LEBANON: SUNNI MUFTI DEFENDS CHRISTIAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001585 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SUNNI MUFTI DEFENDS CHRISTIAN RIGHTS Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Sunni Grand Mufti Qabbani, stressing the Christian contribution to Lebanon's unique identity, asserts that the Sunnis are committed to the 1989 Ta'if Accord's 50-50 power-sharing arrangement between Christians and Muslims. Even if the Christian population dwindles, he said, this relationship must be maintained to preserve Lebanon's identity. The Shia, on the other hand, want to change Lebanon's identity by changing the ratio to thirds, divided between Christians, Sunnis, and Shia. Qabbani also cited Iran as Lebanon's primary problem and denounced Hizballah's arms. End Summary. IRAN ASPIRES FOR REGIONAL CONTROL -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff and Senior FSN Political Advisor, spent 90 minutes meeting with Sunni Grand Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani on October 9. He said Lebanon's problems today are temporary, but that this is the first time Lebanon faces such an acute and difficult situation. He said Lebanon's biggest problem is Iran and its influence in Syria, noting the two countries employ different tactics in carrying out their policies in Lebanon: Iran inserts itself in Lebanese politics while Syria uses unrest. ¶3. (C) Qabbani accused Iran of having a desire to control the region through varied means, including financially and through property ownership. Iran reached the Mediterranean Sea through its proxy, Hizballah, he noted, just as it reached Palestine through Hamas. He affirmed, "Each country has the right to be strong in order to preserve its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." However, he continued, Iran does not limit itself to these principles and instead strives for complete influence over the region, particularly over the Gulf. He cited by example Iran sending scores of its citizens to three islands in dispute between Iran and the UAE, to establish an Iranian presence. PRESERVING 50-50 POWER-SHARING -------------- ¶3. (C) Qabbani believes the Shia in Lebanon are asking for a power-sharing formula based on the 1/3 formula (i.e. 1/3 Christian, 1/3 Sunni, 1/3 Shia). Qabbani stressed that the Sunnis in Lebanon want to abide by the Ta'if Accord, saying, "the Ta'if agreement, which distributed power on a 50-50 basis between Christians and Muslims, should be preserved even if there is only one Christian left in the country." This power-sharing arrangement guarantees Lebanon's freedom, democracy, and identity. At the close of the meeting, Qabbani emphasized again the value of Lebanese Christians in the government, and how their presence is essential to Lebanon's identity. He referred to other countries with greater percentages of Christians where Christians do not enjoy the same role in the government as in Lebanon. HIZBALLAH BUYING OUT SUNNI LAND -------------- ¶4. (C) Based on the notion, "he who controls the land holds the decision," Qabbani commented on the pace at which Hizballah is buying real estate in Beirut, citing examples of Hizballah buying out Sunni families, or of village demographics shifting dramatically from primarily Sunni and Druze areas to two-thirds Shia. Qabbani has confronted this dilemma by creating an endowment for the Sunni community to enable Sunnis to keep their properties instead of selling them to Shia. He said some Arab states are funding this endowment to help the new Sunni generation maintain its presence in Beirut. OPPOSING MILITIAS; FEAR OF HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶5. (C) Qabbani said the Sunni community is most interested in preserving the state of Lebanon and he opposes the formation of Sunni militias. He supports Hizballah disarmament and the BEIRUT 00001585 002 OF 002 implementation of UNSCR 1559, though not by force. Qabbani said independent Shia figures do not talk together because they are afraid of Hizballah, and similarly, the Arab world is afraid of Iran. Regarding Hizballah's alliance with the Shia Amal movement, Qabbani explained that while there is great enmity between the two Shia-dominated parties, they probably allied together to protect their own interests. USING THE ELECTIONS TO QUELL CHAOS -------------- ¶6. (C) Qabbani said the next Lebanese president should be from March 14 and should be able to contain Hizballah in a way that preserves Lebanon's interest over the interests of Iran and Hizballah. He believes that if Iran and Syria want chaos, there will not be elections. He recommended that the Christians adopt a unified political stance to confront potential chaos. Potential chaos could result if there is foreign intervention, if there is a majority plus one quorum, or if there is no participation in the elections. Qabbani added that there also needs to be a solution to the Shebaa Farms dispute and a defense strategy to move military capability from Hizballah to the Lebanese army. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Qabbani was quick to denounce Fatah al-Islam-type Sunni terrorists and even more quick in defending Christian rights in Lebanon: he was not the fire-breathing Sunni cleric feared by so many supporters of Michel Aoun. His stout defense of the 50-50 power-sharing arrangement with Lebanon's Christians, whatever the latter's demographic share, would be reassuring to many Christians who fear the implications of their declining population. But we do not believe that Qabbani, who has never struck us as particularly deep or open-minded, has suddenly discovered the intrinsic value of Lebanon's diverse Christian population. Instead, we suspect that he fears the political implications of the arms, money, and expanding population of the Shia. The 50-50 power-sharing arrangement set up by the Taif Accord is a useful tool, in other words, to help keep Shia power in check. Qabbani's comments on the Christians had less to do with his attitude about the Maronites, we believe, than about his worries regarding the Shia. FELTMAN