LEBANON: INTERIOR MINISTER INSISTS AOUN MARCHES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000141 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: INTERIOR MINISTER INSISTS AOUN MARCHES TO SYRIAN DRUM, WHILE NASRALLAH FOLLOWS IRAN Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On January 25, just as serious unrest at Beirut Arab University was beginning, Minister of Interior Hassan Saba told the Ambassador that the LAF would exercise more decisive control of the situation if further violence occurs. Minister Saba, whose ministry controls the ISF which has been held in reserve due to confessional sensitivities, would not criticize his beleaguered counterparts in the LAF. Saba stated that at the Tuesday, January 23 evening "lessons learned" meeting of the Central Security Committee, PM Siniora had ordered the LAF to pro-actively protect government institutions and prevent the illegal blockage of roads in any future encounter. Regarding the tactics and objectives of the March 8th opposition, Saba said that while Michel Aoun was eager to push Lebanon over the brink (with the blessing of the Syrian regime),he believed Hassan Nasrallah was obeying the commands of Iran and actually holding the Aounists back. Minister Saba insisted that the country's Sunni community was solidly united behind the Siniora government and said that one of the reasons Nasrallah pulled back Tuesday night was his genuine surprise at the rapid and energetic Sunni reaction in the streets. He was unconcerned about rumors that a Syria-backed, civil-war era Sunni militia leader, Ibrahim Qoleilat, had returned to Lebanon. Finally, Saba said the recent round of Saudi/Iranian discussions may yet presage an agreement acceptable to both sides. End summary. ¶2. (C) Minister of Interior Hassan Saba tendered his resignation from the Siniora government last February, following the poor performance of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in their response to Sunni "Danish cartoon" riots in downtown Beirut on February 5. Conveniently, Saba's resignation was never formally accepted: after the resignation of the six pro-Syrian ministers and the 11/21 assassination of Minister Pierre Gemayel, the cabinet came perilously close to constitutional collapse (which would happen if "more than one third" of the original 24 ministers were out). Thus, Saba returned to his post, to give the cabinet majority additional "cushion." Saba received the Ambassador and Special Assistant on January 25, in part for a discussion of the violence that occurred on January 23. Disconcertingly, even though violent unrest at Beirut Arab University on January 25 was already underway during the ambassador's meeting with Saba, and the news was breaking on the local channels, no one on his staff bothered to interrupt the hour-long meeting to inform the minister of significant developments. ¶3. (C) After thanking the U.S. for its assistance to the ISF in 2006 and expressing hope the program would be expanded in the coming year, Minister Saba turned to recent events. He said that despite enormous pressure being brought to bear by Hizballah, Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Suleiman Franjieh, and other members of the anti-government March 8th coalition, the Siniora government would never give in to political blackmail. As the democratically-elected government of Lebanon, it would continue to exercise its responsibilities. Saba insisted that the governing March 14 majority was willing to negotiate and compromise, but would not relinquish its constitutional authority to street mobs. TWO MOTIVATIONS, ONE DESIRED OUTCOME -------------- ¶4. (C) Addressing the concerted effort by March 8th to bring down the government, Saba argued that the opposition is actually driven by two motivations: a Syrian set of objectives -- energetically, even blindly, subscribed to by former General Aoun, Suleiman Franjieh, the "Syrian Nationalists" (SSNP),and others; and Iranian objectives -- methodically pursued by Hizballah. In Saba's opinion, the "ruthless" Syrian regime wishes to eliminate any chance the Special Tribunal will be established, but at the same time also seeks to re-exert effective (and profitable) control over Lebanon. In pursuit of these goals, it would benefit Syria if Lebanon fell into chaos to validate its tired claim that Lebanon is incapable of self-rule. And although a logical person would not want to rule over such a place as Lebanon, Saba argued that the "madman" Aoun saw that path as the only way he could obtain his life's ambition -- the E presidency. As such, Aoun is willing, and indeed anxious, to drive his country over the precipice. ¶5. (C) Hizballah, on the other hand, is willing to play a much more patient game. Saba said it was obvious that Nasrallah is trying to temper the nearly "out-of-control" Aounists and Maradists (the unpredictable supporters of anti-government Maronite leader Suleiman Franjieh and others in the north),but the events of January 23 indicated that may be more difficult than Hizballah's leader anticipated. In Saba's analysis, Nasrallah would prefer to allow the slow, steady application of street pressure, interspersed with short, violent displays of power, to wear down the democratically-elected Siniora government. Even though Nasrallah has been surprised by PM Siniora's resilience and fortitude, he still believes the government would eventually collapse, in which case Hizballah will march into power and rule Lebanon according to an Iranian regional agenda. ¶6. (C) Minister Saba explained that even though Aoun and Nasrallah diverge on methods, their ultimate goal remains the same -- the collapse of the pro-reform government -- and this keeps the volatile Maronite and methodical Shiite together in a powerful alliance. Ironically, the outcome that many fear, a catastrophic Sunni-Shia conflict in Lebanon, is now acting as the most effective brake on Nasrallah's ambitions. But Saba wondered how long that fear would hold off decisive street action by Hizballah. SUNNI SOLIDARITY -------------- ¶7. (C) When asked about the unity of Lebanon's Sunni community, Minister Saba insisted that although the country's Sunnis often appeared passive, when confronted with what they perceive as an existential threat, that community will react swiftly and with self-protective violence. (Note: As indeed happened later on 1/25. End note.) He said that much like Nasrallah's misjudgment of last July when it underestimated Israel's response to Hizballah's cross-border attack of July 12, Nasrallah had also misinterpreted Sunni "passivity" in the face of labor demonstrations on May 10 and Shia street actions following a televised parody of Nasrallah. The Interior Minister argued that Hizballah's senior leadership had been astonished by the immediate and violent Sunni reaction on January 23, and to a great degree, had retreated. ¶8. (C) Saba acknowledged that divisions existed in the Sunni community, particularly due to events that took place in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, when the complex web of Sunni patronage was disrupted. But to interpret those differences as serious divisions would be unwise. Recalling the stable inter-communal relations of his youth, Saba expressed regret over the current state of Sunni-Shia affairs, but stated the aggressive regional ambitions of Iran had irrevocably changed that dynamic. He said in modern Lebanon, the Sunni community genuinely felt threatened (a claim made at one time or another to the Embassy by every confession in Lebanon) and would respond without restraint if attacked. Asked about rumors that a notorious Syrian-backed civil war-era Sunni militia leader had returned to Lebanon at Syria's behest to break the Hariri monopoly on Sunni loyalties, Saba seemed unconcerned: the Murabitoun that Ibrahim Qoleilat represented no longer has significant popularity. If Qoleilat is back in Lebanon, his influence would be quite limited. ¶9. (C) Responding to Michel Aoun's assertion (often made to justify his alliance with Hizballah) that Lebanon's Christian community felt threatened by "an ocean of Sunnis" and had to cling to the safety offered by the Shia, Minister Saba pointed out that modern Lebanese Sunnis were committed to political moderation and democracy and Aoun was merely raising fears he knew were baseless. ACTUAL STRENGTH OF AOUN -------------- ¶10. (C) Perhaps showing his Mustaqbal stripes more than he intended (Saba began his rise from a position in the security detail of former PM Rafiq Hariri),Minister Saba said that while Aoun's core strength is holding firm at 20-25 percent of the Christian community, his supporters on the margins were rapidly becoming disenchanted with his tactics. Saba did concede that Aoun has been skillful at exploiting Christian fears of their declining influence and displeasure with Lebanon's widespread corruption and poor government services. But he emphasized that Tuesday's violent confrontations, and the image of Beirut blanketed in the smoke of burning barricades, had badly shaken moderate Aounists. ¶11. (C) Concerning Tuesday's events, Saba said the ISF's intelligence shows the Aounists were well organized both in personnel and logistics. It was clear by late Monday night the Aounists had stockpiled materials and everyone in the streets knew what their responsibilities were to be, come sunrise. And he confirmed other reports that the FPM had an effective communications plan that warned everyone who lived in its areas of strength that they were expected to adhere to the general strike, whether they sympathized with the opposition or not. Lastly, he reconciled his contention that Aoun's strength was declining with its impressive show of force by arguing it didn't actually take many protesters to shut down the city when they were willing to engage in intimidation and thuggish behavior. WHAT COMES NEXT -------------- ¶12. (C) Even though Minister Saba was still unaware of the full extent of the unrest then unfolding at Beirut Arab University, he did state that potential Shia-Sunni violence was far more dangerous for Lebanon than Tuesday's predominantly Christian-on-Christian confrontations. It was the primary reason that both PM Siniora and ISF Commander General Rifi had decided to keep the ISF in reserve and allow the LAF to bear the brunt of the demonstrators' anger. (Hizballah and Aoun have successfully cultivated the rumor that the ISF is a "Sunni militia" working at the behest of the Hariris. In fact, the ISF overall is just as confessionally balanced as the LAF. But, while the LAF has a Christian commander who reports to a Christian Minister of Defense, the ISF is led by Sunni and reports to Saba, a Sunni Minister of Interior.) Saba sheepishly acknowledged that Tuesday was not the security services' finest hour, but assured the Ambassador that PM Siniora had admonished his commanders Tuesday evening and laid down clear guidelines that in any future demonstrations the LAF and ISF would decisively protect government institutions and keep the roads clear. (Note: While the security services performed marginally better on Thursday, it was political consensus leading to curfew, not the LAF, that eventually brought Thursday's riots under control. End note.) ¶13. (C) With regard to diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, Saba indicated he was not a member of the inner circle for those issues, but did profess his belief that recent diplomatic discussions involving both the Arab League and the much-discussed Saudi-Iranian meetings would soon lead to at least a workable proposal that both sides could seriously consider. FELTMAN