sleiman agreed was designed to make it as politically difficult as possible for the LAF to receive U.S. help. The attack against the U.S. assistance was actually an attack against the LAF, Sleiman noted, while reiterating his commitment to the U.S.-Lebanese partnership. PRESERVING LAF UNITY MEANS AVOIDANCE OF PROVOKING SYRIA -------------- ¶3. (S) Asked who was behind the media campaign, Sleiman responded "Syria." Syria has never wanted a strong Lebanese army. While Syria cannot publicly attack the army, it can undermine the LAF in various ways, including by inventing lies about U.S. assistance. The Ambassador asked Sleiman about references he made during the Nahr al-Barid fight to Syrian assistance to the LAF. Syria, Sleiman said, has offered help and training from time to time. But because Syria is so much more powerful than Lebanon, it is important that Lebanon do nothing that might provoke Syria's wrath. Going on at some length, Sleiman expressed frustration that his attempts to protect the LAF from Syrian interference have led many to call him a Syrian agent. Yes, he said, he cultivates good relations with Syrian officers and Syrian leaders. But what is his choice? The LAF could not long survive being seen as an enemy force hostile to Syria. With the LAF itself as divided as Lebanese society, "you must BEIRUT 00001641 002.2 OF 004 understand" how hard it is to promote LAF unity, Sleiman said, claiming that such unity is his primary motivation and objective. Lebanon itself and the LAF in particular had to take the extra steps to avoid confrontation with Syria. ¶4. (S) Sleiman then raised Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's just-concluded trip to Turkey. What Bashar said in Turkey is worrying, Sleiman noted. The way Bashar described Turkey's fight against the PKK sounded like a "rehearsal" of how Bashar would describe Syria's fight against Lebanon. Sleiman said that it was very important that March 14 leaders avoid any Syrian traps that would be used as pretexts for Syria's direct interference in Lebanon. The March 14 threat of having a March 14 president elected by an absolute majority would be a catastrophe, Sleiman noted, as Syria simply will not tolerate a March 14 president and a March 14 PM and a March 14-dominated cabinet. Syria is already building a case that March 14 is a hostile force, and March 14 should work to find a candidate who can win broader support, to frustrate Syria's plans to use the street to undermine the presidential results. SUPPOSEDLY NOT SEEKING PRESIDENCY, BUT CULTIVATING GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAAD -------------- ¶5. (S) The Ambassador asked Sleiman about his own presidential ambitions. Sleiman repeated his usual formula about caring primarily for the LAF ("I love the army," was a frequent refrain of the dinner) but hoping as well to represent the Maronites in a political role later. He described his qualifications as honesty, experience, and "love of Lebanon." He claimed not to be clamoring for the top job. He expressed what sounded to be genuine respect for Walid Jumblatt for telling him frankly that he did not support amending the constitution to permit a Sleiman presidency. As for relations with PM Siniora (which we know are not good),Sleiman said that he sympathized with the difficult political and security circumstances under which Siniora had to labor. Throughout the conversation, Sleiman talked with enthusiasm about his relationship with Minister of Defense Elias Murr and, especially, the personal rapport that he feels has developed between himself and MP Saad Hariri. At several points, Sleiman brought the conversation back around to how impressed he is with Saad Hariri. One reason why Lebanon's Sunnis have suddenly "discovered" the LAF, Sleiman claimed, was because of Saad's strong support. EMILE LAHOUD: NOW, THERE'S A SYRIAN AGENT -------------- ¶6. (S) In contrast to his warm relations with Saad, Sleiman expressed resentment and frustration regarding his relationship with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. As a former commander himself, Lahoud often goes behind Sleiman's back, contacting LAF officers directly in ways that undermined Sleiman's authority. Lahoud relied on Lebanese security officers allied with Syria, including three of the four generals now in jail for suspected involvement in the Hariri assassination, to spy on Sleiman and bypass him. Sleiman drew a strong distinction between his own relations with Syria, which he described as correct and designed to protect Lebanon and the army, and Lahoud's obsequious submission to Damascus' will. Sleiman said Lahoud humiliated himself in an attempt to cater to Syria's wishes, while Sleiman kept Lebanon's interest first and foremost in his mind. ¶7. (S) There were many times over the past three years in particular, Sleiman said, when he defied direct orders from Lahoud that he believed contradicted Lebanon's national interest. As the post-Taif constitution notes (in Article 49) that the LAF falls under the authority of the Council of Ministers, Sleiman argued that he was justified in ignoring Lahoud's orders, which he said included preventing and breaking up the spring 2005 "Cedar Revolution" demonstrations. Lahoud also berated Sleiman for the simple courtesy of paying a condolence call on the Hariri family after Rafiq Hariri's murder, and Lahoud tried to get Sleiman to refuse to deploy the LAF to protect the mourners at Hariri's funeral. Lebanon will be much better off when Lahoud leaves office, Sleiman said. BEIRUT 00001641 003.2 OF 004 LAF TO PROTECT LEGITIMATE GOL INSTITUTIONS, BUT LAF MAY NOT BE ABLE TO INTERVENE IN STREET -------------- ¶8. (S) But will Lahoud leave office, the Ambassador asked. Noting that signs point increasingly to a situation where the status quo is extended well beyond the constitutional expiration of Lahoud's term, the Ambassador asked Sleiman for his view on what is going to happen regarding presidential elections. Sleman calculated that the most likely scenario is that Lahoud will find an excuse to stay in Baabda Palace unconstitutionally. Taking some credit for the apparent drop of support for a second cabinet scenario, Sleiman said that the LAF would "never" support a second, unconstitutional cabinet. The Ambassador emphasized how important it was for the LAF to support and protect the legitimate, constitutional organs of the state. The U.S. partnership depended on the LAF staying on the side of legitimacy, the Ambassador emphasized. ¶9. (S) Sleiman agreed that the LAF could not and would not side with usurpers of constitutional power, although he deemed unlikely the Ambassador's suggestion that the presidential guards could be withdrawn from Baabda Palace at the conclusion of Lahoud's term, thus exposing Emile Lahoud to potential expulsion from Baabda. Sleiman said that the trouble would be if street violence breaks out between Lebanon's feuding political factions, Then the LAF may have little choice but to stay on the sidelines, rather than risk having the LAF splinter. So, while the LAF would continue to protect GOL institutions like the Grand Serail, ministries, and Central Bank, the LAF might not be able to keeppeace in the streets. WORRIES ABOUT AKKAR -------------- ¶10. (S) Moving back to his praise of Saad Hariri, Sleiman said that he is worried about the impoverished, neglected, Sunni-dominated Akkar region of north Lebanon. He said that there needs to be partnership between Saad, the Sunnis of Akkar, and the LAF, to give the Akkar residents a sense of hope. Saad can provide funding for charitable works, and the LAF can provide jobs and a sense of purpose. Akkar risks falling under the sway of Sunni fundamentalists who wil be manipulated by Damascus and perhaps even provide a pretext for direct Syrian intervention in Lebanon. If Akkar falls to Syria, then so does Lebanon, Sleiman warned. The Ambassador noted that the USG is stepping up its own activities in Akkar, and Sleiman urged that we help focus Saad in this direction. One problem, the Ambassador noted, is that because of the amount of Sunni fundamentalism, Hariri financing could end up backfiring politically, if Syria would accuse Saad of providing money to extremists. Sleiman concurred but thought the risks of doing nothing greater than the risks of some dollars going astray. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (S) If Sleiman was putting on an act, he mostly pulled it off. He came across more convincingly as a Lebanese patriot than we have ever seen him in the formal, stiff meetings in his office. The improved impression he made surely stemmed in part from the extended conversation and relaxed setting, with Sleiman lubicated by Scotch and feeling comfortable in mixin up French, English, and Arabic often in the sam sentence (and with the Ambassador relieved to rspond in kind). If his purpose was to convince us that he is not simply a Syrian agent, he largely succeeded; his motivation is no doubt related to his understanding of Syrian wishes, but there are clearly other factors at play in his calculations as well. ¶12. (S) But if he hoped to persuade us that he is also appropriate presidential material (as his frequent warm references to PM-in-waiting Saad Hariri suggest),we remain skeptical. Perhaps in self-conscious recognition that he does not come from one of Lebanon's political or business dynasties, he seems too concerned with slights and too susceptible to perceived humiliations to be an effective BEIRUT 00001641 004.2 OF 004 leader. For example, we believe that the bad relationship between Sleiman and PM Siniora, both of whom are proud, self-made men from humble provincial backgrounds, is based in large measure by each man's perception that the other does not accord proper deference. And, more damaging to our view of the Commander, we remember how Sleiman blinked at the beginning of the Nahr al-Barid battle, proceeding only when pushed to do so from above (by Murr, Siniora, Hariri, etc.) and from below (by officers and soldiers appalled at the lost of LAF life). ¶13. (S) Still, with this dinner, Sleiman unexpectedly demonstrated a type of political courage. Rejecting the Ambassador's offer to get together at another time when the U.S.-Lebanese mil-mil relationship was not headline news, Sleiman hosted he Ambassador in a relatively public setting on the very night when the pro-Syrian media was feasting on the cooked-up stories of U.S. military bases in Lebanon. Throughout the dinner, both Sleiman and the Ambassador received frequent phone calls with updates about what outrageous claims were being broadcast and debated. Yet the Commander made an ostensible show of making sure that other officers at Yarze that night knew that he and the Ambassador were having a good time, not a difficult discussion (although there was some of that, too). This dinner, in other words, was surely intended as a signal that Sleiman was not inclined to allow the ugly media campaign undermine the growing U.S.-Lebanese military cooperation. If the other officers dining at Yarze that night told their families and friends that the Commander seems to have a fine relationship with the United States, Sleiman probably calculated that such rumors would not hurt his presidential ambitions, either. FELTMAN