LEBANON: BERRI'S LATEST TWIST: A DISGUISED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001461 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI'S LATEST TWIST: A DISGUISED ATTEMPT TO ELECT SLEIMAN? REF: BEIRUT 1334 BEIRUT 00001461 001.4 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Following a lengthy discussion between Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's senior advisor and Pol/Econ Chief, Berri, in the latest twist in the opposition's tireless efforts to gain control of the presidency, is proposing a one-month trial period for his initiative to seek a consensus candidate. While this obviously is a last-ditch attempt to revive what many perceive to be an OBE'd initiative in the wake of the September 19 assassination of March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem, we find the idea intriguing. Much as we would like to believe in the Speaker's self-proclaimed altruism, our suspicions tell us that this may be a clever attempt to bring Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Sleiman to Baabda Palace through the back door. End summary. GHANEM ASSASSINATION DEALS DEATH BLOW TO BERRI INITIATIVE -------------- ¶2. (C) Pol/Econ Chief met with Ali Hamdan, senior advisor to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, on September 21, two days after the assassination of March 14 MP Antoine Ghanem. Hamdan noted that the Lebanese press reported that the attack also put an end to Berri's initiative for a compromise president. (Note: The initiative comes with a price tag -- March 14's acceptance that a two-thirds quorum is mandatory to hold a vote, effectively giving March 8 a veto over any candidate. End note.) Surprisingly, Hamdan agreed with this assessment, stating that the bomb that killed Ghanem had effectively also destroyed the bridge the March 8 opposition was trying to build with the March 14 majority. US "industrial strength" was needed to put the bridge back together, he stressed, adding that the Saudis had urged PM Siniora and Future Movement leader Saad Hariri to support the initiative. ¶3. (C) Hamdan complained that March 14's delay in responding to the initiative was another attempt to stall until the last possible moment, at which time the majority intended to impose its own candidate on the opposition using an absolute majority vote. He urged the US to discourage March 14 from going this route, repeating March 8's well-known argument that US support for this strategy removed any incentive March 14 has to compromise. Pol/Econ Chief noted that March 14's majority was not guaranteed, even less so after the assassination of yet another one of its MPs. BISHOPS' STATEMENT WON'T DETER PARLIAMENTARY BOYCOTT -------------- ¶4. (C) Referring to the September 19 Maronite Bishops' call (septel),which said "boycotting the presidential election is boycotting the nation," Pol/Econ Chief asked how March 8 could justify its absence in light of the Bishops' strong statement. Hamdan argued that an MP's decision not to attend a session was not necessarily the same thing as a boycott, differentiating between the example of former MP Hussein Husseini, who officially boycotted parliament for his entire for year term starting in 1992 because the Syrians dropped him from becoming Speaker, and a March 8 MP's decision not to attend an electoral session. It is up to the voters, he said, to judge whether their representative is justified in abstaining from a parliamentary session. AOUN'S VASELINE CARPET -------------- ¶5. (C) Furthermore, Hamdan continued, the role of the minority is one of veto power. Pol/Econ Chief countered that this power effectively gives the minority a majority voice if it is used to veto every candidate except its own. Speaking of which, she asked, noting that Free Patriotic Movement Leader General Michel Aoun himself still claimed to be the opposition's one and only candidate, does March 8 support the General? Aoun is the first victim of Berri's compromise initiative, Hamdan scoffed. Even Michel Murr had warned him BEIRUT 00001461 002.4 OF 005 he was on a "Vaseline carpet;" Murr reportedly told Aoun he would unroll his support for the General on September 25, but if Aoun didn't have the votes, he would slide out the door. THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG? -------------- ¶6. (C) Hamdan then returned to the usual March 8 refrain: Lebanon's constitution mandates a two-thirds quorum. Pol/Econ Chief retorted that each side had its own interpretation of the ambiguously drafted constitution, rendering the debate a non-starter. Hamdan tried again: why should the opposition make the first move when March 14 had yet to agree to any of its overtures? Let them make a goodwill gesture. Pol/Econ Chief replied that this line of reasoning only takes us in circles, with each side putting the onus on the other to act. It was like the chicken and the egg, Hamdan agreed, which came first? ¶7. (C) Pol/Econ Chief, explaining the term, urged March 8 to take the moral high ground by agreeing to holding elections without preconditions. This would make it easier for the US to support the Speaker's initiative to find a consensus president, she argued. Hamdan, who appeared not to immediately digest the full significance of the term (or perhaps the moral high ground term touched a nerve; Hamdan has a reputation for being quite the philanderer),insisted Amal had already done so with its initiative. Pol/Econ Chief explained that taking the moral high ground meant doing what was right regardless of what the other side does, and without any conditions. One side needed to make the first move. ISLAM AND THE SUNNI-SHIA SPLIT -------------- ¶8. (C) Sliding into yet another analogy (in a meeting in which colorful metaphors abounded),Hamdan said asking March 8 to agree to participate in the election without any guarantees that March 14 would not impose its candidate using an absolute majority vote was akin to the Shia losing their claim that Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Mohamed, was Mohamed's rightful heir as leader of Islam. According to Hamdan, Ali yielded his claim to the throne based on an understanding that the Sunni's would sacrifice their candidate as well. Instead, the Sunni's imposed their choice and Ali had to wait through three caliphates before assuming his rightful place is Islam. March 8 would not fall prey to the same trap. ¶9. (C) Pol/Econ Chief noted that, since there were ample candidates whom the Speaker himself had told the Ambassador during their August 30 meeting (reftel) March 8 would not oppose, why not have each side write down two names in a sealed envelope to be opened at noon on September 24 (the day before parliament is scheduled to convene to begin the election process). If both envelopes contain a common name, problem solved. ¶10. (C) Hamdan said he liked the fact that in this exercise the US played a neutral role by not pushing either envelope, arguing that was what was needed to make March 14 compromise. Pol/Econ Chief noted that the Ambassador had been consistently supportive of the Speaker in public, and that the US was not pushing any candidates. If the opposing sides, without foreign interference, came up with a consensus candidate, the US would support that candidate. The US focus was on the end result, but the opposition should not impose conditions on how to get there. AMAL CRITICIZES HIZBALLAH'S RIGHT TO ARMS -------------- ¶11. (C) Hamdan again insisted that the US practice more neutrality. Pol/Econ Chief responded that it was only natural that the US would side with the democratically-elected majority government, and that in the end, if push came to shove, the US probably would support the presidential candidate who best embodied the principles outlined in the Bishops' statement, i.e., one who supports a sovereign, free and independent Lebanon. The presence of Hizballah -- whose armed militias go counter to the Bishops' statement -- in the opposition makes it difficult for the US BEIRUT 00001461 003.4 OF 005 to practice 100 percent neutrality. ¶12. (C) Hamdan was quick to distance Amal from Hizballah, stating that Berri had openly criticized Hizballah's claim to arms. "It is not the Shia's responsibility to guard the border," he said. Berri made this point in his August 31 speech in Baalbek at the commemoration ceremony marking 29 years since the disappearance of Amal's founder, Imam Musr Sadr. This is the first time Shia are saying this, Hamdan stressed, and it is echoed in the Bishops' statement. OPENING THE RACE TO DARK HORSES -------------- ¶13. (C) Did the US envision an expansion of the pool of candidates, Hamdan asked, noting that former Finance Minister (in the 2005 Mikati cabinet) Demianos Kattar had emerged recently as a possible dark horse. Pol/Econ Chief reiterated that the US was not in the business of playing the name game, but questioned the need to expand the pool when the two sides already had narrowed the field to a handful of acceptable candidates. ¶14. (C) Hamdan then revealed a "secret;" a foreign envoy reportedly told Berri that Justice Minister Charles Rizk had told him he thought March 8 would oppose his candidacy because of his role in promoting the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. (Note: The mystery man in question may be Sudanese President Bashir's Special Envoy Mustapha Othman Ismail, who visited Lebanon in mid-September. Our efforts to get details of the visit from the Sudanese embassy were unsuccessful, though the diplomat we met with was both surprised and pleased to receive a visit from the US Embassy.) GIVE BERRI'S INITIATIVE A CHANCE -------------- ¶15. (C) A few hours later, Pol/Econ Chief received an SMS from Hamdan saying he needed to talk right away. Berri, he relayed over the phone, had a "better idea." Let's give his initiative a chance, i.e., agree to the two-thirds mandatory quorum for a limited one-month trial period from September 25 until October 25. The Speaker, Hamdan assured, would deliver. Asked what Berri was asking of the US, Hamdan replied that it should support this effort privately with March 14. He expressed particular concern regarding Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, who seemed to be the March 14 leader most opposed to Berri's initiative. (Note: According to press reports, Berri called Jumblatt the same day, September 21, to offer his condolences; the Ambassador raised the initiative with Jumblatt on September 23, though the Druse leader did not provide any significant comments. End note.) Pol/Econ Chief promised to relay the Speaker's message to the Ambassador. BERRI MAKES NICE WITH HARIRI, POSTPONES MEETING WITH PATRIARCH -------------- ¶16. (C) During the face-to-face meeting, Hamdan said Berri had had two "good" telephone conversations with Future Movement leader Saad Hariri. When pressed for details, Hamdan said the talks were primarily pleasantries and exchanged condolences after the Ghanem assassination, but demonstrated the good intentions of both parties. Asked about the Speaker's cancellation of his planned September 21 meeting with the Patriarch, Hamdan said this was due to security considerations, but Berri intended to meet with him soon, although Hamdan did not know when. Hamdan also cited security concerns as the reason Berri did not attend Ghanem's funeral, sending a representative in his place. Berri was disappointed, Hamdan added, not to have received a condolence call from the US Ambassador, as he had from other foreign missions. COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) We find it surprising that Hamdan admitted Berri's initiative is dead. Rather than surrender, however, Berri hopes revive his proposal for a one-month trial period. Though we suspect this is just the latest in a long list of BEIRUT 00001461 004.4 OF 005 the Speaker's crafty moves to ensure March 8 has a strong (if not determining) voice in the election, the idea does have some merit: 1) it would call Berri's bluff; should the opposition veto any of the proposed candidates (i.e., Boutros Harb, Robert Ghanem) that Berri claims March 8 would accept, the Speaker's true colors would be revealed once and for all; 2) in the wake of yet another assassination of a March 14 MP, it would be a public relations victory for the majority if it accepts, after having lost its own moral high ground in the public's eyes by rejecting Berri's initiative; and 3) if no president has been elected at the end of the period, March 14 still has one month before the expiration of President Lahoud's mandate to elect its own candidate. ¶18. (C) The pitfalls are obvious: 1) the proposal breathes new life into what is arguably a defunct initiative, buying Berri more time to come up with his next move; 2) March 14 is on the defensive once again: having dug in its heels with its insistence on its right to elect a president by absolute majority, it is unlikely to give in to Berri now, especially after Ghanem's assassination; but if it rejects the idea, it again becomes the bad guy in the public relations battle; and 3) Berri may be using us to bring a reluctant Jumblatt, whom Berri appears to see as the sole March 14 holdout, around to accepting his initiative. (We doubt Samir Geagea would be on board, either, but Berri is historically quicker in simply disregarding Christian input.) ¶19. (C) Then there are the unknowns: 1) where does this leave March 8 ally General Michel Aoun, who is still under the illusion (and perhaps rightfully so -- only time will tell) that he is the opposition's one and only candidate?; 2) is Hizballah on board?; 3) what are the implications of the October 25 deadline, given that, as of October 16 until November 14, parliament resumes its legislative role, during which time constitutional amendments could be made; and, most troublesome, 4) wherein lies the trap in this latest Berri ploy? We've seen too many past examples of the Speaker's efforts to undermine Lebanon's democratic institutions to believe, despite what we say publicly, the Speaker has nothing but the country's best interests at heart. SLEIMAN TO THE RESCUE? -------------- ¶20. (C) Comment continued: We see one interpretation of Berri's latest proposal that answers many of these questions: that the real, hidden goal is to elect LAF Commander General Sleiman as president. If March 14 agrees to the one-month trial period, the opposition can spend three weeks pretending to play the game but in reality ensure that no candidate is elected by depriving parliament of the mandatory two-thirds quorum. Then, on October 16, when parliament reverts back to its legislative role for one month (Berri himself provided this clue in his last meeting with the Ambassador, opening his calendar to the date),and there is still no president, Sleiman, a hero after defeating Fatah al-Islam terrorists in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, will emerge as the only one who can "save the country" from chaos. Starting October 16, parliament can take the necessary legislative action to amend the constitution to allow Sleiman to run (normally high-ranking government officials have a two-year cooling-off period). ¶21. (C) By this time, we imagine the scenario goes, March 14 MPs are tired of fighting, the Patriarch and the country are getting nervous about what will happen next, and all agree that electing Sleiman, who up until now, being a stealth March 8 candidate, has stayed of the limelight, should step forward and put an end once and for all to the ongoing political crisis. Aoun has already been tried on and discarded in early rounds of voting, so he is taken care of (especially if the constitution is further amended to limit Sleiman's term to two years vice four, giving Aoun another chance in 2009, following the 2009 parliamentary elections where he hopes to make huge gains). A win-win situation for all, if March 14 would agree. HOUSE OF MIRRORS -------------- ¶22. (C) Comment continued: It's an ingenious plan. Berri BEIRUT 00001461 005.4 OF 005 gets his secret candidate elected without putting him forward or even acknowledging that Sleiman is March 8's top choice. Indeed, in our last meeting with the Speaker, in which he listed possible consensus candidates, he immediately ruled out Sleiman and Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh on the grounds that constitutional amendments would be too difficult. It explains why Hamdan refuses to play the envelope game, knowing full well March 8 can't submit Sleiman's name (for fear of being found out) and won't submit other names, like Harb or Ghanem, that is has said it wouldn't veto. It also explains Hamdan's attempt to widen the pool of candidates; the more candidates, the more time it takes to narrow the list, buying March 8 time until the critical October 16 date. Finally, it explains why Hamdan differentiates between a parliamentary boycott and abstention, giving March 8 MPs a justification for not going to parliament without disobeying the Bishops' statement. ¶23. (C) Hizballah also would like this scenario; a friendly president might talk tough on Hizballah arms and make as if working to incorporate them into the LAF, while in reality turning a blind on to many of Hizballah's activities. Interestingly, Hamdan seemed at pains to distance Amal from Hizballah's arms. While it is much too early to detect cracks in the Amal-Hizballah alliance, it is encouraging to hear that Berri is openly challenging Hizballah's right to "defend" Lebanon's borders. But this may just be another example of the house of mirrors that makes us see what they want us to see, rather than the reality, i.e., a tactical move designed to boost LAF Commander Sleiman's presidential prospects. CROCODILE TEARS FOR BERRI -------------- ¶24. (C) Comment continued: On a last note, it strikes us as incongruous that March 14 leaders were present at Ghanem's funeral in full force, despite yet another assassination of one of their own kind and despite well-founded security concerns, while Berri, a leader of the pro-Syrian opposition, cites security concerns for his absence, despite the fact that he is Speaker of the parliament of which Ghanem was a member. We shed crocodile tears for Berri's complaint that he did not receive a condolence call from the US Ambassador following Ghanem's assassination, the latest in a long list of political assassinations against outspoken anti-Syrian politicians, beginning with the February 14, 2005 attack on former PM Rafik Hariri. FELTMAN