LEBANON: MARCH 14 CHRISTIANS SAY WITHOUT A MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001610 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 CHRISTIANS SAY WITHOUT A MARCH 14 PRESIDENT, ALL IS LOST Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) March 14 Christian leaders Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and Nayla Mouawad are focused on obtaining a March 14 presidency, without which they say the coalition's ideals and accomplishments will be lost. All three leaders -- all of whom consider themselves presidential candidates -- noted that Maronite Patriarch Sfeir is unable or unwilling to play a constructive role in presidential politics, while General Aoun is likely to contest the results of a simple majority election. March 14 leaders are working hard to coordinate a united message at home and abroad; they will not go ahead with a 50 percent plus one majority election unless they are sure of adequate votes and immediate Lebanese and international support for such a president. Lahoud appears calm and focused on strategic coordination. In contrast, Harb is relying on the support of Speaker Nabih Berri, backchannel communications, and the prospect of a compromise on UNSCR 1559 to keep himself in the running, but promised to support Lahoud in the event of a 50 percent plus one election. End summary. PRESIDENCY ESSENTIAL TO MARCH 14 VISION OF LEBANON -------------- ¶2. (C) March 14 Christian leaders are focused on obtaining a March 14 presidency. Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and Nayla Mouawad noted to the Ambassador and Econoff in separate October 9-10 conversations that, without a March 14 president, all of the coalition's ideals and accomplishments will be lost as the opposition's "rival project" gains ascendancy. Lahoud and Harb and the two designated March 14 presidential candidates, with Mouawad also considering herself in the running. FRUSTRATED WITH THE PATRIARCH -------------- ¶3. (C) All three leaders argued that Maronite Patriarch Sfeir is unable or unwilling to play a constructive role in presidential politics. Mouawad criticized the Patriarch's October 11-12 meetings for opposition and March 14 leaders as poorly timed and unproductive, since the Patriarch has been unable or unwilling to hold Christian leaders accountable for not complying with his prior judgments. Harb accused the Patriarch of wanting a weak president so that Sfeir could remain the preeminent Maronite. ¶4. (C) Lahoud expressed frustration that the Patriarch was not more mindful of Christian leaders' security, and criticized him for publicly announcing the time and venue of the meetings. He noted that the seven March 14 Christian leaders invited to attend would not send delegates, but would depart a day early and stay overnight outside their homes closer to Bkirke so that their travel routes would be less predictable. Respected An-Nahar editorialist and Patriarchal confidante Emile Khoury told Lahoud the Patriarch planned to tell invited opposition leaders Suleiman Franjieh and Michel Aoun that he would consider those deputies who did not attend the parliamentary session responsible for forcing a 50 percent plus one vote. ¶5. (C) March 14 Christians expected Aoun to tell the Patriarch his deputies will boycott the parliamentary session and challenge the next president, arguing that the seats he believes he won in the 2005 election would have guaranteed his election as president. The presence of the Aounist MPs at any vote is essential for the credibility of the election results, Lahoud observed, but more likely Berri deputies will attend while Hizballah and Aoun deputies boycott and position themselves to challenge the elected president. A proper process in choosing the president will be essential in forming a new cabinet, Lahoud noted. Increased pressure on individual "swing" MPs and influential bloc mobilizers Michel Murr and Nabih Berri to participate in the inevitable selection of a 50 percent plus one president would help. MARCH 14 COORDINATION AND EXTERNAL OUTREACH CONTINUE -------------- BEIRUT 00001610 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) March 14 Christians are working hard to argue their coordinated case with the Patriarch and to present a united, reasonable face to Lebanon and to the world. Lahoud on October 10 noted that March 14 leaders had initiated a plan to send delegates to a strategy meeting hosted by March 14 MP Carlos Edde ahead of the Patriarch's meeting. Their message to the Patriarch is that a 50 percent plus one vote was not March 14's first choice, but was preferable to a vacuum in the presidency and marginalization of the Christians. Their message to the public is that March 14 has made a good faith effort to compromise by participating in the Patriarch's initiative and by suggesting multiple candidates, while the opposition has refused to give grounds for rejecting March 14 candidates. March 14 plans to retain two presidential candidates until mid-November's "serious crunch," Lahoud ruminated, since it makes the coalition look reasonable and helps prevent people splitting from the group. More preventative pressure on those who might split from the group would also help, Lahoud agreed, just as the U.S. visa ban and asset freeze threats have been useful in that regard. ¶6. (C) Broader March 14 coordination at home and abroad continues. Jumblatt sent allies Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Aridi to test Lahoud, Harb, and Robert Ghanem on their willingness to either vote in or stand as a candidate in a 50 percent plus one election; MPs Harb and Ghanem agreed to vote for Lahoud if they are not chosen as consensus candidates able to earn a two-thirds majority. Lahoud noted that he, Amine Gemayel and Samir Geagea were coordinating a March 14 Christian message with Nayla Mouawad ahead of her trip to Washington; they were also trying to coordinate their message with Saad Hariri's and Jumblatt's. Jumblatt in particular has turned out to be a strong force holding March 14 together. THE DAY AFTER: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR A 50 PERCENT PLUS ONE VOTE -------------- ¶7. (C) All three Christian leaders noted that March 14 is thinking carefully about whether and how best to proceed in electing a president without a two-thirds majority. Lahoud noted that March 14 will not go ahead with a 50 percent plus one election until they have assurances that they have enough votes, and that such a president will be immediately recognized and supported by the army, the Central Bank, the Patriarch and March 14 Christians, and international players such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. Harb clarified that he will attend and vote for Nassib Lahoud if March 14 is forced to pursue a 50 percent plus one vote, although he himself will not be a candidate unless there is two-thirds consensus. It remains unclear whether March 14 still has enough votes; MPs Mohamad Safadi and Ghassan Tueni appear undecided. Harb cited a Jordanian source as saying that 11 of 68 deputies would not participate in such a vote, yet Michel Murr (allied with Aoun) told Harb he has 10 deputies ready to follow his lead, should Murr agree with the majority on a candidate. Mouawad noted the president's first act would be to replace Army Commander Michel Sleiman and Military Intelligence Chief George Khoury to ensure troops are under March 14 leadership. Lahoud noted that Prime Minister Siniora's senior advisor Mohamad Chatah reports that though Gulf leaders prefer consensus, they reject any compromise which discards March 14 principles, and view Lahoud as their first choice candidate. FRONTRUNNER LAHOUD CALM, CONFIDENT. SECOND STRING HARB FLIRTING WITH COMPROMISE -------------- ¶8. (C) Lahoud appeared calm, confident in his role as lead March 14 presidential contender, and fully immersed in March 14 strategy, coordination, and long-term planning. In contrast, Harb appeared tightly focused on tactical questions; we hear rumors that his family members are still working behind the scenes to advance his candidacy with March 8 (and perhaps even Syrian) figures. Harb commented to us that March 14 leaders in September appeared to shift their focus to Lahoud, and promised that in the event of a 50 percent plus one majority election, he will vote for Lahoud. Harb is thus counting on Berri's distaste for Lahoud and fear of a March 14-controlled election to promote himself as the March 14 candidate most palatable to the opposition. He noted that Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's latest speech did not reject Harb, assessed that the Shia would never accept Lahoud due to his Saudi ties, and cited a BEIRUT 00001610 003 OF 003 Berri relative as saying that the opposition prefers Harb to Lahoud. ¶9. (C) Harb's close interaction with Berri could still help March 14; he recently argued to Berri that if the Speaker did not hold the election on October 23 he should accept moral responsibility for any assassinations or popular violence resulting from the delay. In addition, Harb is working to prevent Berri from falling back on Michel Sleiman as a compromise president. On the other hand, Harb is looking for concessions that will strengthen his candidacy in the eyes of the opposition. He told the Ambassador on October 9 that he was carefully studying whether UNSCR 1701 incorporated UNSCR 1559 to the extent needed to be able to declare UNSCR 1559 fulfilled and no longer necessary. Such a concession to the opposition would enhance Harb's presidential chances. The Ambassador argued strongly for the retention of 1559. FELTMAN