LEBANON: EAC DISCUSSES 1/25 VIOLENCE; AGREES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000135

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: ASEC PTER KPAL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: EAC DISCUSSES 1/25 VIOLENCE; AGREES TO
MEASURES

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) At 1800 hours on January 25 DCM chaired a full
meeting of the Embassy's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) to
review the day's events and consider measures in response to
the violence in Beirut and elsewhere on January 23, 24, and

25. The EAC made the following observations:

(a) Lebanon's security forces, principally the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF),
are not performing well, and notably, they have been either
unwilling or incapable for taking control of scenes of
violence. The LAF does appear to be enforcing a curfew that
will continue until 0600 hrs. January 26.

(b) There has been unusual amount of shooting, mostly small
arms fire, by individuals who are not part of the security
forces.

(c) Nearly all elements of the Lebanese political and
confessional spectrum have been active in violence this past
week.

(d) The leaders of Lebanon's political and confessional
groups have not been able to control fully their followers,
with unforeseen or unplanned escalation in violent
confrontations.

In the wake of this week's events, and in particular, given
the unpredictability of the current situation, the EAC agreed
to the following updated steps:

(a) A recommended warden message to the American community
was endorsed and will be transmitted to the Department for
approval.

(b) Non-essential travel by USG officials to Lebanon should
be deferred for the next 15 days and pending country
clearances for Embassy Beirut will be reviewed.

(c) Off-compound move requests will continue be reviewed on
a case-by-case basis, with special attention to developing
events and destinations of higher risk.

End summary.

JANUARY 25 EVENTS
--------------


2. (C) At about 1400 hrs. local, fighting broke out at the
Beirut Arab University, in the southern section of the city,
between rival supporters of the March 14 majority and the
opposition coalition of Hizballah and Amal. We estimate that
at least one person has been killed and about 90 injured.
Some reports have has many as four people killed. This
violence follows activities of January 23, which included
fighting between the largely Christian supporters of General
Mchel Aoun and LF leader Samir Geagea, the establishment of
roadblocks throughout the Beirut area and other parts of the
country, the sealing off of the airport by roadblocks, the
burning of tires, and participation in violence by Muslim as
well as Christian factions.


3. (C) The student melee of January 25 appears to have
escalated out of control quickly. By 1600 hrs. local, March
14 leader Saad Hariri and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah
were reported by the media to have asked their supporters to
stand down. In the meantime, roadblocks at least temporarily
cut off access to the nearby Beirut (Rafiq Hariri)
International Airport. The road extending southward from the
airport to Naama was closed off; this road leads to the Ain
el Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp as well PFLP-GC
installations in Naama. Apart from the violence at the
university and nearby areas including the airport, we heard
that there were also incidents in the town of Chtura, which
is on the main highway leading eastward from Beirut to
Damascus.


4. (C) Violence on the Beirut Arab University campus not

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only escalated quickly, but spread to surrounding areas
within one or two kilometers of the university, including the
airport area. There was much shooting into the air,
including magazine clips that were emptied in bursts of fire.
Students were not only armed with guns, but also large
sticks and iron bars, which they used to damage cars. A
visitor to the Embassy, who passed through the airport during
the late afternoon, observed a truck being overturned in the
airport parking area. He also commented on the rapid
retreat, upon this incident, of some traveling UNIFIL
soldiers into the airport itself, from the sidewalks and
parking areas adjacent to the airport building where they had
been standing. There were reports of violence within the Ain
el Hilwa refugee camp, with subsequent deployment of LAF
troops to areas just outside the camp. There were also
reports that four LAF soldiers had been shot in the back. As
of 1930 hrs. local, an Embassy employee who resides in West
Beirut said that he continued to hear occasional gunfire.



5. (C) The LAF was not aggressive in quelling the violence
on campus and elsewhere. The ISF seemed confused about
events, in its contacts with Embassy security staff. By
mid-evening, the LAF was using vehicles and troops to contain
the people still in the street in the university vicinity.
The Government declared a curfew on the evening of January
25, to extend from 2030 hrs. to 0600 hrs. on January 26. The
Minister of Education announced that all schools and
universities in Lebanon would be closed on January 26.

EAC ACTION
--------------


6. (C) The EAC held a lengthy discussion of the past few
days' events, and agreed on the observations set forth in the
summary above. The EAC took note of the unpredictability of
events in Lebanon at this time. The EAC also focused on the
vulnerability of the airport to roadblocks which prevent any
vehicular entry or exit from the airport premises.


7. (C) All of the factors discussed above, taken together,
led the EAC to a consensus on the measures described in the
summary above. The EAC recognized that while extreme
prudence is called for at this time, the Embassy should
maintain its regular functions and activities to whatever
degree is feasible from a security standpoint. In that
respect, the EAC agreed to request Department approval for an
updated warden message, recommend that non-essential travel
to Lebanon by USG employees be deferred for the next 15 days
and that current travel clearances be reviewed (mainly on
account of the airport vulnerability),and to subject Embassy
personnel off-compound move requests to heightened scrutiny.
EAC members discussed the present move policy in detail and
noted the importance of coordinating moves in the context of
prevailing threats and conditions, including specialattention
to destinations and travel routes. The EAC will review these
measures at frequent intervals as the situation in Lebanon
evolves.


FELTMAN