DUELING WITH LEBANON'S ARMY COMMANDER ON SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001465 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY SUBJECT: DUELING WITH LEBANON'S ARMY COMMANDER ON SECURITY THREATS, PRESIDENCY REF: BEIRUT 1457 BEIRUT 00001465 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 9/24 meeting with the Ambassador, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman downplayed the risk of street violence. While Christian leaders allied with Hizballah like Suleiman Franjieh and Michel Aoun were actively arming their followers, Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces remain much more powerful on the ground. Like Minister of Defense Elias Murr before him (reftel),Sleiman rebuffed the Ambassador's suggestion that the LAF try to crack down now on militia-building activities. He argued that, first, the dangers are exaggerated (especially if March 14 avoids provocative actions),and, second, the only real solution is political (i.e., a consensus president). The Ambassador argued that choosing a consensus president, while preventing a crisis over the presidency, solves nothing. As soon as the president takes place, the same stalemate over Lebanon's future will complicate the selection of a prime minister, formation of a cabinet, and development of the requisite government program. Sleiman disagreed. By having a president, "70 percent" of the issues will be solved, as Sunnis and Shia -- whose mutual distrust and loathing leads to political stalemate -- suddenly have a referee each can trust. Alluding to his own presidential prospects, Sleiman said that he would want to see UNSCR 1701 fully implemented and Hizballah's arms brought gradually under the control of the state. End summary. PUSHING FOR LAF ACTION AGAINST MILITIA-BUILDING -------------- ¶2. (S) As he had with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Murr a few days earlier (reftel),the Ambassador met one-on-one with LAF Commander Sleiman on 9/24 to raise concerns about reports of militia-building activity across Lebanon. The Ambassador argued that the LAF should not be sitting idle when factions were distributing arms, training their followers, and in some cases planning for pre-emptive steps. Referring to the moral high ground the LAF occupies after its Nahr al-Barid victory, the Ambassador said that the frightened Lebanese public would welcome the LAF trying to crack down on the militia-building activities. No one would be able to question the LAF's national credentials, so now is the time for the LAF to move. Responding to Sleiman's comment that "everyone is doing it," the Ambassador distinguished between the self-defense concerns by March 14 leaders, who have legitimate concerns for their lives, and what seems to be aggressively offensive activities by March 8 figures like Suleiman Franjieh. If Franjieh were not preparing for action, Jumblatt and Geagea would not be as concerned with contingency planning. ¶3. (S) Sleiman agreed that Franjieh and Michel Aoun were arming and training their followers, Franjieh to a larger extent than Aoun. But he disagreed with the suggestion that what they were doing was inherently worse than others' efforts at self-defense. If street violence would break out in the Christian areas, Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces are stronger on the ground. Walid Jumblatt is stronger than Wi'am Wihab. The Ambassador noted that Hizballah is strongest on the ground, and it seems wiser to take measures now to ensure that street violence doesn't break out. Once violence breaks out, it is harder to stop than to prevent now. The Ambassador cautioned Sleiman that the USG partnership with the LAF is based in large measure on the LAF's record to date; if the LAF suddenly abdicated its role by staying on the sidelines while militias grabbed parts of Lebanon, the USG would have to reevaluate our cooperation with the LAF. The LAF accepted with heroism and sacrifice its responsibility for protecting Lebanon against Fatah al-Islam terrorists; now the LAF needed to accept its responsibility in cracking down on militias and protect the state institutions. COMMANDER SEES THREAT OF VIOLENCE AS EXAGGERATED -------------- BEIRUT 00001465 002.2 OF 003 ¶4. (S) Switching from stilted English to a typically Lebanese melange of French and Arabic, Sleiman said that he thought that the danger of street violence was exaggerated. People are posturing, trying to intimidate the others. The LAF could inadvertently provoke violence by moving against political groups which had done nothing wrong. The LAF had to stand neutral until such time as one group actually took action on the street, at which point the LAF could move against the perpetrators. In an exchange with the Ambassador, Sleiman made it clear that he did not see the danger of Hizballah initiating street violence but rather any problems starting with the Christian or Druse streets. The Ambassador reminded Sleiman that March 14 leaders have not been initiating violence but are rather the victims of violence; it is more likely, for example, that Wihab would attack Jumblatt than vice versa. POTENTIAL VIOLENCE LINKED TO PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶5. (S) The real solution to the militias is not the LAF anyway, Sleiman insisted. Rather, the solution must come politically. And that political solution starts with the presidency. If a consensus president emerges, immediately the tensions drop, the fears begin to evaporate, and paramilitary preparedness slows. If March 14 insists on using its constitutional interpretation to elect a one-sided president, then the risks increase. So instead of pushing the LAF to act, perhaps the Ambassador should be pushing the political sides to a consensus solution, Sleiman advised. The Ambassador asked Sleiman to consider the worst-case scenario, that no consensus emerges, March 14 elects its own president, and March 8 forces take to the streets in protest. What happens? Sleiman said that his first priority would be to preserve the unity to the army. If that is short-hand for inaction, the Ambassador said, then the LAF will have lost the credibility it gained in Nahr al-Barid. Standing on the sidelines means backing the insurgents. DEBATING THE IMPACT OF ELECTING A CONSENSUS PRESIDENT -------------- ¶6. (S) Sleiman repeated that, to avoid that scenario, Lebanon needed a consensus president. The Ambassador said that, while we would welcome a president with broad political and popular support, the language of threats and the militia-building activities by March 8 did not seem to be leading Lebanon in that direction. With MP Antoine Ghanem's murder last week, the message is being passed to March 14 leaders that they should submit to the March 8 view of a consensus candidate or face extermination, either politically or physically. If there is a consensus presidential choice that emerges in this over-heated atmosphere, the Ambassador said, none of the problems bedeviling Lebanon would be solved. Hizballah would still smuggle arms and keep Lebanon poised in danger of war. Paris III reforms would still be blocked. Michel Aoun would continue to insist on sidelining the Sunnis. Yes, a consensus president would prevent a crisis over the presidency, but then the crisis and stalemate will be shifted to the process of choosing a PM, selecting a cabinet, and designing a government program. ¶7. (S) Sleiman said that, "with your permission," he wished to disagree. The stalemate in the Lebanese system today is based in large part on the deep distrust between Sunnis and Shia, he said. Each look to block the other, with the Shia dominating March 8 and the Sunnis dominating March 14. Aoun, "a crazy man," is with the Shia, while Geagea, "a murderer," is with the Sunnis. If there is a new president that emerges by consensus, then "70 percent of our problems disappears." Aoun and Geagea are reduced in size, as the Christians rally and unite around a neutral figure. The Sunnis and Shia suddenly have a referee each can trust. What is now impossible to achieve because one side or the other suspects a trick becomes easier, when the president throws his weight behind it. Electing a consensus president restores essential balance in the system, allowing it to function again, after the "nightmare" of Emile Lahoud's term. ¶8. (S) Even the problem of Hizballah's arms? the Ambassador asked. "We have to be realistic," Sleiman said. No president will be able to force disarmament of Hizballah from BEIRUT 00001465 003.2 OF 003 one day to the next. If he were president, he said, he would want to insist upon the implementation of UNSCR 1701 being part of the cabinet program. Gradually, and with the right political environment locally and the region, Hizballah's arms should be brought under the control of the state. The Ambassador noted that we would expect a new president and cabinet to address immediately the problem of arms smuggling into Lebanon from Syria. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) Speaking with unusual confidence, Sleiman postured as presidential material in this meeting. While the topic of his own ambition was only touched upon, his defense of the presidency (as the cure to what ails Lebanon) surely reflects his own hopes. But our point in seeing him today was not to discuss his future career prospects but rather to put down a marker that we see the LAF playing an essential role in preventing street violence in the weeks ahead. In his effort to appear neutral and faute-de-mieux acceptable to all, Sleiman surely did not welcome our message. We will continue to emphasize to him and those around him that there is no acceptable neutrality if GOL institutions come under attack. If he gives us his usual response -- that his first priority is to preserve the unity of the army -- we will inquire what is so sacred about a unified army, if that unity cannot be used to protect Lebanon's institutions from an internal coup d'etat. FELTMAN