LEBANON: MARONITE BISHOPS CALL FOR SOVEREIGN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001514 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE BISHOPS CALL FOR SOVEREIGN, FREE, INDEPENDENT LEBANON REF: BEIRUT 1475 BEIRUT 00001514 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) In what many view as their clearest and most political statement ever, Lebanon's Maronite bishops issued their eighth annual "call" on September 19, a beacon of light on a day of tragic juxtaposition; just hours later a massive car bomb killed March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem, bringing to six the number of parliamentarians killed in the past few years. Key elements in the statement are highlighted below: -- the statement highlighted the fundamental choice facing Lebanon: "either our country will be sovereign, free, and independent, or it will be subordinate. And we have seen where subordination has taken us;" -- it said the solution will not come without the cooperation between the president, parliament, and government; -- noting the "decisive, momentous" nature of the presidential election, it called for a president with political experience who is able to "unify the Lebanese" and work towards expanding the state's authority over all of its citizens; -- it expressed the bishops' hope that Berri's initiative (to find a consensus presidential candidate) succeeds; -- it made no reference to the two-thirds quorum, instead, noting the duty of MPs to vote, declaring that "boycotting the presidential election session is boycotting the nation." If elections don't take place, "the future of the country will be grim;" -- it noted that many MPs have left the country in fear of political assassinations; -- it condemned the acquisition of arms and money by confessional groups to use in "exerting hegemony" over others; -- it also condemned the lack of state control in these activities, leading to the rise of "mini states that would rise on the remains of one individual state." -- it praised the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) solidarity in Nahr al-Barid. COMMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) This statement was significant in several respects. Without being explicit, it strongly condemns Hizballah's arms. Many see it as condemning implicitly Lebanon's Shia in their efforts to dominate other sects, a traditionally taboo subject. ¶3. (C) In term's of the presidential election, the statement had something to offer for both sides, though overall it appears to be a victory for March 14: March 8 can cite the language calling for a president who can "unify" the country as support for its efforts to seek a consensus candidate (the statement even praises Berri's initiative by name). March 14, meanwhile, can find comfort in the emphasis on a "sovereign, free, and independent" country as ammunition against the pro-Syrian opposition. ¶4. (C) The qualifications cited for the president rule out some candidates, like bankers Riad Salameh and Joseph Taraby. Further, a president who can "unite the Lebanese" is a far better formula that the Patriarch's contention that the president needs to be from neither March 14 nor March 8, but instead equidistance from all sides. The praise for the LAF may also be seen as a vote of confidence for LAF Commander Michel Sleiman's candidacy for the presidency. ¶5. (C) The language on boycotting parliament, though strong and appearing to lend strong support to March 14, was not ignored by the opposition in the September 25 electoral session of parliament (reftel). While all 68 March 14 MPs, despite significant security concerns, heeded the call, only BEIRUT 00001514 002.2 OF 002 six from the opposition were present, four from Berri's Amal bloc and two from the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) bloc. Berri, as Speaker, needed to live up to his promise to "convene" parliament (though whether or not parliament was technically convened is a matter of dispute, given that no vote was held),could hardly afford not to send any representatives, though he was careful not to send enough to help March 14 make the two-thirds quorum (86 out of 128). (A two-thirds majority is needed for a candidate to win in the first round; if two-thirds of the MPs are not present, by default it is impossible to get a two-thirds majority). It is doubtful whether the opposition will head the bishops' call on October 23, the next scheduled voting session, unless a consensus candidate has been agreed. Nevertheless, the bishops' statement provides considerable moral power to the anti-boycott calls of March 14, and we hope that the Patriarch and Maronite clergy can repeat this message frequently. ¶6. (C) We should bear in mind as well that the bishops' statement, despite its timing, is about much more than the presidency; it is essentially a spiritual and moral "state of the union" message. The fact that this year's call was clearly more political than usual reflects the Maronite church's alarm at Lebanon's ongoing political crisis. ¶7. (C) While the presidency, traditionally held by a Maronite under Lebanon's complex confessional political system, is of immediate concern to Lebanese Christians, who see themselves increasingly marginalized, the bishops' statement also recognizes that all of Lebanon's problems will not be solved by the election of President Lahoud's successor. Hizballah's arms, Lebanon's relationship Syria, and the country's future as a sovereign, free and independent state are the underlying issues that must be addressed. And, as the bishops so wisely point out, the solution will not come without the cooperation between its president, the parliament, and government. ¶8. (C) Public attention to the widely anticipated statement was quickly diverted to the Ghanem assassination just hours later after its release. While the attack underscored the importance of the bishops' message, sadly, it also seemed to disparage it. We continue to reference the principles embodied therein when asked publicly which candidate the USG prefers (being careful not to play the name game). Unfortunately, it appears the Maronite church's moral suasion is not enough to deter pro-Syrian forces from using parlimaentary boycotts in an effort to torpedo Lebanon's struggling democracy. FELTMAN