JUMBLATT WORRIED SAAD HARIRI IS DRIFTING TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001407 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY SA SUBJECT: JUMBLATT WORRIED SAAD HARIRI IS DRIFTING TO QUICKLY TOWARD EXCESSIVE CONCESSIONS Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Asking to see the Ambassador urgently on 9/13, Druse leader and MP Walid Jumblatt expressed concern about Saad Hariri's thinking. The March 14 meeting the previous evening was difficult, Jumblatt said, because Hariri, Boutros Harb, and Mohammed Safadi were too ready to give in to Parliament Speaker Berri's insistence on a two-thirds quorum for all presidential electoral rounds. But while relieved that March 14 in the end stayed united, Jumblatt was alarmed at his one-on-one session earlier with Hariri. He is too eager to be prime minister, Jumblatt analyzed, and thus is too willing to make a deal on the presidency to achieve his PM goal. With Jumblatt, Hariri used language similar to what his father would use just before conceding everything. Hariri insisted that Saudi King Abdullah proclaimed Berri's initiative good, and he hinted at backing Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh for president. These are not good signs, to Jumblatt's mind. In addition, Hariri admitted to Jumblatt that the state of relations with France remains murky. End summary. MARCH 14 MEETING INITIALLY DIVIDED, WITH SAAD READY TO CONCEDE TO BERRI -------------- ¶2. (C) Stopping by Jumblatt's Beirut residence on 9/13 at the Druse MP's urgent request, the Ambassador discovered a brooding Jumblatt pacing his living room. After a perfunctory "coffee or tea" question, Jumblatt went to the point. "We must talk about Saad. I don't like what I heard yesterday" (when Saad Hariri returned back to Beirut after several weeks absence). Describing the previous evening's March 14 bloc meeting, Jumblatt said that Saad Hariri, MP (and presidential hopeful) Boutros Harb, and MP (and Minister) Mohammed Safadi tried to get the rest of the group to concede to Nabih Berri's insistence on a two-thirds quorum for any presidential election round. That gives Berri the upper hand in starting any talks, Jumblatt complained. "We don't need to do that, at least not now." He credited himself, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and presidential aspirant Nassib Lahoud with pulling the group back toward a more ambiguous welcome of Berri's initiative. Jumblatt expressed relief that the group was able to develop a joint communique ("it wasn't bad") in the end. "But we need Saad to work with us, not against us." HARIRI'S REASSURANCES OF JUMBLATT MAKE DRUSE LEADER MORE SUSPICIOUS -------------- ¶3. (C) Worse, Jumblatt said, was the one-on-one meeting he had with Hariri earlier on 9/13, when Hariri went to see Jumblatt. He started by saying that Saudi King Abdullah had pronounced Berri's initiative good. He noted that the Lebanese people are tired and ready for a compromise earlier rather than later. Jumblatt claimed to have expressed astonishment, saying that, after having run hard for nine-tenths of the marathon, surely Hariri was not dropping out for the last lap. Hariri then tried to reassure Jumblatt, pledging that he would never betray or abandon him, and he even reached Nazek Hariri (Rafiq's widow) by phone in Paris so that she could help calm Jumblatt. "I didn't like it at all," Jumblatt said to the Ambassador. "Saad reminded me of his father," who Jumblatt claimed would put on similar performances just before he was ready to give up and "concede everything." HARIRI MUSING ABOUT RIAD SALAMEH, QUESTIONS NASSIB LAHOUD -------------- ¶4. (C) Jumblatt said that Hariri then started to muse aloud about presidential candidates: Jean Obeid is definitely out ("thank god for something," Jumblatt said). Boutros Harb is a "wheeler-dealer." Ghattas Khoury is 100 percent "with us." LAF Commander Sleiman is also out, although Jumblatt thought that Hariri's subsequent comment on Sleiman indicated that the question is still open: Hariri praised Sleiman's reaction after Rafiq Hariri's assassination, when Sleiman reportedly came to Saad and offered to resign in protest. BEIRUT 00001407 002 OF 002 ("Why have I never heard that story before yesterday?" Jumblatt asked suspiciously.) As for Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, Hariri thought he was a possible compromise, despite being "only 60 percent with us." Jumblatt reminded Hariri of several examples where Salameh "betrayed" Rafiq Hariri. ¶5. (C) As for Nassib Lahoud -- the putative front-runner March 14 candidate -- Hariri said that he is only "75 percent with us." That is ridiculous, Jumblatt fumed to the Ambassador, insisting that Nassib is the best candidate. Saad's problem with Nassib is that he is "100 percent independent. He can't be bought." Rafiq Hariri also had a problem with Nassib, in that he had no way of ensuring control. Now, Jumblatt continued, Saad's entourage has told him to watch out for Nassib for the same reasons. "We may not be able to get Nassib," Jumblatt said. "But we need to try." JUMBLATT CONCLUDES SAAD'S PM DREAMS MEANS HE'LL COMPROMISE ON PRESIDENT -------------- ¶6. (C) Jumblatt said that he concluded from his talk that Saad is too eager to become Prime Minister. Because he wants the job as soon as possible, he wants presidential elections at almost any price. The idea of a disputed presidency or two-government scenario does not appeal to him, for uncertainty either delays or diminishes the prospects for his premiership. "Saad needs to learn what I learned after too many years," Jumblatt said. "Lebanon needs a strong, independent president." Repeating again Saad's reported criticism of Nassib Lahoud, Jumblatt said that, like Rafiq, "Saad wants a weak president." Pulling his punches slightly, Jumblatt said that "Saad is not a bad guy. But that entourage!" The entourage, Jumblatt claimed, is "always attacking Siniora," making Saad even more eager to replace him. QUESTION MARK ON RELATIONS WITH FRANCE -------------- ¶7. (C) Finally, Jumblatt said that, after a conversation that Jumblatt found was more about theatrics than substance, Saad confided to him that it remained unclear what was happening with the relationship with France. Jumblatt noted that French Foreign Minister Kouchner did not ask to see him (in what we note is a very quick trip to Beirut -- Jumblatt is not the only one skipped). Given that French President Sarkozy will never embrace the Hariris as Jacques Chirac did, Jumblatt thought that, no matter what happened with France, Saad would feel disappointed. But the problem seems to be deeper than simply the lack of personal ties to the Hariri family, Jumblatt fretted. While expressing a desire to visit Paris and meet with officials to judge the relationship on his own, Jumblatt said that he had fished but failed to get an invitation. He said that he would invite newly arrived French Charge Andre Parant for lunch or dinner to try again. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Jumblatt did not survive as head of the Druse, and manage to keep the Druse more influential politically than their demographic weight would otherwise suggest, by being gullible. Naturally wary, he was allowing his suspicions to reach a fever pitch. His ally Marwan Hamadeh told us later that Jumblatt was "over anxious," that Hariri was not as ready to move toward enormous concessions as Jumblatt fears. We will see Saad on Saturday to explore his thinking with him. But we guess that Jumblatt's suspicions are not far off: that Saad believes he can make a deal on a weak president that would pave the way for him to be a prime minister who just happens to be more powerful than the president. Having watched the political and bureaucratic battles between Emile Lahoud and Rafiq Hariri and between Emile Lahoud and Fouad Siniora, we will try to encourage Saad to see the importance of creating a president-premier partnership rather than rivalry. FELTMAN