LEBANON: "CHANGE AOUN" URGES GREEK ORTHODOX

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001623

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: "CHANGE AOUN" URGES GREEK ORTHODOX
ARCHBISHOP

BEIRUT 00001623 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Greek Orthodox Archbishop Elias Audi is worried about
March 8 and March 14's inability to date to find a solution
to the presidential election impasse. He believes the key to
a solution lies in a shift in General Michel Aoun's thinking,
which begs the question, who is most suitable to influence
Aoun? Surprising us, Audi suggested Marada leader Suleiman
Franjieh for that role because, despite his friendship with
Syria's Asad family, he is "deep-down, a Maronite" and is
perceived to be influential with Aoun. While polite about a
fellow cleric, Audi expressed unmistakable concern about the
lack of leadership exercised by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir.
In Audi's view, Sfeir should be viewing the presidency from a
broader, Christian-wide perspective rather than thinking only
about the Maronites. Audi said that, in his view, Nassib
Lahoud or Charles Rizk would be the best president, but
neither will be elected if Sfeir does not take stronger
positions. As for Lebanon's biggest challenge, Audi cited
Iran and Hizballah. End Summary.

THE NEED TO SHIFT AOUN
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met with
Archbishop Elias Audi, Metropolitan for the Orthodox
Archdiocese of Beirut, on October 15. The Ambassador asked
about three probable scenarios regarding the elections: 1) a
consensus is reached, albeit with the danger that a
presumably Syrian-selected president is chosen; 2) March 14
moves forward with a half plus one majority; or 3) no
president is elected and the status quo continues until March
14's majority is weakened. Audi believes all of these are
very bad and difficult options for Lebanon, adding, "If
(General Michel) Aoun sticks to his dream (of becoming
president),there will be no solution." Audi's own dream is
for Aoun to "turn a bit around" and give up on his
presidential aspirations, saying, "The situation will change
if Aoun changes."

HOW TO SHIFT THE GENERAL
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3. (C) But how to turn Aoun around? Audi suggested that if
Aoun internalizes Lebanon's dire need for a president chosen
freely by Lebanese, then maybe he will give up his personal
aspirations. Audi wondered if Aoun is so focused on his own
candidacy that he fails to realize Hizballah has its own
plans, its own regime, and is using him. Audi recommends
that someone work on Aoun to convince him of his own role in
the current deadlock and to make an appeal for the future of
the Christians. The Ambassador noted that the Embassy is in
regular touch with Aoun's MPs and advisors.

WHO CAN SWAY AOUN
--------------


4. (C) Audi expressed skepticism over the ability of Aoun's
aides to appeal to Aoun, citing tension between Audi and
Aoun's aides when Audi criticized in a sermon the Aoun bloc's
support for the downtown tent city protest. He mentioned
there are three MPs who unconditionally support Aoun, and
then there is MP Michel Murr, who is close to Aoun but may
not always follow him. However Audi rejected the
Ambassador's inquiry about the utility of Murr in influencing
Aoun, saying Murr was a pro-Syrian and opportunist during the
civil war and therefore is not completely trustworthy.


5. (C) Instead -- to our astonishment -- Audi recommended
former minister and ex-MP Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the
Marada movement, as the best person to sway Aoun. Noting our
surprise, Audi expressed his appreciation for the Ambassador
having met with Franjieh in the past. Audi argued that,
while Franjieh is close to Syrian president Bashar al-Asad,
he can be counted on to put the interests of the Maronite
community at the forefront. Franjieh's relationship with the
Asads is based in his personal history (with the Asads having
informally adopted him after Franjieh's family was murdered,
when Franjieh was a boy). But, putting that relationship
aside, Franjieh is also a Maronite from the Maronite

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stronghold of Zghorta and he has genuine Maronite following.
Repeating that Franjieh had Maronite weight that others close
to Aoun lack, Audi added that Franjieh has a "big heart" and
is a dedicated Maronite.

PLEASED WITH BKIRKI MEETINGS
--------------


6. (C) Audi remarked that he was happy with the October 11
and 12 meetings held by Patriarch Sfeir with Christian
political leaders because they created small waves of
progress. He said that Franjieh was hesitant to attend the
meeting with Sfeir, so his deciding finally to attend, with
Aoun, was a positive step. Rejecting the suggestion that the
Patriarch refrain from receiving those who disregard his
calls (on removing tents and not boycotting Parliament),Audi
again asserted that, "The keys are in the hands of Aoun, if
he chooses to use them." He believes that Aoun would concede
the presidency to someone else if there were a two-thirds
majority in favor of that other person.

LESS PLEASED WITH THE PATRIARCH
--------------


7. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador about whether Patriarch
Sfeir could be doing more to see that a president is elected,
Audi paused. Choosing his words carefully and adding lots of
caveat about his respect for the Patriarch, Audi mused that
his Maronite colleague is as enamored with media attention as
he is with a solution that could lower the spotlight focused
upon him. Audi also lamented that Sfeir views Lebanon's
presidency through a purely Maronite perspective. The
president is important for all Christians in Lebanon, Audi
said, suggesting that the Patriarch should be exercising
leadership by convoking all of Lebanon's Christian hierarchy,
not simply the Maronites, to Bkirki. The Patriarch views the
presidency too narrowly and is suspicious of those other
Christian religious leaders, like Audi, who could help solve
the problem. Audi rebuffed the Ambassador's suggestion that
he go to Bkirki on his own to speak with the Patriarch. On
those occasions when Audi has gone to Bkirki, the Patriarch
has listened but not given substantive responses. (Comment:
We know the feeling. End comment.)

AUDI'S PICK: NASSIB LAHOUD AND CHARLES RIZK
--------------


8. (C) Audi revealed that, in his view, the two best
candidates for president are Nassib Lahoud and Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk. Both have proven to be courageous and
independent, Audi said. But Nassib is opposed by
pro-Syrians; Rizk (because of his work on the Special
Tribunal) by Syria itself. The only way to get either
elected, Audi speculated, was for Maronite Patriarch Sfeir to
exercise leadership and help make it happen. Audi did not
believe that would happen.

IRAN AND HIZBALLAH: LEBANON'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS
--------------


9. (C) Audi also revealed that what he fears most in
Lebanon's political sphere is growing, seemingly irreversible
Hizballah power and Iranian influence. Hizballah and Iran
wish to change Lebanon, he said. The Sunnis have finally
"discovered that they are Lebanese" (as opposed to previous
allegiances to the greater "Arab nation"),just as Hizballah
and Iran are busily dismantling the vestiges of Lebanon.
Audi agreed with the Ambassador that, to start reversing this
trend, Lebanon's next president could not come to power
because of Hizballah blessing alone.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) In this meeting as previously, Bishop Audi
displayed a perceptible tilt in the direction of March 14
rather than March 8. This was especially true in his worries
about Hizballah and Iran. In this regard, Bishop Audi
sounded a now-familiar chord: that it is easier (or, more
accurately, slightly less impossible) to get Michel Aoun on
board for a credible president than to get Hizballah or Amal
buy-in. But his suggestion was bizarre that we attempt to
approach Aoun via Suleiman Franjieh, a personal friend of
Bashar al-Asad. There seems to be an attempt currently

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underway by many parties to rehabilitate Franjieh, whose
close relations with Damascus so discredited him that he did
not even attempt to defend his Zghorta parliamentary seat in

2005.


11. (C) We agree with Audi that Franjieh has important
Maronite weight by virtue of the genuine popular support he
enjoys in northern Lebanon, and we will continue to deal with
him (albeit infrequently, with our last visit to him in
February). But we would be very surprised if Franjieh has
any more influence on Michel Aoun than others do. If Michel
Aoun does not listen to Maronite Patriarch Sfeir about
showing up for the parliamentary session, why would he listen
to Franjieh to step aside to allow a consensus presidential
candidate to win?
FELTMAN