LEBANON: SINIORA TO USDP EDELMAN: ARMY IS KEY TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001625 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS IR IZ LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA TO USDP EDELMAN: ARMY IS KEY TO POLITICAL STABILITY BEIRUT 00001625 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an October 16 meeting with visiting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Eric S. Edelman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Mark T. Kimmitt, PM Siniora stressed the need to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the best way to empower the Lebanese state and integrate Hizballah's arms. Stressing the need to keep the LAF non-politicized, Siniora dismissed prospects for LAF Commander Michel Sleiman's presidential candidacy. Explaining current GOL thinking on border security initiatives, Siniora also argued that regional issues, especially Iran's growing influence and the Palestinian problem, are undermining Lebanon's security. End summary. ¶2. (C) USDP Edelman, DASD Kimmitt, the Ambassador, Defense Attache, Pol/Econ Chief, and DOD Lebanon Desk Officer Dalton met with PM Siniora and advisors Mohamad Chatah, Roula Noureddine, and a military advisor in a one hour meeting at the PM's office in the Grand Serail on October 16. PROMOTING STRATEGIC MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION -------------- ¶3. (C) USDP Edelman, who had last visited Lebanon on a 1983 visit with then Secretary of State George Schultz, began the meeting by congratulating Siniora for the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) success in defeating Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian camp. Lebanon has many friends at DOD, he said, and the U.S. would not turn back the clock. Explaining that Secretary Gates had asked him to come to explore ways to develop further LAF capabilities, Edelman said the USG had been impressed with the LAF's performance at Nahr al-Barid and had supported its efforts by providing 45 flights in military assistance. USDP Edelman said DOD would like to create a U.S.-Lebanese Bilateral Defense working group to improve the two countries' strategic relationship. This was a step not just supported within DOD but within the USG as a whole. The U.S. was prepared to work with the LAF to define its needs and establish a program intended to support these needs, especially through future security assistance. ¶4. (C) PM Siniora, noting that Lebanon had changed significantly since 1983, noted the "diminishing role of the state" since then despite the GOL's efforts from 1992 onward to expand its sovereignty throughout the country. However, there was a growing conviction among the Lebanese over the past few years of the need to give the state the "necessary teeth" to execute its authority, despite the "islands of authority" that currently exist outside the state's authority. Nahr al-Barid was very important in this respect; despite predictions that the LAF would split along confessional lines, it stood firm, in large part because of the GOL's determination and strong Sunni leadership, he said, citing the role he himself played together with parliament majority leader Saad Hariri, and the Sunni Grand Mufti in pushing the LAF to fight. Commenting that "nothing succeeds like success," Siniora said Lebanon needed the LAF to win at Nahr al-Barid. As a result, LAF confidence had increased, as well as the GOL's determination to increase the authority of the Lebanese state to exercise a "monopoly" in providing security over all 14 Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Now the key was to empower the LAF with the necessary equipment and training to allow it to assume its responsibilities and to ensure it remains non-politicized. USE ARMY TO INTEGRATE HIZBALLAH...BUT SLOWLY -------------- ¶5. (C) Responding to Siniora's reference to the GOL's monopoly on the use of force, USDP Edelman stressed that the professionals in the Pentagon were especially impressed with the LAF's ability to engage in urban warfare. Its performance had helped decrease skepticism on the Hill, and there was now a greater disposition to build on this success. BEIRUT 00001625 002.2 OF 004 However, some wondered whether the LAF's recent successes had put any dent in Hizballah's claim to its right to arms. Siniora, noting that Hizballah's declaration that the LAF's entering Palestinian camps was a "red line" had been largely ignored, reiterated that it was the GOL's determination that made this operation possible, and the LAF's credibility had increased as a result. However, he cautioned, we can't rush things; we must first convince the public that only the Lebanese state and its agencies can protect Lebanese citizens and their property. Acknowledging that in the coming months the GOL would face some real tests regarding Hizballah's arms, Siniora again stressed the need to keep the LAF non-politicized by providing it all necessary support. The LAF, he argued, is the medium to integrate Hizballah. We cannot eliminate Hizballah through confrontation or forced disarmament, he said, but only through negotiations and legal measures to close the "gaps" that allow these arms to exist. ¶6. (C) In addition, Siniora continued, related issues like Shebaa, Ghajar, and the continuous Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace (which, he commented, don't provide Israel with any additional security) all only provided excuses for Hizballah. Taking these issues off the table would help the GOL "corner" Hizballah, he argued. Yesterday's exchange of corpses and one Lebanese prisoner were a good sign, he added, but a broader solution was needed to wean Shia support away from Hizballah. USDP Edelman again agreed that strengthening the LAF was key to forging a free, sovereign, and independent Lebanese state, and reiterated that the GOL had many friends in Washington. SINIORA OPPOSES SLEIMAN PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶7. (C) Expanding on the need to keep the LAF neutral, Siniora said the LAF should not be a vehicle for personal ambitions. For this reason, he explained, the constitution should not be amended to allow someone like LAF Commander General Michel Sleiman to run. (Note: Under the constitution, sitting government officials like Sleiman must wait two years following the end of their term in office before becoming eligible to run for president. End note.) Stressing that his position was not intended against any particular individual, Siniora said he opposed the principle, which also applied to other Maronite positions like the Central Bank Governor (currently Riad Salameh, also a possible candidate) and the head of the Supreme Council. NEED FOR INCREASED BORDER SECURITY -------------- ¶8. (C) Siniora asked USDP Edelman to pass two messages to Secretary Gates. First, the importance of increased border SIPDIS control capacity. As the interrogations of FAI detainees from the fight at Nahr al-Barid demonstrated, most of the non-Lebanese militants had entered Lebanon by crossing the border with Syria at "non-official" crossing points. Siniora said his government is exploring several ideas, aimed at 1) preventing the continuous supply of equipment and provisions from Syria to the armed (PFLP-GC and Fatah Intifada) Palestinian camps in two areas of the Lebanese-Syrian border; and 2) controlling other porous border areas. The German Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP) was a good start, he said. He responded to USDP Edelman's comment that the initiative had experienced several delays by stating, "not because of us." Siniora said he was optimistic more would be done, but an increased military presence or at least observers was necessary to ensure the mission's success. The GOL therefore was exploring the idea of a hybrid (Arab/European) presence, Siniora continued, noting that Syria would not accept an extension of UNIFIL to the east, a position he deemed understandable, given UNIFIL's limited mandate. Siniora reported that he had discussed this idea with France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. In response to USDP Edelman's inquiry, Siniora said the GOL had not approached the Turks, noting that they were otherwise occupied with their own border issues, but that it intended to. He agreed with the USDP's suggestion that the Turks, like the Europeans, had successful experience with paramilitary police, and said the GOL would BEIRUT 00001625 003.2 OF 004 pursue the possibility. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador raised the October 19-20 visit to Lebanon of the French, Italian, and Spanish foreign ministers, asking whether these issues could be incorporated in UNSCR 1701, whose next report is due later in the month. Siniora confirmed that he would address this, but maintained that the GOL's current proposal, for a hybrid border presence, would best alleviate Syrian concerns. IRAN AND PALESTINIAN ISSUES KEY TO LEBANON'S SECURITY -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The second message Siniora wished to send to Secretary Gates was the importance of regional issues for SIPDIS Lebanon. Iran, he said, is trying to "hijack" the Arab world, including Lebanon. If its goal was only to defend the Shia cause, he argued, there were plenty of other Shia areas; instead Iran was using Lebanon as a battlefield to fight its cause under the "cloak of Islam." Khomenei had "not consulted Lebanon" when he proclaimed Iran's intention to defeat the U.S. in Lebanon, he smirked. ¶11. (S/NF) USDP Edelman, agreeing that Iran's influence in the region was not constructive and dangerous, noted that he had been in Basra two days earlier, where it was clear the Iranians were trying to project their influence by creating a Hobbesian state of nature by supplying all of the actors (JAM, ISCI, Fadhilah, and others) who were contending for economic and political power in the South. Iran, he said, is replaying in Iraq what it did in Lebanon in the 1980s by creating a Hizballah-like organization. Noting that the U.S. had detained Hizballah trainers from Lebanon involved in training al-Sadr's secret cells and that the U.S. also had seen similar Iranian lethal assistance flowing to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Edelman agreed that Iran's strategy was about regional dominance. Siniora concurred, noting that where once the Iranian clergy had used the state to advance their goals, now it was the other way around. ¶12. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked what was the significance of the replacement of Iran's hard-line Ambassador to Damascus with a career diplomat. Siniora responded that it was "sketchy;" Syria needs Iran's support, he said, but it is not happy with the growing Iranian influence in Lebanon, according to "serious informants from inside Syria." USDP Edelman added that Iran's growing nuclear capabilities made the situation even more serious, though the U.S., with increased support from the Sarkozy government, hoped the international community would be able to put stronger pressure on Tehran. Furthermore, it was necessary to empower those who want to resist Iran's influence, he noted, adding that DASD Kimmitt was working with the Gulf Security Dialogue on a U.S. arms sale package to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to bolster these countries against Iran. ¶13. (C) Siniora agreed that pressure, including sanctions, would bear fruit in "one way or another," but lamented the fact that their effectiveness had been offset by rising oil prices. China and Russia shared concerns about Iran, he said, but also have their own agendas. He termed the U.S. arms sales "understandable," commenting that, as with most arms deals, they probably would end up like "scraps in the desert." ¶14. (C) Turning to the Palestinians, Siniora stressed this was the "real issue;" nothing else matters if a long-term solution to the problem is not found, he argued. Everything else is just "busy work" that will not lead anywhere but ultimately will guarantee that the U.S. is not successful in the Middle East. Reports, during Secretary Rice's visit to the region, that the Israelis are confiscating additional land only serve to increase the justification of extremists. What is the U.S. giving Abu Mazen, he asked, "nothing!" Hamas is not the solution, but Abu Mazen isn't effective either. The U.S. must do something, he urged. Asking about the prospects for the upcoming U.S. conference in Annapolis, Siniora stressed the need for careful preparation; otherwise, he said, better to postpone it to avoid a catastrophe. Chatah noted that Secretary Rice had said that no BEIRUT 00001625 004.2 OF 004 non-Palestinian issues would be on the agenda, which the GOL believed would be a significant shortcoming. Siniora added that without Jerusalem on the agenda, the Saudis, as protectors of the Holy Sites, would not be able to attend either. ¶15. (U) USDP Edelman has cleared this cable. FELTMAN