LEBANON: BERRI INITIATIVE MOVING AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001483 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI INITIATIVE MOVING AHEAD REF: A. BEIRUT 1475 ¶B. BEIRUT 1469 BEIRUT 00001483 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) As he promised he would, Speaker Berri called MPs to parliament on September 25 to begin the process of electing Lebanon's next president. Because only 74 MPs showed up, 12 short of the two-thirds majority needed to elect a president on the first round, the session was adjourned without a vote, and Berri said he would call another presidential election session on October 23. Despite Berri's claim to us that he is making progress on his initiative to reach a consensus candidate, we can't help but suspect that much of this drama is nothing but stalling tactics to allow March 8 more time to get its own candidate elected. End summary. ¶2. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and FSN Political Advisor met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's advisor Ali Hamdan on September 25 for a readout of Berri's September 24 meeting with Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and opening (and immediate adjournment) of parliament earlier on the 25th to begin the process of electing a president (Ref A). Hamdan had delayed his meeting with us to consult first with Berri about his one-on-one meeting with the Patriarch. BERRI HAPPY AGAIN -------------- ¶3. (C) Hamdan said the Speaker was regaining his optimism, lost after the September 19 assassination of March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem, following his positive meetings with the Ambassador (Ref B) and the Patriarch. Noting that the media (except, notably and predictably, Hizballah's al-Manar) portrayed a recent sequence of events as evidence of U.S. support for Berri's initiative to find a consensus candidate, Hamdan thanked the U.S. for providing "symbolic" support. (The events were the Ambassador's September 23 lunch with Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid Jumblatt and Berri's September 24 meeting with the Ambassador, immediately followed by Berri's meeting with the Patriarch.) ¶4. (C) Following his meeting with Sfeir, Berri told the press, "I can assure the Lebanese that the atmosphere is not as dark as everyone imagines The atmosphere is optimistic and not pessimistic." (Note: This may be in response to the Ambassador's remark to Berri earlier the same day that the continuing string of assassinations and ongoing political crisis did not bode well. End note.) PATRIARCH PROVIDES POLITICAL COVER -------------- ¶5. (C) The Patriarch and Berri did not discuss names during their one hour tete-a-tete, Hamdan confirmed. Pol/Econ Chief, citing press reports suggesting that the meeting had ruled out March 14 candidate Nassib Lahoud and Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun, asked whether this was the case. Aoun is dead as a candidate, Hamdan reaffirmed, reiterating, however, that no names were discussed during the meeting. Rather, the Patriarch stressed the need to elect a non-partisan consensus candidate. ¶6. (C) Pol/Econ Chief also asked whether the two had discussed the possibility of a constitutional amendment. (Note: An amendment is needed for sitting government officials like Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Michel Sleiman and Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, who normally face a two-year cooling off period before being eligible to run for president. End note.) Hamdan said the Patriarch's comments were in line with what he said publicly and with what the Ambassador had told Berri (Ref B),i.e., he was not wild about the idea but would go along with it if it was the only way to "save the country." SMOOTH SAILING FOR CAPTAIN BERRI -------------- ¶7. (C) Hamdan, who was at parliament during the electoral BEIRUT 00001483 002.2 OF 004 session but not in the chamber itself, said the opening went calmly, without any confrontation, except for Jumblatt, who appeared tense. What is wrong with this guy? he asked rhetorically. Security was extremely tight, he said, pulling out his cedar-imprinted single access badge (which he promised to have the new president sign and have framed); "too tight," he complained, they even blocked cell phone coverage. ¶8. (C) Hamdan said the opening of parliament marked the third stage in Berri's initiative to reach a compromise. First, there was the Speaker's August 30 Baalbek speech, Hamdan said, pulling out the Arabic text of the speech, in which he had highlighted the passage criticizing Hizballah's arms. Second was the meeting with the Patriarch (in which he told the press afterward, "when waves become very high, any ship or captain of a ship resorts to the lighthouse -- i.e., the Patriarch -- to reach safety. My visit is within this framework"). Third was Berri's convening of parliament. BERRI PREEMPTS MARCH 14 -------------- ¶9. (C) Does this constitute an actual convening, Pol/Econ Chief asked, noting that a vote had not been held because only 74 deputies (and not the two-thirds majority required by the constitution to elect successfully a president in the first round) had shown up and parliament had been adjourned. Hamdan said yes; by "calling" for parliament to meet, Berri had convened parliament. He will do so again on October 23. In the meantime, Berri will continue his mediation efforts: he met with Future Movement leader Saad Hariri twice on the margins of the parliamentary session and a third meeting was planned soon. Asked whether Berri planned to meet with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Hamdan said Geagea's wife and March 14 MP Setrida Geagea had met with Berri that morning. Representatives from the anti-Syrian Qornet Shewan movement (which played a key role in the 2005 Cedar Revolution following the assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri) were scheduled to meet with the Speaker at his office on September 26. We are more than half-way there, Hamdan proclaimed. ¶10. (Note: According to Article 73, the last ten days prior to the expiration of the current president's mandate, i.e., November 14 to 24, parliament "shall meet automatically," i.e, without being convened by the Speaker, for the purpose of electing a president if it has not/not been yet been convened by this purpose. The constitution is vague on whether a two-thirds quorum is necessary during this period. March 8, citing precedent and other articles that specify the need for a two-thirds quorum, argues it is; March 14 argues the opposite, since -- unlike in the cases of constitutional amendments and impeachment -- it is not explicitly stated. March 8's fear is that March 14 will use this period to elect a president using an absolute majority, a vote it claims cannot proceed without the mandatory two-thirds quorum. March 8 is trying to avoid this scenario altogether by arguing that, since Berri has convened parliament once, Article 73 can no longer be invoked. End note.) AOUN OUSTED -------------- ¶11. (C) Pol/Econ Chief noted that, assuming all 68 March 14 MPs are on board, Amal, with only 15 MPs, still does not have enough to reach the 86 votes needed for the two-thirds quorum March 8 insists is required. Hamdan replied they would also get one vote from the Syrian Baathist party (Qassem Hachem), bringing the total to 84, and that Aoun MPs Elie Skaff and Michel Murr had told Berri they were with him (i.e., they would forgo Aoun in favor of a consensus candidate). How would March 8 convince Aoun he was not a viable candidate without giving him the benefit of a vote, Pol/Econ Chief asked. He knows, Berri said, but admitted March 8 probably would wait until the last minute to impart this unpleasant news. Only Ghaleb Abu Zaynab, a "second track" Hizballah official, claims Aoun is Hizballah's candidate, Hamdan said. STALL TACTICS -------------- ¶12. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked whether, if this positive BEIRUT 00001483 003.2 OF 004 momentum continued, the Speaker would reconvene parliament earlier than October 23, as planned, to elect a consensus candidate. Hamdan's immediate response was that they would not be able to reach consensus that quickly. Noting that the Speaker had insisted to the Ambassador that the presidency was the key to solving all of Lebanon's political problems she asked whether it would not be better to elect a president sooner rather than later, before more MPs are killed. Hamdan's answer was (a somewhat reluctant, it seemed) yes. HIDDEN THREADS -------------- ¶13. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked whether there any new candidates in the race. Hamdan responded with one of his by now infamous analogies, using an Arabic term commonly used in political circles of a "kotbeh mukhfiyeh" ("hidden thread") to describe a secret strategy that can unravel the whole deal. Lebanese always like to have a hidden thread, explained, so we should not be surprised to see other names emerge. ¶14. (C) Pol/Econ Chief then asked whether, if no consensus is reached, LAF Commander General Michel Sleiman or Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh would be considered. Hamdan said securing the necessary constitutional amendment would be difficult. There are two ways to initiate the process: 1) the president, with cabinet's approval, proposes an amendment; 2) parliament passes legislation, but this would be a much lengthier and more complicated process. (Even this second option, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk points out to us, requires cabinet approval. PM Siniora has consistently stated his refusal to go along with a constitutional amendment.) ¶15. (C) The first option suggests March 8 would need to recognize the legitimacy of the Siniora government, Pol/Econ Chief noted. Yes, Hamdan agreed, adding that Siniora had not accepted the resignation of the six ministers who walked out last November, so technically March 8 could accept its proposal to amend the constitution. (We expect that the resigned ministers would return to the cabinet expressly for the purposes of passing the draft amendment, should a consensus be reached and Siniora's stiff opposition overcome.) FIXED MENU FOR MARCH 8 -------------- ¶16. (C) So, if things are moving along so well, what did March 8 expect for the U.S., Pol/Econ Chief asked. The Lebanese always know what they want, he said, delving into another metaphor; they'll ask your advice about the best option on the menu, but, in the end, they'll order want to eat. COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) Once again, we wonder what Berri is really up to. We wonder whether our March 14 contacts will accept Berri's claim that parliament has been officially convened, given that there were not enough MPs present to hold the first round of voting. Given the language in Article 73 of the constitution, accepting that parliament has been convened would undermine the majority's strategy of electing its own candidate during the last ten days of the 60-day period before Lahoud's mandate ends. We also wonder how Aoun will be convinced to step down voluntarily absent a decisive vote. ¶18. (C) We wonder if Berri is cozying to the Patriarch in order to pave the way for his eventual support for a constitutional amendment, one that will allow a candidate who can "save the country." We also wonder how March 8 can pick and choose when it is convenient to recognize the Siniora cabinet (i.e., should it sign off on a Lahoud proposal to amend the constitution) -- and, if it does recognize the cabinet for the purpose of a constitutional amendment (perhaps by having the resigned ministers return),could it continue to question the government's past decision, including to establish the Special Tribunal to investigate the Hariri assassination? ¶19. (C) We wonder (actually, we're pretty certain) whether BEIRUT 00001483 004.2 OF 004 the Speaker's request for the September 24 meeting with the Ambassador, the day before parliament was scheduled to convene, was a clever public relations move designed to demonstrate to March 14 that Berri has U.S. support for his initiative. While we will continue to support publicly all his efforts to find a 100 percent made-in-Lebanon consensus candidate, we have also warned March 14 about the possible pitfalls in boarding Berri's ship. (No matter how good the life jacket, Walid Jumblatt, for one, is unlikely ever to board.) ¶20. (C) Most of all, we wonder why Berri, who claims the presidency is the key to all of Lebanon's problems, has postponed the vote for one month, until October 23, one week longer than the October 17 date he announced just two days earlier. Possibly to deflect attention away from the critical October 16 date, when parliament reverts to its legislative function? That would give parliament one week to pass legislation amending the constitution to allow the likes of Michel Sleiman and Riad Salameh to become president. Does he really need that long to reach a consensus when things are moving along so well? (One interesting possibility for this delay: while Marwan refuses to confirm this story, we heard that the reason for Marwan Hamadeh's private consultation with Berri yesterday was to tell Berri that Jumblatt -- assuming his visa clearance comes through -- plans to be in Washington on October 17. According to this theory, Berri, in a small conciliatory gesture to Jumblatt, agreed to wait an additional week.) ¶21. (C) Despite Hamdan's claim that Berri is more than halfway there, we won't hold our breathes for any announcements anytime soon. We expect to continue to hear positive noises about Berri's progress, but we also expect Berri's hurry up and wait game will drag things out until his ship safely reaches the post October 16 harbor, when the opening of the regular parliamentary session makes constitutional amendments somewhat easier to achieve. FELTMAN