LEBANON: WORRIES ABOUT RED LINES ON UNSCR 1559

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001535

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY IR
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WORRIES ABOUT RED LINES ON UNSCR 1559

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Four well-informed Embassy contacts -- Walid
Jumblatt, Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and journalist Sarkis
Naom -- all argued in separate meetings with the Ambassador
that pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon are using upcoming
presidential elections to bury UNSCR 1559. They (and we) see
this as a dangerous development. Jumblatt worries that Saad
Hariri will too readily concede the resolution in order to
ease his way into the premiership; Jumblatt hopes Washington
will deliver a firm message to Hariri about the need to
preserve the resolution that likely contributed to his
father's death. Lahoud sees SAUDI duality at play: SAUDI
Arabia firmly rejects dealing with Syria yet wants at all
costs to avoid a conflict in Lebanon. This, in Lahoud's
view, leads to pro-Syrians believing they can force a stake
through the heart of UNSCR 1559 while also imposing a weak
presidential candidate. Naom, claiming to be in touch with
both Iranian diplomats and Hizballah officials, sees
opposition to UNSCR 1559 as only the tip of the iceberg. For
Iran and Hizballah, any discussion of disarmament is a red
line, given Iran's need to maintain a retaliatory strike
force, in the event of air strikes against Iran. Harb mused
that the anti-UNSCR 1559 push by Syria's allies may give
March 14 a bargaining chip in bringing in a March 14
president committed to Hizballah disarmament via other
methods. End summary.

UNSCR 1559 BACK IN THE HEADLINES
AS PRO-SYRIANS TRY TO BURY IT
--------------


2. (C) In recent days, UN Security Council Resolution 1559,
adopted on 9/2/04 (the day before the Syrian-orchestrated
extension of Emile Lahoud's presidential term),is again
making headlines in Lebanon. Hizballah and Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri are reprising their usual bad cop/good
cop roles: Hizballah officials insist that Lebanon's next
president explicitly reject UNSCR 1559, while Berri says
that, once presidential elections are complete, then UNSCR
1559 can be declared subsumed into UNSCR 1701, passed in
August 2006 to end the Hizballah-Lebanese hostilities.
Berri's argument is that two of UNSCR 1559's demands -- the
withdrawal of Syrian troops and presidential elections free
of foreign interference -- will have been implemented. The
"disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese
militias" of OP3, he insists, is superseded by the language
in UNSCR
1701, which refers back to UNSCR 1559.

UNSCR 1559 AND UNSCR 1701:
NO EQUIVALENCY ON DISARMAMENT
--------------


3. (S) UNSCR 1559 has long been described by pro-Syrians
here as an unfriendly resolution imposed on Lebanon, whereas
UNSCR 1701, which had Lebanese input and was approved by the
entire (then united) Lebanese cabinet, is perceived as a
"friendly" resolution. But by being so vocal about the need
to set aside UNSCR 1559, pro-Syrian politicians have provoked
new suspicions among March 14 contacts. We note that the
spirit of UNSCR 1701 is far different than the unambiguous
language regarding disarmament in UNSCR 1559. In UNSCR 1701,
OP3, by talking about prohibiting weapons "without the
consent of the Government of Lebanon," seems to offer an
escape clause from UNSCR 1559's disarmament obligations: if
a Lebanese cabinet with sufficient Hizballah strength (i.e.,
control of the "blocking third") gives its consent to
Hizballah's weaponry, then those weapons are not in violation
of UNSCRs. In OP8 in UNSCR 1701, the language on disarmament
is better, but OP8 contains a whole list of "principles and
elements" aimed at a "permanent ceasefire and a long-term
solution." In other words, by jettisoning UNSCR 1559 and
relying only on UNSCR 1701, Hizballah has two tools in its
hand: the possibility of GOL "consent" for its arms, and the
linkage to all the elements of a broader settlement with
Israel.

JUMBLATT HOPES WASHINGTON WILL EMPHASIZE
TO HARIRI IMPORTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS
--------------


BEIRUT 00001535 002 OF 003



4. (S) MP Walid Jumblatt told the Ambassador in a 10/2
meeting that the pro-Syrian insistence to drop UNSCR 1559 --
relayed to Hariri by Berri in their recent consultations, and
then shared by Hariri to March 14 leaders -- is evidence that
it is "worthless" to talk about a "consensus" president.
There is no such thing. Jumblatt believes that the
pro-Syrians strive to insulate Hizballah from disarmament via
three overlapping methods: declaration that UNSCR 1559 is no
longer relevant (a condition Hizballah will impose on any
presidential candidate and will also insert in the new
cabinet program),imposition of a weak president who cannot
defy Hizballah or Syria, and insistence on a "blocking third"
within the cabinet to be able to threaten cabinet collapse if
any progress toward disarmament is attempted.


5. (S) Jumblatt expressed worry that the pro-Syrians just
might get all three of those conditions, in part because of
Hariri's prime ministerial ambitions. Hariri, Jumblatt
believes, wants to start his premiership in a "calm
environment," and creating a calm environment means conceding
to Hizballah's wishes. It would be an "outrage" for March 14
to "give up" UNSCR 1559, given the number of UNSCR 1559
"martyrs" there are, Jumblatt said. "Rafiq Hariri paid for
UNSCR 1559 with this life." Jumblatt expressed the hope
that, in Washington, Hariri will be bucked up regarding the
"international legitimacy," with UNSCR 1559 being noted as a
key part of the international defense of Lebanon's
sovereignty and independence.

NASSIB LAHOUD: SAUDI FEARS OF CONFLICT
MAY LEAD TO ADVICE TO HARIRI TO COMPROMISE
--------------


6. (S) March 14 presidential hopeful Nassib Lahoud was
equally worried as Jumblatt, but he did not see Saad Hariri
as an enthusiastic participant in burying UNSCR 1559.
Instead, Lahoud mused about SAUDI instructions to Hariri.
Saying that he has this information "from very good sources
close to the King," Lahoud (whose sister-in-law used to be
married to King Abdullah) said that SAUDI ARABIA remains
furious at Syria. While this SAUDI boycott of Syria is
normally a good thing -- and it permitted Hariri to be
unusually vocal in his criticism of Damascus lately -- there
is another tendency of SAUDI Arabia, Lahoud insists, that is
less helpful. SAUDI ARABIA at all costs wants to avoid
conflict. So SAUDI Arabia, while snubbing Damascus, might
very well be telling Hariri to go along with a deal with
Berri, in order to prevent a crisis over the presidency.
This SAUDI tendency toward caution is probably giving the
pro-Syrians the hope that it is now realistic to kill the
hated UNSCR 1559. Hariri might not be able to push back,
because of SAUDI instructions to avoid a conflict.

"BLOCKING THIRD" NOT AS BAD
A CONCESSION AS PRESIDENT, UNSCR 1559
--------------


7. (S) Like Jumblatt, Lahoud argued that it would be an
enormous mistake for March 14 to concede either on UNSCR 1559
or on the presidency. But, unlike Lahoud, he thought that,
if March 14 had to concede something, it should concede the
"blocking third" in the cabinet. If the president, PM,
parliamentary majority, and most ministers remain on the side
of March 14, then March 14 wishes will mostly prevail. If
the Hizballah-dominated "blocking third" of the cabinet turns
out to be an insurmountable nuisance, then the March 14 PM
can resign, re-starting the cabinet formation process. What
is frightening about the "blocking third" now, Lahoud
emphasized, is the president's ability to sign the
cabinet-formation decree, a power that cannot be overcome.
But, once Emile Lahoud is out of office and a March 14
president installed, the president's signatory power becomes
an asset, not a liability, for March 14. Expressing
annoyance that March 14 is pressured to give up its
constitutional right to elect a president, Lahoud mused about
whether agreeing to concede the "blocking third" in the
cabinet would be sufficient to satisfy those European and
Arab countries insisting that March 14 be the side to
compromise.

ATTEMPTS TO KILL UNSCR 1559 PART
OF IRANIAN STRATEGY FOR RETALIATORY FORCE
--------------


8. (S) An-Nahar journalist and political columnist Sarkis

BEIRUT 00001535 003 OF 003


Naom was equally alarmed by the attempts to kill UNSCR 1559,
but he looked at it in the broader context. Citing insights
he claimed to glean from Iranian diplomatic and Hizballah
contacts, Naom said that the Iranian-Hizballah positions
develop in the context of regional developments. With the
possibility of military strikes against Iranian nuclear
targets, Iran will not abide any attempt to move toward
Hizballah's disarmament now. Hizballah's weapons will be
preserved at all costs, in order to be used in retaliation
against Israel, in case of an attack on Iran. So the
assumptions that Iran, unlike Syria, doesn't care about
Lebanon's presidency is false. Iran cares deeply that the
president be so weak as to be unable to promote disarmament.
Iran will use Hizballah to prevent the emergence of any kind
of credible president, Naom said, and will insist on the
abandonment of UNSCR 1559. "It is impossible for Iran to
compromise when it comes to Hizballah's rockets," Naom
concluded.

BOUTROS HARB: MUSING ABOUT "DOING" 1559
WHILE CONCEDING IT VERBALLY
--------------


9. (S) Over dinner with the Ambassador on 10/1, March 14's
second presidential aspirant, Boutros Harb, shared similar
concerns about the attempts by pro-Syrian Lebanese to declare
UNSCR 1559 no longer applicable. UNSCR 1559 is a "foundation
stone" of Lebanon's freedom, Harb said, using his lawyer's
training to analyze differences with UNSCR 1701, with the
latter lacking in his view. But, he said, "we're going to
have to give something" to get a March 14 president
sufficiently accepted in Lebanon to avoid some kind of
crisis. Harb wondered whether March 14 leaders might tell
Berri that, if the pro-Syrians accept either Nassib Lahoud or
himself being elected, then March 14 will agree that, for
Lebanon, UNSCR 1559 is "moved under the 1701 file." Neither
Nassib or himself will abandon the drive to bring Hizballah's
weapons under the control of the state, so maybe there could
be a "semantic" concession to March 8. March 8 could declare
victory, in that the March 14 leaders would agree verbally to
set UNSCR 1559 aside, but then the March 14 president, PM,
and majority would work to see it implemented in fact. The
Ambassador reminded Harb that Lebanon does not have the right
to set aside UNSCRs or unilaterally declare them implemented.
The point, Harb retorted, is to "end the era of militias."
So far, "your methods aren't working. Maybe mine will."

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) Like our March 14 contacts, we are alarmed by the
new insistence by the pro-Syrians to drop UNSCR 1559 one way
or another. We are reassuring our contacts that the USG and
other UNSC members are not in the habit of abandoning UNSCRs,
so they need not worry that UNSCR 1559 is about to be
forgotten history. Yet this new focus by the pro-Syrians on
UNSCR 1559 is just a taste of the problems to come. Even if
presidential elections pass successfully, this issue will no
doubt be one of many areas of conflict that must be worked
out for the new cabinet program that, along with the
ministerial roster, is submitted the parliament for the
cabinet's vote of confidence.


11. (S) We agree with Jumblatt that it is a good idea for
Washington to remind Hariri of the importance of UNSCR 1559:
while we don't believe that Hariri would subscribe to setting
aside the resolution that arguably led to his father's death,
it will be useful for him to be able to return to Lebanon and
tell his contacts of the importance of this issue and that it
absolutely cannot be ignored or set aside. After all, if the
new president and new cabinet (including the new PM that
could be Saad himself) do not commit themselves to UNSCR 1559
(even if full implementation takes time),it will be very
hard for us to continue to offer extensive economic, social,
and military assistance that Lebanon needs. A new president
and new PM and new cabinet will surely want this assistance
to continue, and Hariri, we hope, will grasp the linkage of
our help with UNSCR 1559.
FELTMAN