LEBANON: PDAS DIBBLE'S VISIT REVEALS A FULL AGENDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001446 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/DEMOPOLOUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PDAS DIBBLE'S VISIT REVEALS A FULL AGENDA FOR THE OCTOBER CORE GROUP MEETING Classified By: DCM William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a September 12-14 visit, EEB PDAS Elizabeth Dibble met with GOL officials, bankers, and World Bank economists, who agreed on just two issues: continued U.S. support for Lebanon is essential during the upcoming presidential election period, and Lebanon has a lot to discuss at the upcoming Core Group meeting. Finance Minister Azour will present a strategy for continued engagement with the IMF during the transition to a new government, but World Bank Middle East region Director Saba emphasized the need for Azour to hear donor concerns at the meeting. While Azour was confident Lebanon will continue to meet IMF targets and pursue reform, Central Bank Governor Salameh argued that, without a compromise president, Lebanon could spiral into a crisis. Saba noted that Lebanon is likely to miss key targets later this year and to lose momentum on reform when the new government takes power. ¶2. (C) Lebanon has made limited progress preparing for power and telecom privatization, Dibble was told. Bankers noted that while GOL-bank cooperation maintains a stable system, their appetite for Lebanese debt is decreasing. Finally, experts on post-July 2006 war and post-Nahr al-Barid reconstruction noted that their efforts are on track. End summary. ALL AGREE ON ONE ISSUE: MUCH TO DISCUSS AT OCTOBER CORE GROUP MEETING -------------- ¶3. (C) EEB PDAS Dibble met with GOL officials, bankers, and World Bank economists during her September 12-14 visit to Lebanon. The three-day visit was filled with contradictory messages that reflected the speakers biases, but all contacts agreed on two points. First, all GOL officials thanked PDAS Dibble for her hard work facilitating the cash transfer, noting that U.S. assistance is an important bolster for market confidence as well as for GOL finances. GOL and non-governmental contacts alike emphasized that continued U.S. support for Lebanon will be essential during the upcoming electoral period. Second, all agreed that Lebanon has a full agenda of urgent issues to discuss during Core Group and bilateral meetings on the margins of the October World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings in Washington. ¶4. (C) Finance Minister Jihad Azour previewed two strategies he is prepared to present in Washington to demonstrate Lebanon's continued engagement with the IMF and to maintain externally-imposed discipline. First, if Lebanon quickly elects a president in the September 25-November 24 election period, Azour is ready to lay the groundwork in his October meetings for the next government to negotiate a formal Stand-By Agreement. Since it will likely take some two months for a new authoritative government to form once a president is elected and this will likely not be done by the time its current Emergency Post Conflict Agreement (EPCA) ends in January, Azour called for U.S. support for an extension of or a new EPCA. Azour also is planning a Core Group meeting and bilateral meetings with his counterparts in the Gulf and EU to request further bilateral assistance. ¶5. (C) Visiting World Bank Director for the Middle East and North Africa Joe Saba emphasized that Azour needs to hear donors' concerns at the planned Core Group meeting; if the EPCA ends without a new program in place (and with several targets not met) Lebanon will have a hard time obtaining further support from the Bank or other donors. The Bank has asked Azour to schedule additional "strategic" meetings in October to ensure he is fully aware of credit committee concerns. Lebanon will have to implement more fiscal and structural reforms before the Bank can provide more budget support, Saba argued. While Bank staff requested another $75 million loan conditioned upon reform, they will not be able to disburse before a new government and a new IMF agreement are in place, Saba worried, limiting the GOL's access to concessional budget support. Unable to provide more cash, Saba hopes over the next several months to provide more consultants and technical assistance to help achieve reform goals. ¶6. (C) Minister of Economy and Trade Sami Haddad is unsure BEIRUT 00001446 002 OF 005 whether he will travel to Washington in October to discuss trade issues. He expressed frustration and resentment at what he viewed as a consistent lack of U.S. political support for Lebanon's WTO accession. He repeated his frequent arguments that Lebanon has a more liberal trade regime than many existing and recent WTO members, has a tariff level lower than the regional average, and is "doing its homework" to meet U.S. demands. Despite Lebanon's qualifications, American technical negotiators clearly have not received a political signal to support Lebanon's accession, Haddad argued, and have not even answered the GOL's correspondence from earlier negotiating rounds. ¶7. (C) Finally, Ghassan Taher of the Prime Minister's Office will present to donors a comprehensive investment program at the Core Group meeting. Lebanon requires additional financing to resolving existing projects and pursue strategic ones not feasible given the GOL's fiscal constraints. MOF UPBEAT ON EPCA, STABILITY... -------------- ¶8. (C) FinMin Azour was far more optimistic than World Bank officials, Lebanese regulators, or private bankers about Lebanon,s ability to meet its financial obligations and continue reforms under the next government. Azour confidently reported to PDAS Dibble that progress on reform has been excellent considering that neither the parliament nor the cabinet is meeting as expected. Lebanon met all of its second quarter EPCA targets and is prepared to meet targets for the rest of the year with the exception of setting a floor on the gas excise tax. Azour argued raising the excise tax was too politically sensitive for the current cabinet and was unnecessary since the GOL was already exceeding EPCA revenue targets; the GOL since 2004 has earned no revenue from the excise tax, but is not subsidizing fuel prices. He argued that raising revenues now would simply lead to higher expenditures; instead Azour hopes to the GOL will increase public transportation and find other ways to help low and middle class citizens in 2008, and raise the gas excise tax then. ¶9. (C) Azour admitted he is worried about a funding gap, as the GOL has received less than projected in donor contributions; according to his data the GOL has signed just $1.3 billion in official agreements. Azour reiterated that he has taken measures to avoid financial problems during the election period, and that he saw no need to raise interest rates or exceed EPCA targets on GOL borrowing from the CBL. Azour expressed more confidence that the GOL has created a structure to continue reform after the current cabinet departs, including intermininsterial committees with work plans, and enabled the next government to more forward even more quickly once it reached office. ... WHILE CBL URGES COMPROMISE TO FORSTALL COLLAPSE -------------- ¶10. (C) Central Bank officials expressed confidence in their ability to manage amidst the current political crisis, but argued that without a political compromise Lebanon could face a crisis beyond their control. All eyes are on the first two weeks of November, Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh told us. With a green light from the U.S., Lebanon could have compromise president -- Salameh admitted his candidacy -- and a majority cabinet, Salameh projected. Without pre-selection of a compromise president there will be more political instability and investors will be less willing to fund the GOL. The market expects a compromise president or a negotiated solution, Salameh commented, but is watching troubling indicators: credit default swap rates in London have risen from 4 percent to 5.5 percent in the last two months; demand has exceeded offers for dollars; and the GOL is relying on the CBL to supply it with dollars because subscriptions for Eurobonds are weak. Salameh went on to argue that a political compromise that allows economic growth would benefit the GOL later, luring citizens of all backgrounds away from political parties and enabling the GOL to provide a social safety net superior to Hizballah's. ¶11. (C) Salameh continued his alarmist argument, raising the specter of massive socio-economic dislocation, depreciation of the pound, and a GOL unable to pay soldiers enough to maintain control. When Lebanon last had two governments, Salameh noted, the CBL lost its reserves and caused depreciation and inflation by trying to placate both BEIRUT 00001446 003 OF 005 governments, while depositors and investors fled. ¶12. (C) Banking Control Commissioner Walid Alameddine argued that a political compromise is necessary to maintain stability not only for Lebanon but for regional and U.S. banks. Since the US sub-prime incident, rating agencies have a lower tolerance for risk, he noted, and will react harshly to any political instability in Lebanon. In addition, a mere 900 wealthy individuals control 16 percent of Lebanon's deposits, which are over 70 percent dollarized. If they move their money suddenly, a large transfer of dollars could affect the US banking system, Alameddine argued. He also attributed the net $3.7 billion foreign exchange outflow July 2006 war to Central Bank dollar purchases to suppor the MOF. Of the Bank's $13 billion in gross foreign exchange reserves, nearly all of that belongs to commercial banks, he reminded us. WORLD BANK WORRIES LEBANON SLIPPING ON EPCA, REFORM... -------------- ¶13. (C) Saba, World Bank Senior Economist for Lebanon Sebnem Akkaya, and newly arrived Country Manager Demba Ba told us that the GOL's overall fiscal performance is out of line with EPCA targets; while revenues are on track, donor aid is arriving too slowly, and higher than expected interest payments and subsidies to state-owned power company EDL (responsible for 84 percent of expenditures this year) are driving higher expenditures. The GOL will have to finance this growing deficit either through the markets, the CBL, or through donors. If the GOL has to raise interest rates to attract market financing, its payment costs will rise further still. The GOL is also diverting from the EPCA on the gas excise tax, on its CBL borrowing ceiling, and probably on telecom privatization, Saba noted. The IMF was unrealistic to expect the GOL to set a floor on the excise tax during the election cycle and amidst an economic downturn in which Shia taxi drivers have already been hit hard, but EPCA revenue projections left the excise tax out. ¶14. (C) Saba believes that while all Lebanese parties agree on the main economic issues, the institutional framework is inadequate to continue the reform momentum. Saba worried the GOL's weak capacity and reliance on UNDP consultants indicated reform momentum and strong relationships with the international community would not continue under the next government, which might consider the UNDP team political appointees. To that end, the Bank continues its six-year pattern of focusing on technical assistance to civil servants. ...AMIDST MIXED SIGNALS ON POWER AND TELECOM PRIVATIZATION -------------- ¶15. (C) Higher Council for Privatization (HCP) Chairman Ziad Hayek noted that power and telecom privatization are moving ahead, while all other privatization discussions were on the back burner. Hayek noted that power reform is the most urgent issue. The GOL since November 2006 has used the plan of resigned Hizballah Minister of Power Fneish's plan to lure private sector investors or independent power producers (IPPs) to increase production. The GOL plans to sell a 40 percent stake in the Beddawi (Deir Ammar) plant and find an IPP to construct an additional 450 MW plant there it, and to allow private producers in Zahle and Shwe Fat to sell their power to the GOL grid. The GOL is also pursuing private distribution; consultants CRA International in May began reviewing contracts to manage the low voltage distribution network, install meters, and manage collection. The public private partnerships concept has the potential to help the GOL to improve many other basic services, Hayek noted optimistically. ¶16. (C) Ziad Hayek identified EDL's twin oversight by the MOF and the Power Ministry rather than by a single regulator as the greatest impediment to reform; the two ministries have different priorities and staffs, leading to delays and miscommunications. In addition, Hayek lamented that even if the plan were fully implemented, EDL would still lose $500 million a year unless it is able to raise the rate it charges consumers. While the GOL believes it has finally reached an agreement with Egypt and Syria to secure natural gas for Beddawi and thus lower production costs, Hayek was skeptical that Syria, which the pipeline transits, would ever allow the BEIRUT 00001446 004 OF 005 free flow of gas, and called for floating LNG terminals or the use of compressed gas. ¶17. (C) Acting Minister of Energy and Water Mohammed Safadi, and Chairman of Electricity du Liban (EDL) Kemal Hayek lamented that staff at the Ministry of Energy and Water (MOEW) and EDL are inept, and that EDL loses more than 30 percent of its potential revenue in uncollected payments --including from GOL entities and Palestinian camps -- and technical losses. Larger losses stem from the fact that the current balance sheet assumes crude oil prices of $20/barrel; each increase of $1 per barrel of crude oil results in a $16 million per year loss for EDL. Despite a 47 percent increase in revenues over the last three years EDL still appears to be hemorrhaging despite progress installing meters and building a national power distribution grid. Safadi was optimistic that a recently signed Egyptian/Syrian deal would allow Lebanon to obtain Egyptian gas to fuel Beddawi in early 2008, saving the GOL $200 million per year. ¶18. (C) Ziad Hayek was less optimistic regarding telecom privatization. While the business plan is ready, corporatization of fixed line provider Liban Telecom is on hold until the cabinet approves its politically sensitive board, an action Hayek assessed as politically impossible until a new government is formed. The HCP is ready to meet the government,s internal deadline for beginning the sale of the mobile licenses in mid-September but was awaiting the Prime Minister,s and cabinet,s approval. Hayek admitted that selling the licenses amidst political uncertainty could result in lower valuations, but believed that because the next government would complete the sale through a televised auction, it would be seen as legitimate and transparent. Hayek in early September finally had the Prime Minister,s approval to begin a public awareness campaign about telecom privatization and to give tangible evidence of reform "to let people know their lives will get better." ¶19. (C) Chairman of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) Dr. Kemal Shehadi expressed appreciation for U.S. support and training for himself and his staff. He expressed frustration at the GOL's slow progress toward privatization of both the mobile and fixed line providers. The GOL is not ready to solicit expressions of interest for the two mobile licenses later this month, he noted. The Director General of the Ministry of Telecommunications (MOT) and other GOL officials have dragged their feet so much that the TRA itself may not be ready; it has not been able to obtain the funding or staff the GOL promised it. (Note: Embassy staff will report follow-on meetings with Shehadi and Minister of Telecommunications Hamadeh via septel. End note.) BANKERS LESS EAGER TO FUND THE GOL -------------- ¶20. (C) A roundtable of bankers -- Makram Sader of the Association of Banks, Nadim Kassar of Fransabank, Saad Azhari of Blom Bank, Francois Bassil of Byblos Bank, and Walter Sioufi of Citibank -- attributed the "Lebanese miracle" to a trustworthy banking system three times the size of the Lebanese economy and a continuing stream of remittances. Sader noted that the banking system no longer relies on a handful of large Gulf-Arab depositors, but instead two-to-three thousand large depositors who are well informed and form a better spread of investors. Kassar optimistically pointed out that Paris III had a great impact in Lebanon, and depositors trust the banking system more than they trust the GOL. Sioufi pointed out however that capital flight would be quick in the event of a major breakdown, and "there is starting to be talk." ¶21. (C) Noting that banks "no longer have the appetite to write more checks," Sioufi pointed out that if Paris III donor pledges do not materialize there will be "trouble." Azhari concurred, saying that the banks will be intermediaries, but not financiers. In order to fully comply with Basel II requirements in 2008 banks will have to decrease their exposure to sovereign risk, indicating that in a crisis the banks might be more constrained in their ability to finance the GOL. Asked pointedly what will happen in the banking system if a two-government scenario materializes, the bankers, who spoke in one voice on most issues, replied quickly that the CBL will "pay for power, salaries and debt, and then wait and see." BEIRUT 00001446 005 OF 005 GOL CLAIMS POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION ON TRACK... -------------- ¶22. (C) Ghassan Taher, who since August 2006 has led the Prime Minister's reconstruction team from the Prime Minister's Office, is still directing donor-funding compensation to owners or renters of homes damaged or destroyed during the July 2006 war with Israel. Taher clarified that home owners are free to repair, rebuild, or relocate as they see fit. In the southern suburbs of Beirut, Taher told us, the GOL insisted on paying individual apartment renters or owners while Hizballah's Wa'ad Project has insisted on coordinating reconstruction. Taher believes Wa'ad has approximately 50 construction projects underway. While the GOL has issued checks, residents of the southern suburbs are waiting for a signal from Hizballah before forward with the correct paperwork to claim their compensation. In the south, Taher told us, poor documentation of ownership and occupancy delayed payments, but by now those who want to rebuild their single family homes have started. Others have relocated. ...AND NAHR AL-BARID RECONSTRUCTION STARTING -------------- ¶23. (C) Haddad expressed appreciation for the recent U.S. donation to fund reconstruction of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, but asked that the U.S. urge other donors not to divert the $300 million or more needed to rebuild the camp from Paris III commitments to help Lebanon. Diverting funds from Lebanon to the Palestinians it houses would exacerbate growing resentment toward that population and subject the GOL to accusations that it is "implanting" the Palestinians and expanding the Sunni population. Lebanon and the World Bank need four to six more weeks to complete a plan for rebuilding, but the Prime Minister is already fundraising via letters to his counterparts and seeking an international figure to spearhead that effort. ¶24. (C) Ambassador Makkawi, head of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, expressed appreciation for the American contribution to UNRWA's appeal and emphasized the need to improve conditions in all 12 camps and for all Palestinians remaining in Lebanon, and to allow Palestinians to work in skilled jobs. Makkawi envisions two phases of response to Nahr al-Barid. The first phase, worth $28 million, will cover interim compensation to affected fisherman, farmers, injured soldiers, and will restore damaged cultural areas. After at least six months -- once demining, rubble removal, and technical assessments are finished -- camp reconstruction and economic development of the surrounding areas worth $282 million can commence. Makkawi described three concurrent UNRWA plans for housing refugees until the camp is rebuilt: the agency will provide some refugees with a rent subsidy to be used inside or outside Beddawi camp; UNRWA will build some temporary homes on leased vacant lots near Nahr al-Barid; and those who stay with family in Beddawi will recieve additional subsidies. ¶25. (C) World Bank consultant Dr. Satah Arnout added that Bank studies and technical assistance will support camp reconstruction while seeking opportunities for the GOL to address rural and urban poverty -- finally perceived as a security and social as well as an economic phenomenon. The Bank plans a broad economic and social assessment of north Lebanon and will seek donor assistance to spur development there. Saba worried that a rebuilt Nahr al-Barid camp will look considerably nicer than the other Palestinian camps in Lebanon, among the worst in the world, creating an incentive for other rebellions. The Bank is seeking a political partner -- likely Canada or Norway -- in reconstruction, plans to support Ambassador Makkawi with technical assistance and field assessment teams, and expects to use existing municipal and community development programs as models to address reconstruction of both the camp and surrounding Lebanese communities. ¶26. (C) PDAS Dibble has cleared this cable. FELTMAN