LEBANON: A PRESIDENTIAL VACUUM BENEFITS SYRIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001612 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 3 CHANGED TO CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: A PRESIDENTIAL VACUUM BENEFITS SYRIAN ALLIES BEIRUT 00001612 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Former President Amine Gemayel expressed grave concern over the possibility of a vacuum in Lebanon's president. In his view, a vacuum would lead to a weakening of the March 14 majority and would enable Syria to manipulate the constitutional system in its favor. Gemayel is worried about a "Ta'if II", enacted by Syrian supporters, that could constitutionalize Hizballah's right to arms, change the power-sharing relationship from 50-50 to one-third each for Christians, Sunnis, and Shias, and essentially institutionalize a relationship with Syria, at Syria's direction. Having attended the Patriarch's March 14 meeting October 12, Gemayel also commented on the worthlessness of the Patriarch's efforts, and affirmed that, in the absence of other solutions, it is critical for March 14 to proceed with the goal of "half plus one" majority in electing a president. DANGERS OF A PRESIDENTIAL VACUUM -------------- ¶2. (C) Former President and head of the Phalange party Amine Gemayel expressed his fears of a presidential vacuum to the Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, in an October 13 meeting, one day after the Patriarch's meeting with March 14 leaders. Gemayel repeatedly drew upon his experiences as president (1982-88) when the failure to elect a new president was used to change the constitution, leading to the Ta'if Agreement. If a president is not elected, Gemayel predicts the subsequent weakening of March 14 MPs, as they are forced to compromise, which will then pave the way for Syrian allies to push forward a "Ta'if II"; i.e, a new power-sharing agreement. ¶3. (C) Such an agreement, Gemayel argued, would amend the constitution in favor of Syria, including overruling the call for Hizballah's disarmament, institutionalizing relations with Syria, and shifting the current 50-50 Christian/Muslim power-sharing formula to a system based on thirds (Christian, Sunni, Shia). Giving the Shia one-third of the power is significant, Gemayel noted, given that the constitution already permits a "blocking third" in the cabinet, which Syria, through its Shia alliance, would control under his presumed "Ta'if II." Gemayal foresees the opposition insisting on agreement on these issues, even before electing its own president. Gemayel believes that as a "Ta'if II" is the probable outcome of a presidential vacuum, a president must be elected, even if it is a half plus one majority. A VACUUM, NOT A COLLAPSE -------------- ¶4. (C) Gemayel believes it is not in the interest of Hizballah for the GOL to collapse, because the group needs the umbrella of the government's institutions to carry out its agenda. However, he suspects Hizballah is capable of "hard brinkmanship" - if there is a vacuum, the group will prolong the vacuum until all options are exhausted, and that is when Ta'if II will be reached and Syria's influence in Lebanon via the Shia bloc permanently institutionalized. PATRIARCH DELIVERED A NON-MESSAGE -------------- ¶5. (C) Gemayel provided details about the meeting he participated in with other March 14 leaders with the Patriarch at Bkirki the previous day. He explained the list of participants was an issue for both March 14 and March 8 groups, relaying that he insisted on the inclusion of MP Nayla Mouawad and for the March 8 meeting, while General Michel Aoun insisted on Suleiman Franjieh. During the meeting with March 14, the Patriarch, as usual, refrained from providing specific direction, and delivered a religious speech calling for the participants to love each other and find a compromise, concluding by warning that the future of Lebanon is at stake. ¶6. (C) Gemayel commented that the Patriarch's conclusion was no conclusion and the message was a non-message, rendering his efforts worthless. In sum, the Patriarch conveyed the impression he was trying, while also BEIRUT 00001612 002.3 OF 002 communicating that if a compromise is not reached, he will wash his hands of the situation. (Comment: MP Boutros Harb made the comparison separately to the Ambassador that the Patriarch resembled Pontius Pilate, in that he is washing his hands of responsibility for what may come next. End Comment.) Gemayel said the same message was delivered to March 8 leaders. ¶7. (C) Gemayel reported the Patriarch is forming a committee, following the meeting, composed of two people each from March 8 and March 14, in consultation with a bishop. Gemayel declared the committee, aimed at finding a compromise, a "junk proposal" and worthy of a "first class burial." He noted that March 14 is not sure it will participate. PROCEEDING WITH HALF PLUS ONE -------------- ¶8. (C) Based on Gemayel's fears of a presidential vacuum, he believes March 14, desiring the support of the USG, Saudi Arabia, and other allies, should proceed as if it will elect a president with a half plus one majority. He added that March 14 leaders need to do a self-assessment as to whether they can, in fact, go all the way with half plus one, because he believes Hizballah and General Michel Aoun are ready for a political confrontation. But, tactically, there is no choice but to threaten this course now. GEMAYEL'S PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) Gemayel pressed the Ambassador on which names were being revealed to him. Gemayel acknowledged that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told him his name was on his list of 12 possible candidates. Gemayel is in regular communication with MP Ghassan Tueni, whom Gemayel described as having adopted a role as an informal spokesman for Berri, and will continue to feel him out as to Berri's thinking. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) More and more, we are hearing about the possibility of the pro-Syrians exploiting to their advantage a vacuum or extension of the status quo beyond the 11/24 expiration of Emile Lahoud's presidential term. Most of our March 14 contacts fear that such a scenario allows the March 8-Aoun bloc as much time as it needs to chip away at the March 14 majority, waiting for the day when a pro-Syrian president and pro-Syrian prime minister can be installed. Gemayel's worries went beyond this, seeing a vacuum as conducive to a change in constitutional arrangements that would give Hizballah a permanent "blocking third" of the government and parliament. ¶11. (C) Like other presidential aspirants, Gemayel also believes that he -- and he alone -- has the magic formula that allows Lebanon to avoid either a vacuum (the alleged pro-Syrian strategy) or the "half-plus-one" election threat of March 14. In Gemayel's case, he believes that his behind-the-scenes ally is Nabih Berri, delivered to Gemayel by his friend Ghassan Tueni. Gemayel has asked the Ambassador to join him at Ghassan Tueni's house later in the week, where presumably Gemayel believes that Tueni will reveal to us Berri's s ecret support for Gemayel's candidacy. We did not have the heart to tell Gemayel that while, yes, Berri had put Gemayel's name down as an afterthought on a list of twelve presidential candidates he wrote down in our presence, Berri also scratched his name off quite early in the discussion. Berri, like others, has commented that Gemayel makes a better former president than he did as a serving president. FELTMAN