LEBANON: FRENCH POSITION IS WORRYING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001383 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV LE FR SY IR SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH POSITION IS WORRYING REF: PARIS 3734 BEIRUT 00001383 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) The analysis in Embassy Paris' excellent reporting (reftel being the most recent) on what appears to be a dismaying shift in France's Lebanon policy corresponds with the Lebanese impression of French views. (As we will report separately, the Egyptians may also be moving in this direction.) In recent days, March 14 contacts with close ties to France have started to sound alarm bells. Based on articles in the credible Arab press (such as Randa Takieddine's 9/10 report in al-Hayat) and on recent contacts with French diplomats here, we also do not like where French policy seems to be headed. ¶2. (S) Abandoning the Hariri-focused Lebanon policy of Jacques Chirac is one thing (arguably even a good thing),but the Sarkozy team looks to us to be on the verge of jettisoning the very pro-independence fundamentals that led to some of the most noteworthy accomplishments of the last several years: Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the closure of Syria's intelligence offices here, the deployment of the LAF to the south, the expansion of UNIFIL, elections free of Syrian interference, establishment of the Special Tribunal, and so forth. In our view, pressuring March 14 to accept a presidential compromise brokered by Nabih Berri now puts too much faith in the parliament speaker and has the danger of codifying Syrian-Iranian power in Lebanon. By embracing Berri's initiative, the French also rush into the trap set by March 8-Aoun forces, by which France is peeled away from the heretofore solid U.S.-French-Saudi-Egyptian consensus on Lebanon. By splitting the international and regional coalition backing Lebanon's independence, Berri and his allies make it that much easier Syria and Iran to increase their own influence, at the expense of Lebanon's independence. ¶3. (S) Embassy Paris can best judge why the French are moving toward a defeatist position regarding Lebanon's presidency. UNIFIL force protection issues and the desire common to all newcomers to show a break with a previous administration may be partially responsible. But we suspect as well that part of the reason is similar to what provoked Maronite Patriarch Sfeir into abandoning so many of his ;presidential red lines: the shameless fear-mongering by March 8-Aoun figures, who continually brandish threats of a vacuum, second government, violence, chaos or -- to quote Michel Aoun -- even civil war as the inevitable alternatives to a compromise president. Instead of condemning this intimidation, the French, like the Patriarch, shudder in fear and then rush to embrace the idea of compromise. March 14 leaders, by standing on principle rather than compromise, start to appear to be the extremists. March 14 leaders thus become the ones on whom to apply the pressure to compromise. ¶4. (S) We also wonder whether the French view Nabih Berri's "grand compromise" on the presidency with great relief, as a life-line to save the sinking Kouchner-Cousseran initiative. Maybe they believe that, if Berri's idea works, they can take credit. We would caution the French not to rely on Berri. While there are political and confessional reasons to praise Berri publicly, in fact he has served as one of the main instruments to attack Lebanon's legitimate institutions. Unable to control the March 14 parliamentary majority, Berri bypassed it, shifting debate to a Berri-created National Dialogue table more easily manipulated. When the cabinet threatened to vote (as permitted by the constitution) rather than operate by consensus, Berri announced the withdrawal of the Shia ministers. Thus Berri's proposal to work with March 14 on a compromise president (on the condition that March 14 accepts the two-thirds quorum that gives Berri and his allies veto power) is more likely another trick to deprive the constitutional majority of its rights rather than it is a statesman-like gesture. But if Bernard Kouchner and Jean-Clause Cousseran were coming up empty-handed in their high-profile initiative and in need of something they can claim as French success, then they may see the Berri gesture -- which in fact requires March 14 to make the meaningful compromise, not Berri -- as a godsend. The end result, like the impact of the intimidation noted above, is a proclivity to favor "compromise" at any cost. ¶5. (S) Yet if Berri is truly interested in coming up with a genuine consensus candidate for the presidency, then he should, in our view, be willing to talk with March 14 leaders unconditionally. We do not see any reason why he could not BEIRUT 00001383 002.2 OF 003 start discussions on candidates now -- the list of potential candidates he shared with us privately is the same list that virtually anyone following the news here would create. The fact that he is insisting on the abandonment of the March 14 trump card -- the possibility of using an absolute majority but without a two-thirds quorum to elect a president, leaving Berri with the quorum as his trump card -- before talking makes us suspicious. As described in reftel, the French see a conciliatory move on Berri's part, where we see a trap. Berri will either use the combination of quorum requirements and intimidation to impose a "consensus" president fully cleared by Syria, or he will blame March 14 for the vacuum and chaos when March 14 refuses to elect the candidate(s) deemed acceptable by Berri. The French seem ready to join Berri in blaming March 14 for the crisis. ¶6. (S) Our views on Jumblatt differ from those ascribed in reftel to the French. Whereas the French see Jumblatt as (quoting reftel) "the biggest threat to moving ahead," we see a much-needed reference point. Jumblatt's insistence on a March 14 president (which the March 14 majority does have the numbers to elect, after all) is a more reasonable position than the official March 8-Aoun line that only Michel Aoun is an acceptable choice. And, if ultimately the two sides do start working on a consensus candidate, Jumblatt -- along with Samir Geagea -- will see that the negotiations start out with highly credible candidates proposed by March 14. Perhaps strangely for someone infamous for his frequent shifts of position, Jumblatt has done as much as anyone to preserve certain March 14 principles. We also note that, in his 9/6 LBC interview (broadcast after reftel's meetings), Jumblatt made it clear that he would not block any genuine consensus. But by being on one end of the spectrum -- the end that we, and the French, have not only supported but helped create -- Jumblatt usefully pulls the rest of March 14 more in his direction before any negotiations begin. In that, it strikes us that France, if it truly wants compromise rather than March 14 submission, should welcome rather than condemn Jumblatt's role as a needed counterweight to the strong positions of Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and Nabih Berri. ¶7. (S) We also wonder who are the "extremist candidacies" cited by the French. Presumably, Michel Aoun even in the French mind still qualifies as extremist. On the March 14 side, the French must be thinking of Nassib Lahoud, who was their favorite candidate not so long ago. The problem with Nassib is not that he is extremist -- he demonstrates the very essence of moderation and reasonableness -- but that he has been branded as such by pro-Syrian figures, who insist despite all evidence to the contrary that he is a Saudi-American puppet. (As Nassib voted against much legislation proposed by Rafiq Hariri, the March 8-Aoun figures have to go through considerable contortions to insist on Nassib's subservience to Saudi Arabia.) When we ask our Lebanese contacts just why, of all the March 14 politicians, Nassib is subject to the harshest criticism, they cite Nassib's high ethical standards. Mohamed Chatah described Nassib as "Syria's nightmare" because he cannot be bribed with money or sexual favors. "It has nothing to do with his politics. They don't like the fact that he is impossible to blackmail." ¶8. (S) Yet if in the end March 8 and March 14 leaders come together peacefully in favor of a true consensus president who is a credible figure, then we should certainly support the choice of the Lebanese themselves. We do not differ from the French there: a genuine consensus with broad support in Lebanon would be a most welcome development. But the French seem to be moving toward forcing March 14 into a compromise now, and that's the change in position that dismays us and our March 14 contacts. A compromise should come naturally, not be forced by pressure on one side. Kouchner arrives in Lebanon on Thursday (9/13). If he touts this new line -- that March 14 "extremist" leaders need to compromise with the "sensible" Berri now -- then France is in essence siding with Syria and Iran's hopes. ¶9. (S) In our view, it would be far more useful if Kouchner's message would be somewhat different. Instead of pressuring March 14 into giving up its quorum trump card to hand it to Berri to use instead, he should privately and publicly encourage Berri to meet March 14 leaders unconditionally, as March 14 figures have already proposed. A consensus candidate could still emerge from such talks -- and Kouchner could state his hope that one would -- but Berri would no longer enter the talks from the position of strength of knowing that he has (through the quorum) the veto. If BEIRUT 00001383 003.2 OF 003 Berri does not wish to meet, then Kouchner could call his bluff and ask him to allow parliament to meet and engage in free elections, as free elections would probably lead to the emergence of a moderate candidate who poses no danger to Lebanon (or, for that matter, Syria). We wish that Kouchner would also state unequivocally that France's position is that fear-mongering by threatening chaos, second governments, and violence is an unacceptable tactic on the part of the March 8-Aoun forces. Kouchner could usefully demand, for example, that March 8-Aoun forces remove the sit-in, as a sign that they are interested in consensus achieved peacefully. ¶10. (S) We also note that, even if the presidency is decided by consensus, the issues that divide the Lebanese will not be resolved when a name is selected. Rather than rely on sit-ins and cabinet withdrawals, the pro-Syrians will probably try to use a compliant president to thwart the work of a new cabinet that may still (by virtue of the parliamentary majority) be dominated by March 14 allies. Berri's allies might still walk out of the cabinet or insist on using a blocking minority to derail important measures. To avoid this, it would be better to start working toward agreement on some of the major issues facing Lebanon now. We believe that the French could more usefully engage on coming up with a policy agenda for the future than on the presidency. For example, the policy issues a new president and new cabinet will face include the question of stability for the south, Hizballah's arms smuggling, the safety of UNIFIL, Syrian-Lebanese border issues, Paris III reforms and so forth. On those, we would guess that French policy remains more comfortably close to our own. To the extent that we can suggest Kouchner and Cousseran focus on these rather than the presidency, the easier it may be for us to preserve the U.S.-French partnership on Lebanon. FELTMAN