LEBANON: EAC DISCUSSES 1/25 VIOLENCE; AGREES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000135 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 TAGS: ASEC PTER KPAL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: EAC DISCUSSES 1/25 VIOLENCE; AGREES TO MEASURES Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) At 1800 hours on January 25 DCM chaired a full meeting of the Embassy's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) to review the day's events and consider measures in response to the violence in Beirut and elsewhere on January 23, 24, and ¶25. The EAC made the following observations: (a) Lebanon's security forces, principally the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF), are not performing well, and notably, they have been either unwilling or incapable for taking control of scenes of violence. The LAF does appear to be enforcing a curfew that will continue until 0600 hrs. January 26. (b) There has been unusual amount of shooting, mostly small arms fire, by individuals who are not part of the security forces. (c) Nearly all elements of the Lebanese political and confessional spectrum have been active in violence this past week. (d) The leaders of Lebanon's political and confessional groups have not been able to control fully their followers, with unforeseen or unplanned escalation in violent confrontations. In the wake of this week's events, and in particular, given the unpredictability of the current situation, the EAC agreed to the following updated steps: (a) A recommended warden message to the American community was endorsed and will be transmitted to the Department for approval. (b) Non-essential travel by USG officials to Lebanon should be deferred for the next 15 days and pending country clearances for Embassy Beirut will be reviewed. (c) Off-compound move requests will continue be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with special attention to developing events and destinations of higher risk. End summary. JANUARY 25 EVENTS -------------- ¶2. (C) At about 1400 hrs. local, fighting broke out at the Beirut Arab University, in the southern section of the city, between rival supporters of the March 14 majority and the opposition coalition of Hizballah and Amal. We estimate that at least one person has been killed and about 90 injured. Some reports have has many as four people killed. This violence follows activities of January 23, which included fighting between the largely Christian supporters of General Mchel Aoun and LF leader Samir Geagea, the establishment of roadblocks throughout the Beirut area and other parts of the country, the sealing off of the airport by roadblocks, the burning of tires, and participation in violence by Muslim as well as Christian factions. ¶3. (C) The student melee of January 25 appears to have escalated out of control quickly. By 1600 hrs. local, March 14 leader Saad Hariri and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah were reported by the media to have asked their supporters to stand down. In the meantime, roadblocks at least temporarily cut off access to the nearby Beirut (Rafiq Hariri) International Airport. The road extending southward from the airport to Naama was closed off; this road leads to the Ain el Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp as well PFLP-GC installations in Naama. Apart from the violence at the university and nearby areas including the airport, we heard that there were also incidents in the town of Chtura, which is on the main highway leading eastward from Beirut to Damascus. ¶4. (C) Violence on the Beirut Arab University campus not BEIRUT 00000135 002 OF 002 only escalated quickly, but spread to surrounding areas within one or two kilometers of the university, including the airport area. There was much shooting into the air, including magazine clips that were emptied in bursts of fire. Students were not only armed with guns, but also large sticks and iron bars, which they used to damage cars. A visitor to the Embassy, who passed through the airport during the late afternoon, observed a truck being overturned in the airport parking area. He also commented on the rapid retreat, upon this incident, of some traveling UNIFIL soldiers into the airport itself, from the sidewalks and parking areas adjacent to the airport building where they had been standing. There were reports of violence within the Ain el Hilwa refugee camp, with subsequent deployment of LAF troops to areas just outside the camp. There were also reports that four LAF soldiers had been shot in the back. As of 1930 hrs. local, an Embassy employee who resides in West Beirut said that he continued to hear occasional gunfire. ¶5. (C) The LAF was not aggressive in quelling the violence on campus and elsewhere. The ISF seemed confused about events, in its contacts with Embassy security staff. By mid-evening, the LAF was using vehicles and troops to contain the people still in the street in the university vicinity. The Government declared a curfew on the evening of January 25, to extend from 2030 hrs. to 0600 hrs. on January 26. The Minister of Education announced that all schools and universities in Lebanon would be closed on January 26. EAC ACTION -------------- ¶6. (C) The EAC held a lengthy discussion of the past few days' events, and agreed on the observations set forth in the summary above. The EAC took note of the unpredictability of events in Lebanon at this time. The EAC also focused on the vulnerability of the airport to roadblocks which prevent any vehicular entry or exit from the airport premises. ¶7. (C) All of the factors discussed above, taken together, led the EAC to a consensus on the measures described in the summary above. The EAC recognized that while extreme prudence is called for at this time, the Embassy should maintain its regular functions and activities to whatever degree is feasible from a security standpoint. In that respect, the EAC agreed to request Department approval for an updated warden message, recommend that non-essential travel to Lebanon by USG employees be deferred for the next 15 days and that current travel clearances be reviewed (mainly on account of the airport vulnerability),and to subject Embassy personnel off-compound move requests to heightened scrutiny. EAC members discussed the present move policy in detail and noted the importance of coordinating moves in the context of prevailing threats and conditions, including specialattention to destinations and travel routes. The EAC will review these measures at frequent intervals as the situation in Lebanon evolves. FELTMAN