LEBANON: PM SINIORA DOESN'T SEE A NEAR TERM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000156

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA DOESN'T SEE A NEAR TERM
SOLUTION; URGES CHAPTER VII FOR SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

REF: BEIRUT 00118

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) While warmly praising the U.S. and international
support for Lebanon expressed at Paris III, Prime Minister
Siniora was less hopeful regarding a near-term solution to
his country's current political crisis. Siniora said that
upon his return, he had reached out to Amal leader Nabih
Berri, pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, and FPM leader
Michel Aoun with disappointing results: Berri's tone had
been "cold," Lahoud claimed that Paris III was irrelevant,
and Aoun had refused to take the call from Siniora's office.
(Note: Siniora's senior advisor Mohamed Chatah is still
communicating with moderate Aounist advisor MP Ibrahim
Kanaan, but believes the Aounist camp is split, with Aoun now
listening primarily to his hard-liners. End note.) Due to
constitutional requirements, Siniora said it will be nearly
impossible to overcome March 8th resistance to the Special
Tribunal and asked whether the U.S. would support a Chapter
VII resolution to establish the court, a question he said he
would pose to all UNSC-member ambassadors. The Prime
Minister indicated he understood such an effort would be
difficult and admitted that President Chirac, even while
stating his support of the tribunal last week in Paris,
appeared to want let the matter rest for a while. Concerning
last Thursday's violent Sunni vs Shia confrontation, Siniora
was convinced that Syrian-driven Amal supporters spearheaded
the escalation, while Hizballah, which takes its guidance
from Iran, was essentially a reluctant participant. Finally,
he briefly discussed a plan to create an Arab consultative
body to ensure the Arab assistance declared at Paris III does
not lose its momentum. End summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with the Ambassador
and Special Assistant on January 29 in his office in the
Grand Serail. Senior advisors Ambassador Mohamed Chatah and
Rola Noureddine also attended the meeting. The Prime
Minister was noticeably more reserved than usual.


3. (U) PM Siniora described Paris III as an powerful
affirmation of the international community's support for
democracy in Lebanon. It had surpassed his expectations and
will hopefully provide the foundation upon which his country
can build stability and prosperity. He particularly
expressed deep gratitude for the critical role played by the
U.S. in making the conference a success. Siniora said he
would be sending President Bush a letter of sincere thanks
from the Lebanese people. He mused about whether he could
place a phone call to the President. Lastly, he also wanted
to express his special thanks for the U.S.-Lebanon
Partnership Initiative, which he hopes will create new
opportunities, particularly in the field of education.

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL IS CRITICAL FOR SOVEREIGNTY
--------------


4. (C) Despite the galvanizing support Lebanon received at
Paris III, PM Siniora was deeply concerned that last week's
events in Beirut confirmed that the anti-government March 8th
coalition was playing for keeps. He discussed the harshly
uncompromising statements that Hassan Nasrallah has been
making in his nightly televised Ashura sermons, as well as
the previuos evening's dogmatic interpretation of the impasse
by Michel Aoun's closest advisor Gibran Bassil on an
interview show. Even Nabih Berri, who assured the Ambassador
last week that he was looking for a negotiated solution
(reftel),has turned "cold" and is withdrawing once again
into unhelpful silence. In Siniora's opinion, Berri's lone
effort at compromise was essentially a plan to implement the
Syrian agenda in steps: freezing movement on the tribunal;
creating a blocking minority for Hizballah; and a resignation
of the Siniora government. In Siniora's eyes, a political
solution, if still possible, is a long way off. Siniora
stated that he was unaware of the content of any discussions
between the Iranians and the Saudis on Lebanon.


5. (C) The best way forward, Siniora maintained, is
establishment of the tribunal by international fiat, that is,
by a Chapter VII resolution. At this point in time, with a
confident Syria and Iran pushing their proxies (although
apparently at different speeds),he sees little likelihood

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that either Aoun or Nasrallah would agree to any solution
short of a near-complete surrender by March 14th.


6. (C) Acknowledging that attaining Chapter VII would be
extremely difficult given the Russian, Chinese and possibly
even French positions, Siniora nevertheless argued that if
the Syrians were not held accountable, or at least indicted,
their increasing pressure would eventually break Lebanon.
Siniora's advisor Mohamed Chatah asked if the U.S. would be
willing to introduce a Chapter VII resolution, even if it did
not have the express support of the French, implying that
such a move, even if unsuccessful, would give the Syrians
pause in their drive to unseat the democratically-elected
government of Lebanon. Siniora then repeated the question,
saying that he would ask all ambassadors from countries
represented on the Security Council the same question. The
Ambassador repeated the U.S. view that it would be extremely
difficult to obtain a Chapter VII resolution.


7. (C) Siniora inquired whether UNIIIC Commissioner
Brammertz, at the completion of his mandate in June, would
write a report that would, in effect, be an international
indictment of those responsible for the assassination of
Rafiq Hariri. Perhaps Siniora was signaling that he is
already considering the implications of a failure to
establish the tribunal, but he continued that what was most
important for Lebanon was an unequivocal indictment of those
guilty of the crime, presumably Syria and its agents in
Lebanon. But that depended on Brammertz writing a far
different final report than his interim reports would
indicate. Siniora requested U.S. assistance in convincing
Brammertz that if he has indictable proof, he should clearly
state so in his final report, otherwise, the evidence may
never see the light of day.

IS SYRIA CALLING THE SHOTS
--------------


8. (C) In his discussion of last Thursday's Sunni-on-Shia
violence, the Prime Minister expressed his view that the
prominent role played by Amal supporters in the confrontation
at Beirut's Arab University indicated that Syria now held the
upper hand in making the tactical decisions in the current
crisis. At the same time, the reticence of Hizballah's
supporters to fully engage the Sunni protesters showed that
Iran continued to influence events, but mainly to control the
degree of conflict, while Syria appeared to be directing when
things actually occur. (Note: Hizballah supporters did
participate in Thursday's violence, but principally in
reaction to events. And Nasrallah was the first March 8th
leader to call his supporters off the street in the face of
the subsequent LAF curfew. End note.)


9. (C) The Prime Minister said that while Lebanon was
presently in a precarious "balance of terror," Syria would do
all it could to drive the situation into chaos -- thus
affirming its long-held position that Lebanon without Syria
is ungovernable. It was this belief that formed the basis of
his pessimistic outlook for a genuine political compromise.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The Siniora we encountered in our 1/29 meeting was
not the Siniora we are accustomed to seeing. While in recent
weeks Siniora had been intensely focused and energized on the
preparations and lead-up to Paris III, in this meeting he
seemed utterly devoid of initiative or ideas of what to do
next. Usually firmly positioned on the windbag side of the
conversational spectrum, the PM was surprisingly reticent and
nonresponsive. Even the ubiquitous ringing phones of his
office and aides were eerily silent for the first time we can
recall. And except for his effusive praise of Paris III and
the U.S. leadership role in its success, Siniora was downbeat
-- more so than we have ever witnessed before. One had the
impression that he was in the "day after," let-down, hangover
period after a really excellent party in Paris: Paris III is
over, the much-feared financial crunch in February can now be
handled successfully, but grim political realities in Lebanon
have not changed significantly. Marwan Hamadeh confided to
the Ambassador later that evening that Siniora's depression
may also stem in part from Nazek Hariri's insulting treatment
of him in Paris. The "closest friend to Rafiq" was,
according to Hamadeh, treated coldly by Rafiq's widow even at
the dinner she hosted for the Lebanese delegation to Paris
III on Thursday night.

BEIRUT 00000156 003 OF 003




11. (C) As surprising as his bleak mood was the ignorance
Siniora professed about any Saudi-Iranian efforts to end
Lebanon's political crisis. He was (understandably)
dismissive about Nabih Berri's ideas without offering any
counter proposals of his own. Only two topics seemed to
capture his interest: sending out feelers about the Quixotic
possibility of a Chapter VII resolution creating the Special
Tribunal, and U.S. policy towarde Iran and Hizballah.
Indeed, while there was nothing particularly noteworthy about
the substance of the discussion of U.S. policy toward Iran
and Hizballah, it was clear that the Siniora was obsessed by
the topic. Deeply worried, the PM seems to have digested and
accepted as fact U.S. media reports suggesting potential U.S.
military action in Lebanon against Hizballah. When the
Ambassador saw Siniora briefly in the evening, Siniora again
raised this topic, urging the U.S. to realize that U.S.
military action against Hizballah inside Lebanon would
strengthen, not weaken, popular support for an organization
he, too, detests. Such action, he said, will be the excuse
that Hizballah needs to attack the Grand Serail and destroy
the "made-in-U.S." prime minister once and for all. (We
suggested that he relax.) While we asked for this meeting
with the PM in order to engage him seriously on the question
of how to control the Syrian-Lebanane border, we will have to
try that topic in a subsequent meeting.
FELTMAN