LEBANON: PRO-SYRIANS SEE ADVANTAGES TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001603

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR
ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRO-SYRIANS SEE ADVANTAGES TO
PERPETUATING STATUS QUO


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Selim Jeressaiti, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's
legal advisor, reported that LAF Commander Michel Sleiman
remains the presidential candidate of choice for Hizballah
and Syria. While expressing his own hope that a genuine
consensus candidate would emerge instead, Jeressaiti argued
that Syria and Hizballah will simply wait until they can
impose Sleiman on Lebanon. The best way to do so might be to
preserve the status quo -- PM Siniora in the Grand Serail,
Emile Lahoud in Baabda Palace -- well beyond the November 24
expiration of Lahoud's presidential term. Over the next
months, the March 14 majority might vanish under bribery,
public discontent, intimidation, defections, and
assassinations. At the point they gain the parliamentary
majority, Hizballah and Syria can dictate not only the next
president but also the next prime minister and cabinet
majority.


2. (S) The two downsides for Syria of this scenario,
Jeressaiti acknowledged, are the perpetuation of the hated
Siniora cabinet and, more serious, the danger that the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon will be up and running before
the March 14 majority is definitively destroyed. Asked what
would happen if March 14 uses the 'half-plus-one" scenario to
elect a president now and pre-empt the "status quo" option,
Jeressaiti said that Lahoud would leave Baabda Palace without
appointing a second cabinet (choosing to turn over his
presidential powers to a military council instead),but
Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and other pro-Syrians would seize the
initiative on the street. Chaos would prevail, through
which, again, Michel Sleiman would emerge as a potential
savior. But Jeressaiti did not believe that March 14 could
actually muster an absolute majority vote in parliament,
given the clear costs to Lebanon's stability. End summary.

LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN: STILL
THE TOP CHOICE OF SYRIA, HIZBALLAH
--------------


3. (S) The Ambassador met with Selim Jeressaiti, Emile
Lahoud's legal advisor, for two hours on 10/12 to explore
Lahoud's thinking (as relayed by Jeressaiti) regarding
upcoming presidential elections. Claiming that Lahoud
himself strongly disagrees with the choice, Jeressaiti said
that Syria and Hizballah remain committed to seeing Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman installed as
president, followed by current Military Intelligence (G-2)
chief Georges Khoury replacing Sleiman at the head of the
LAF. Jeressaiti described Khoury as "100 percent Syrian,"
but he was more charitable about Sleiman: Sleiman is not a
Syrian agent, but he's pliant. Desirous of being president
and knowing that March 14 leaders will not support him
(something Walid Jumblatt told him directly over dinner
recently),Sleiman is susceptible to the Syrian and Hizballah
wooing. Promising to support his presidential bid, Hizballah
has acquired from Sleiman a commitment not to crack down on
weapons smuggling or Hizballah's arms.

SLIM HOPE FOR CONSENSUS ALTERNATIVE
--------------


4. (S) Emphasizing that he agrees with March 14 leaders
("some of my best friends are from March 14") that Sleiman is
the wrong choice for Lebanon, Jeressaiti said that there is
still very slim hope for a genuine consensus around
candidates like Michel Edde, Shakib Qortbawi (a lawyer),MP
Robert Ghanem, or even March 14 candidate Boutros Harb.
Jeressaiti expressed his own preference for Harb and said
that he thought he could get Emile Lahoud (whose personal
priority, Jeressaiti confirmed, is to block his ex-friend
Charles Rizk and his hated cousin Nassib Lahoud from the
presidency) to refrain from trying to impose a Syrian veto of
Harb. Harb's candidacy may be intriguing to Syria and
Hizballah, given the frosty relations between Harb, on the
one hand, and Hariri and Jumblatt, on the other.


5. (S) But Jeressaiti thought that, unless sufficient
outside pressure was imposed on Syria and Iran to back off on
Sleiman's candidacy, all the March 8 talk about genuine

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consensus is just "empty talk." Elaborating, Jeressaiti said
that Iran itself has no candidate but is fully behind
Hizballah's choice of Sleiman. Syria has views, Hizballah
has views, but Iran follows Hizballah's lead in supporting
Sleiman. So March 8 will try to convince March 14 that
Sleiman is the consensus pick.

POSSIBLE OPTION: MAINTAIN STATUS QUO,
WITH BOTH LAHOUD AND SINIORA IN PLACE
--------------


6. (S) The Ambassador asked if Jeressaiti thought that
March 14 could be sufficiently pressured into backing
Sleiman; was the Syrian and Hizballah strategy realistic?
Jeressaiti acknowledged that pushing through a constitutional
amendment (required for Sleiman to become president) at this
moment was an unlikely proposition, politically and
technically. But, if March 8 fails in gaining March 14
acquiescence for Sleiman's presidency now, then March 8 is
willing to wait. Jeressaiti said that he believes that Syria
and Hizballah, in looking at all of the current options,
believe that perpetuating the status quo is best. While
March 8 and March 14 blocs will go through the motions of
seeking a consensus president before the November 24
expiration of Lahoud's term, in fact neither side wants to
concede. So, after November 24, the situation will be the
same as today: PM Siniora will be in the Grand Serail, with
his cabinet recognized by the world, and Emile Lahoud will
stay in Baabda Palace.

SEEKING DUBIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS
BEHIND LAHOUD'S EXTENDED BAABDA STAY
--------------


7. (S) The Ambassador expressed surprise: in previous
meetings, Jeressaiti had repeatedly insisted that Lahoud
would leave office upon the end of his constitutional
mandate, come what may. Acknowledging the change, Jeressaiti
referred to what he said was a French legal concept about
"continuation of public service" to prevent vacuum, an
unwritten constitutional principle that would apply in this
case since Lahoud maintains that Siniora's cabinet, lacking
Shia representation, does not exist. As there is no legal
cabinet that could hold the presidential authorities in
custody until elections, Lahoud is forced to stay. He would
not appoint a second cabinet, but simply remain in place.
Jeressaiti said that Lahoud would also get political cover by
assembling a cross-confessional meeting of Lebanese notables
who would demand that he remain in office, rather than turn
over the powers of his office temporarily to the illegal
Siniora cabinet. Jeressaiti accepted the Ambassador's point
that such a gathering would be easy to pull off but have
little political or constitutional credbility.

PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING STATUS QUO:
RELACE MARCH 14 MAJORITY WITH PRO-SYRIANS
--------------


8. (S) But with Lahoud remaining in office, Jeressaiti
said, life in Lebanon would continue in a form similar to
today: two separate blocs hovering around the Siniora
cabinet and Lahoud's presidency. The army would not be
forced to choose sides, and the security conditions would
remain more or less as they are now, without hostile
takeovers of GOL installations. The point, he explained, was
to allow March 8-Aoun forces time to win the parliamentary
majority. Over a period of weeks or months, March 14 will
become weakened and splintered. The Syrians and Hizballah
will use a variety of means, including bribes and threats, to
win March 14 MPs to their side. Some March 14 MPs, when they
realize that March 14 is unable to elect a president, will
naturally, opportunistically, rush to be on the winning side.
The Ambassador noted assassinations, which Jeressaiti agreed
are also a likely possibility, particularly in districts
(like Baabda-Aley) where by-elections would likely produce
March 8-Aoun victors. Even if the status quo has to be
maintained for two years (until summer 2009 parliamentary
elections),it is better for Syria and Hizballah to wait then
to permit a genuine consensus president to emerge now. For
one thing, the current cabinet program (with its offensive
"defense of the resistance" language) remains in place.

TO SYRIA, HIZBALLAH, SLEIMAN LATER

BEIRUT 00001603 003 OF 005


IS PREFERABLE TO CONSENSUS NOW
--------------


9. (S) At the moment that the March 14 parliamentary
majority has disappeared, then Hizballah and Syria can use
the new pro-Syrian majority to impose Michel Sleiman "or even
Suleiman Franjieh." As the Christians and particularly
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir will have been distraught over the
vacancy in the presidency, then a constitutional amendment
becomes easier. And at that point, Hizballah and Syria, now
controlling the parliamentary majority, will also be able to
impose the next prime minister and cabinet majority. Why,
Jeressaiti asked, would Hizballah and Syria accept a genuine
consensus president now, when they can have a president of
their choosing by waiting only a few months. The Ambassador
noted that Jeressaiti's predictions assume solidarity between
Hizballah and Michel Aoun, for, without the Aoun MPs on
board, this does not work. Jeressaiti said that, with the
trauma of the presidential vacancy upsetting their
constituents, sufficient numbers of the Aoun MPs would join
Hizballah and Nabih Berri to make this strategy succeed.
Michel Aoun, "a crazy man," ultimately will not vote for
Michel Sleiman. But he will certainly support the status quo
for now, rather than allow a consensus or March 14 president
to emerge.

BUT CALENDAR TO SWITCH MAJORITY
RUNS UP AGAINST TRIBUNAL PROGRESS
--------------


10. (S) Jeressaiti said that he envisioned two downsides
for Hizballah and Syria. First, Syria despises Fouad
Siniora. The status quo scenario would permit Siniora to
remain in office, playing a prominent role nationally and
internationally. Second, and more alarming for Syria, the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon might end up being up and
running before the parliamentary majority is safely in
Syria's hands. Syria and Hizballah will want to have the
parliamentary majority change sides and a new president
installed as a fait acccompli before the Special Tribunal's
actions weaken Syrian influence in Lebanon.

PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE BY MARCH 14 TO ELECT
A PRESIDENT BY ABSOLUTE MAJORITY: "UNLIKELY"
--------------


11. (S) The Ambassador noted that March 14 leaders, once
aware of a March 8-Aoun strategy to perpetuate the status
quo, might take pre-emptive action by electing a March 14
president with "half-plus-one" of the MPs. Jeressaiti
thought the possibility of March 14 moving from threat to
implementation was highly remote. March 14 will not have the
65 parliamentary votes needed, he said, as sufficient numbers
of MPs, fearing the consequences of such a provocative act,
will refuse to go along. SAUDI Arabia, fearful of conflict
inside Lebanon being added to regional woes, will advise Saad
Hariri to refrain from such a step. Jeressaiti claimed that
former Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who was recently in SAUDI
Arabia, secured King Abdullah's commitment to advise Hariri
to dissociate his bloc from an absolute-majority vote.
Tactically, Hariri will hold this out as an option;
practically, he will never go along, because of SAUDI orders,
Jeressaiti said confidently.

WITH ABSOLUTE MAJORITY PRESIDENT, THEN CHAOS
-- AND SLEIMAN RETURNS AS LEADING CANDIDATE
--------------


12. (S) The Ambassador pressed Jeressaiti on what would
happen if somehow March 14 does pull off an absolute majority
presidential election. Emile Lahoud will indeed leave Baabda
Palace as scheduled on November 24, Jeressaiti responded.
But, even if the world recognizes the new president, Lahoud
will not. He will not appoint a second, competing government
or participate in creating a second president. But he will
find some vehicle on which to bestow his presidential
authorities. Jeressaiti thought that some kind of military
council would be the likely recipient ad interim of the
presidential powers.


13. (S) But the real problem will be on the ground,
Jeressaiti said. A March 14 absolute majority president will
be besieged and weakened immediately. Hizballah, using gangs

BEIRUT 00001603 004 OF 005


of front men, Michel Aoun, Suleiman Franjieh, and others will
immediately take over key installations around the country.
"There is a plan ready for action," Jeressaiti insisted.
Chaos and violence will prevail. Pausing for a moment,
Jeressaiti mused that the chaos and violence might be
short-lived, given how much more heavily armed the March
8-Aoun forces are compared to March 14. March 14 might be
defeated quite quickly on the street. The LAF will not fight
for the March 14 president, Jeressaiti predicted. In the
midst of all of the problems an absolute majority election
would cause, Michel Sleiman would once again become the
leading presidential candidate. Sleiman would be seen as
potential savior from chaos and violence.

PLAYING WITH, AND DISMISSING, OTHER OPTIONS
--------------


14. (S) The Ambassador asked if Jeressaiti saw any other
options, noting that some have mused about having a prime
minister that leans toward March 8 as the price to pay to
allow a March 14 president to be elected. "Oh, the 'N and N'
option," Jeressaiti laughed, with Nassib Lahoud as president
and Najib Mikati as prime minister. Who, Jeressaiti asked,
would sell that idea to Saad Hariri. Jeressaiti said that
his personal view was that the Nassib Lahoud and Najib Mikati
would be perhaps the ideal pair to get Lebanon out of its
current crisis. But Hizballah and Syria will never accept
this compromise, he said. Jeressaiti asked about whether it
might be possible to try again for a national unity cabinet,
with Mikati as premier, with the idea that such a cabinet
could fill the presidential vacuum with the approval of all
parts of the country until a presidential solution emerges.
The Ambassador said that he found it highly unlikely March 14
would agree to turn over the premiership to Mikati, in the
absence of a credible president and clear guarantees about
the cabinet composition and program.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (S) To borrow a commonly-used caveat from a sister
agency, we would say that Jeressaiti hoped "to influence as
well as to inform." It is safe to assume that Jeressaiti
compared notes with Emile Lahoud about what to us. But we're
a bit mystified by what he hopes we will do with this
analysis: destroy Michel Sleiman's reputation? Or,
alternatively, accept the inevitability of Sleiman as
president? Push our March 14 allies extra hard for some kind
of consensus (other than Sleiman) now, for fear that
otherwise they will have Sleiman forced upon them later? Or
did Jeressaiti simply wish to show off to us how clever and
well-informed he is?


16. (S) Putting aside whatever his motivations might be, we
have to say that Jeressaiti's tidy analysis about the "status
quo" option sounds sensible in light of current political
developments. March 8 leaders do seem to have two goals in
mind -- to see Michel Sleiman elected as president, and to
see the March 14 majority destroyed. (Michel Aoun shares the
second goal only, of course, but is probably an unwitting
participant in the first.) March 8 leaders change their
tactics on how to reach those goals, but the goals remain
constant. In today's political conditions, maintaining the
status quo indefinitely holds out the possibility of
achieving both. A status quo option also frustrates our
ability to use the Executive Orders and visa ban tools.
While we could decide to designate Emile Lahoud for remaining
in office beyond the constitutional deadline of November 24,
there is no second cabinet against which to take punitive
action.


17. (S) If Jeressaiti's description is accurate, then, the
status quo option is a diabolically clever tactical plan
(which makes us wonder again why the always genial Jeressaiti
revealed it to us). Of course, as Jeressaiti also noted, an
absolute majority vote to elect a president (March 14's
alleged trump card) could also inadvertently contribute to
the achievement of the March 8 dual goals: if March 14 is
seen publicly here as having taken an unconstitutional step
that unleashes chaos and violence, then March 14's public
support drops (with MPs surely switching sides) and Michel
Sleiman can appear to be the one person who could stop the
violence. The status quo option described by Jeressaiti may

BEIRUT 00001603 005 OF 005


become outdated or superseded by unforeseen developments in
the near future. But, for now, we recommend taking this idea
seriously.
FELTMAN