LEBANON: SUNNI MUFTI DEFENDS CHRISTIAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001585

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SUNNI MUFTI DEFENDS CHRISTIAN RIGHTS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Sunni Grand Mufti Qabbani, stressing the Christian
contribution to Lebanon's unique identity, asserts that the
Sunnis are committed to the 1989 Ta'if Accord's 50-50
power-sharing arrangement between Christians and Muslims.
Even if the Christian population dwindles, he said, this
relationship must be maintained to preserve Lebanon's
identity. The Shia, on the other hand, want to change
Lebanon's identity by changing the ratio to thirds, divided
between Christians, Sunnis, and Shia. Qabbani also cited
Iran as Lebanon's primary problem and denounced Hizballah's
arms. End Summary.

IRAN ASPIRES FOR
REGIONAL CONTROL
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2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by POLOFF and Senior FSN
Political Advisor, spent 90 minutes meeting with Sunni Grand
Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani on
October 9. He said Lebanon's problems today are temporary,
but that this is the first time Lebanon faces such an acute
and difficult situation. He said Lebanon's biggest problem
is Iran and its influence in Syria, noting the two countries
employ different tactics in carrying out their policies in
Lebanon: Iran inserts itself in Lebanese politics while
Syria uses unrest.


3. (C) Qabbani accused Iran of having a desire to control the
region through varied means, including financially and
through property ownership. Iran reached the Mediterranean
Sea through its proxy, Hizballah, he noted, just as it
reached Palestine through Hamas. He affirmed, "Each country
has the right to be strong in order to preserve its
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity."
However, he continued, Iran does not limit itself to these
principles and instead strives for complete influence over
the region, particularly over the Gulf. He cited by example
Iran sending scores of its citizens to three islands in
dispute between Iran and the UAE, to establish an Iranian
presence.

PRESERVING 50-50 POWER-SHARING
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3. (C) Qabbani believes the Shia in Lebanon are asking for a
power-sharing formula based on the 1/3 formula (i.e. 1/3
Christian, 1/3 Sunni, 1/3 Shia). Qabbani stressed that the
Sunnis in Lebanon want to abide by the Ta'if Accord, saying,
"the Ta'if agreement, which distributed power on a 50-50
basis between Christians and Muslims, should be preserved
even if there is only one Christian left in the country."
This power-sharing arrangement guarantees Lebanon's freedom,
democracy, and identity. At the close of the meeting,
Qabbani emphasized again the value of Lebanese Christians in
the government, and how their presence is essential to
Lebanon's identity. He referred to other countries with
greater percentages of Christians where Christians do not
enjoy the same role in the government as in Lebanon.

HIZBALLAH BUYING OUT SUNNI LAND
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4. (C) Based on the notion, "he who controls the land holds
the decision," Qabbani commented on the pace at which
Hizballah is buying real estate in Beirut, citing examples of
Hizballah buying out Sunni families, or of village
demographics shifting dramatically from primarily Sunni and
Druze areas to two-thirds Shia. Qabbani has confronted this
dilemma by creating an endowment for the Sunni community to
enable Sunnis to keep their properties instead of selling
them to Shia. He said some Arab states are funding this
endowment to help the new Sunni generation maintain its
presence in Beirut.

OPPOSING MILITIAS;
FEAR OF HIZBALLAH
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5. (C) Qabbani said the Sunni community is most interested in
preserving the state of Lebanon and he opposes the formation
of Sunni militias. He supports Hizballah disarmament and the

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implementation of UNSCR 1559, though not by force. Qabbani
said independent Shia figures do not talk together because
they are afraid of Hizballah, and similarly, the Arab world
is afraid of Iran. Regarding Hizballah's alliance with the
Shia Amal movement, Qabbani explained that while there is
great enmity between the two Shia-dominated parties, they
probably allied together to protect their own interests.

USING THE ELECTIONS
TO QUELL CHAOS
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6. (C) Qabbani said the next Lebanese president should be
from March 14 and should be able to contain Hizballah in a
way that preserves Lebanon's interest over the interests of
Iran and Hizballah. He believes that if Iran and Syria want
chaos, there will not be elections. He recommended that the
Christians adopt a unified political stance to confront
potential chaos. Potential chaos could result if there is
foreign intervention, if there is a majority plus one quorum,
or if there is no participation in the elections. Qabbani
added that there also needs to be a solution to the Shebaa
Farms dispute and a defense strategy to move military
capability from Hizballah to the Lebanese army.

COMMENT
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7. (C) Qabbani was quick to denounce Fatah al-Islam-type
Sunni terrorists and even more quick in defending Christian
rights in Lebanon: he was not the fire-breathing Sunni
cleric feared by so many supporters of Michel Aoun. His
stout defense of the 50-50 power-sharing arrangement with
Lebanon's Christians, whatever the latter's demographic
share, would be reassuring to many Christians who fear the
implications of their declining population. But we do not
believe that Qabbani, who has never struck us as particularly
deep or open-minded, has suddenly discovered the intrinsic
value of Lebanon's diverse Christian population. Instead, we
suspect that he fears the political implications of the arms,
money, and expanding population of the Shia. The 50-50
power-sharing arrangement set up by the Taif Accord is a
useful tool, in other words, to help keep Shia power in
check. Qabbani's comments on the Christians had less to do
with his attitude about the Maronites, we believe, than about
his worries regarding the Shia.
FELTMAN