LEBANON: SLEIMAN DISAPPOINTS IN MEETING WITH USDP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001626 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN DISAPPOINTS IN MEETING WITH USDP EDELMAN BEIRUT 00001626 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an October 16 meeting with visiting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Eric S. Edelman and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) Mark T. Kimmitt, a defensive Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Sleiman bristled at USG offers to participate in after action reviews with LAF soldiers and cited potential security risks posed by the upcoming presidential election as his grounds for postponing planned DOD training. Sleiman did, however, express appreciation for USG support for the LAF during its recent battle against extremists in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian camp. INCREASING MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION -------------- ¶2. (C) USDP Edelman, DASD Mark T. Kimmitt, the Ambassador, Defense Attache, Pol/Econ Chief, USDP Military Assistant, OSD Lebanon Desk Officer, OSD Foreign Area Officer met with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman for a half hour on October 16 at the General's office in Yarze. USDP Edelman began by conveying Secretary Gates' congratulations for the LAF's victory against Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian camp, an especially heroic undertaking given the urban warfare environment the LAF faced. As a result, the LAF's estimation has increased in the eyes of the U.S. military and U.S. government, Edelman said. ¶3. (S) Secretary Gates asked Edelman to visit Lebanon to pursue a longer term mil-to-mil relationship, he continued, adding that he planned to propose to Defense Minister Elias Murr the creation of a bilateral working group in a meeting scheduled later that day (septel). This group would help the U.S. military understand the long-term needs of the LAF and enable the USG to continue to provide sustainable support over the long term. Edelman concluded that he looked forward to a productive relationship. ¶4. (S) Sleiman thanked the USDP for the U.S. military assistance, noting that recently there had been a qualitative and quantitative increase in support, especially with the ammunition provided to help the LAF at Nahr al-Barid, as well as the $270 million supplemental, materiel support, and other funding approved for the upcoming year. Sleiman also looked forward to developing "human" relationships through increased training, given that both militaries were waging the same war on terrorism. USDP Edelman agreed that too often the focus was on hardware, whereas what was really important was the persistent military-to-military contact. It is now up to us to define a program that encapsulates this concept, he said. SLEIMAN DEFENSIVE ON CANCELED U.S. MILITARY VISITS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) USDP Edelman then raised Sleiman's last-minute cancellation of two planned U.S. military teams, one to participate in an After Action Review (AAR) of the LAF's performance at Nahr al-Barid to learn from shared experiences and to help define the requirements for future training, and another to provide an on-site assessment for the Comprehensive Training Program (CTP). Sleiman, citing bad timing as the grounds for the cancellations, initially said the LAF was preoccupied with the security situation in the south and Nahr al-Barid and could not spare enough officers and did not have enough time to prepare for the visits. ¶6. (S) Furthermore, he said somewhat defensively, we need to do an in-house analysis first, before we get others involved; would the U.S. let its army be subject to outside review? We are willing to exchange information, he said, but not in response to U.S. critiques. Edelman responded that the purpose of the AAR was an assessment, not an investigation, and that the U.S. military routinely did joint assessments with other countries. The idea was not to assign blame, but to identify things that could be done differently, or what BEIRUT 00001626 002.2 OF 002 difference other types of equipment or training could have made. DASD Kimmitt added that the role of the U.S. participants was not judges or investigators, but facilitators to help senior commanders discover the on-the-ground battlefield issues to help them make better decisions in the future. It was an exercise in self-examination that the U.S. military also practiced, enabling it to perform better, even if some egos were bruised along the way. ¶7. (S) Sleiman, reluctantly it seemed, agreed that such a meeting could occur at the commander level, but that LAF commanders would then be the ones to communicate the results to the lower ranks. Reiterating that the review should first be conducted internally at the staff level, Sleiman said only then would it be ready to discuss and learn from the U.S. It would be too difficult to explain the concept to the lower ranks, he claimed, adding, "this is the reality." ¶8. (S) The Ambassador said he was even more concerned about the cancellation of a visit scheduled the following week to assess training needs and plan for comprehensive training missions, stressing that if the training is delayed, the LAF risks losing USG support. Edelman added that Congress would be monitoring the U.S. military's ability to execute the program and, to ensure future Congressional support and funding, it was necessary to demonstrate progress sooner rather than later. Sleiman protested that he did not say no to the training, but that next week was a busy week for the LAF, which would be on missions to maintain security during the parliamentary session scheduled for October 23 to elect Lebanon's next president, when demonstrations might occur. DASD Kimmitt noted that this would provide an ideal time to provide on-the-job training assessment as the team could see the LAF in action. Sleiman finally agreed that the team could come before January, but they could not go into downtown Beirut. Access is what is most important, the Ambassador stressed; the training assessment cannot be limited to a small number of people that does not include all levels of the Army. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) While he seldom impresses officials, this meeting was LAF Commander Sleiman's worst performance with a USG visitor in years. At times, his savvy LAF interpreter, who recognized the poor impression his boss was making on an important delegation, chose to freelance rather than render an accurate translation of the defensive language Sleiman was actually using. After we built a closer cooperation with Sleiman during the Nahr al-Barid battle, the USG relationship with Sleiman today seems to be on a deteriorating, downward slope. We guess that this is due in large measure to Sleiman's calculation that we do not support his presidential bid, while Syria does. One of the many very good reasons for Lebanon to have presidential elections on time and according to Lebanon's established constitution is so that the transition in the LAF command (linked to a new president beginning his term in office) will occur on schedule as well. Luckily, the LAF command below Sleiman and the political leadership above Sleiman -- particularly Defense Minister Murr (see septel) -- is absolutely committed to a strong, mutually beneficial mil-mil partnership with the USG. ¶10. (U) USDP Edelman has cleared this cable. FELTMAN