WITH NAHR AL-BARID IN LAF HANDS, DEFMIN MURR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001346 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PARM LE SY QA SUBJECT: WITH NAHR AL-BARID IN LAF HANDS, DEFMIN MURR CLAIMS SHAKR AL-ABSI DEAD BEIRUT 00001346 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) On 9/3, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr called the Ambassador to report that the wife of Fatah al-Islam (FAI) leader Shakr al-Absi had positively identified the body of her husband, apparently killed on the last day of fighting on 9/2 in the Nahr al-Barid camp. While Murr said that formal confirmation would await DNA testing, he was now convinced that both Absi and Abu Selim Taha, another Fatah al-Islam leader, had been killed. The LAF killed Nasser Ismail, another terrorist leader, 9/3 (We caution that, in Lebanon, preliminary information is often subsequently proven false; we recommend not commenting on Absi's death until formal confirmation by the GOL.) Murr reported 39 FAI fighters killed on the last day and 19 arrested (figures slightly above what the media is reporting). Murr speculated that the decision by FAI to launch "kamikaze" operations early on 9/2 against the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was triggered by two developments: first, FAI somehow knew that the USG, in the aftermath of CENTCOM Commander Fallon's visit, had delivered SMAW-D weapons to the LAF, capable of penetrating the FAI bunkers. Second, Qatar was secretly brokering a potential surrender deal because of which FAI assumed the LAF had lowered its guard slightly (an FAI assumption Murr claimed was deadly wrong). While MP Walid Jumblatt and PM Siniora's aide Mohamed Chatah found the Qatari role suspicious, Murr thought that the Qataris had merely been naive, hopeful of being seen as peacemakers as opposed to the Saudi fighters within FAI. While a final tally of FAI terrorists killed needs to await further examination, 158 LAF soldiers and officers were killed in what is without question a victory for the LAF and for the state of Lebanon over international terrorists. The USG role in keeping the LAF equipped was essential to this success. End summary. MURR CONVINCED SHAKR AL-ABSI IS DEAD -------------- ¶2. (S) After having met with the Ambassador for over two hours on 9/1 to discuss, inter alia, developments in Nahar al-Barid, Deputy PM and Defense Minister Elias Murr updated us by phone throughout the day on 9/2 regarding what turned out to be the final battle for the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, in which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) prevailed over the Fatah al-Islam (FAI) terrorists. On 9/3, Murr phoned to say that the body of FAI leader Shakr al-Absi (sentenced in death in Jordan for the 2002 murder of USAID diplomat Larry Foley) had been positively identified in six individual visits: four captured FAI fighters who were with Absi in the bunker, a Palestinian cleric ("Sheikh Hajj") who had negotiated with Absi on and off through the Nahr al-Barid battle, and, most convincingly, his wife, who Murr said broke down into hysterics upon seeing the body, cursing and pummeling with her fists those accompanying her to the Tripoli hospital. ¶3. (S) Murr said that, with the face badly disfigured by burning, he would await the results of DNA testing (comparing Absi with his son, in detention) before making formal confirmation, probably on Tuesday, of Absi's death. But he said that he was convinced. He also claimed that witnesses had identified the body of Abu Selim Taha, another FAI leader. Mid-day on 9/3, Murr called to report that Nasser Ismail, who had been a leader of FAI's terrorist operations, had remained hidden in the Nahr al-Barid ruins. When he tried to escape with four others on 9/3 after the fighting had stopped, the LAF killed him as well, arresting the four others. "KAMIKAZE" OPERATION ON FINAL DAY -------------- ¶4. (S) Murr's account of the last day of the battle varies slightly from what other sources and the media are reporting (and we note that there might never be a single, accurate account, although the picture should become clearer in the coming days). Murr described a "kamikaze" FAI operation that started on 9/2 at about 3 a.m. against LAF positions, after what had been a relatively quiet night. (Other sources say BEIRUT 00001346 002.2 OF 004 that LAF pounding had provoked the suicidal assault by FAI.) Consistent with other reports, Murr said that the FAI assault was designed in part to distract the LAF while some FAI fighters and leaders took other routes to escape the camp. Murr said that the LAF, which suffered five deaths of its own on 9/2 (bringing the total LAF deaths to 158 since 5/20), ultimately killed 39 FAI fighters, including six who were tracked down outside the camp (including a couple in "sleeper cell" awakened in Tripoli),and arrested 19. (The media reports 35 killed and 15 arrested.) ¶5. (S) Murr praised the people of Tripoli in the surrounding area, saying that they had helped the army in trying to locate FAI fighters trying to escape. While he did not rule out the possibility that a few might have managed to evade the tight LAF checkpoints established throughout the country and the vigilance of local Lebanese, he did not believe that FAI leaders or large numbers had gotten away. The Ambassador noted that, as of 9/1, Murr estimated that 95 FAI fighters remained in the camp. If 39 (including two from the sleeper cell) were killed and 19 arrested, that left 30-40 FAI fighters unaccounted for from his estimates on Saturday. Murr said to await final investigation of the bunkers, interrogation of those arrested, etc. He said that more bodies may be discovered in the bunkers. Murr said that he regretted that Absi had been killed, given the intelligence value of his interrogation. MURR SPECULATES THAT FAI ASSAULT DUE TO U.S. WEAPONRY, QATARI DIPLOMACY -------------- ¶6. (S) Asked what had provoked the FAI "kamikaze" assault early on 9/2, Murr said that he thought two factors came into play. First, FAI probably had received word somehow about the arrival of the U.S.-provided SMAW-D weaponry, a tangible result of the 8/26 visit of CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon. "We know they somehow we able to monitor what was happening outside the camp," Murr said. FAI probably had incomplete understanding about what the USG was providing but knew that the LAF had new technology to enable penetration of the last FAI bunkers. "For all the reasons you know, we can't thank you as much publicly as you deserve," Murr said, "but please pass on my personal appreciation to everyone." Second, the FAI fighters had assumed, because of a Qatari diplomatic effort aimed at getting FAI to surrender, that the LAF would be more relaxed than usual, allowing the FAI assault to successfully distract the LAF as other FAI fighters and leaders escaped. The FAI was "deadly wrong" in assuming the LAF was not on full alert, Murr said. QATARI NEGOTIATIONS ON FAI SURRENDER? -------------- ¶7. (S) Earlier, on 9/1, Murr had gone into detail into what he insisted was a Qatari diplomatic effort to persuade the remaining FAI fighters to surrender. According to Murr's report, an official from Doha arrived a few days ago to work with the Qatari ambassador. Using the Palestinian cleric "Sheikh Hajj" as an intermediary with FAI, the Qataris presented three conditions to the LAF for FAI surrender, all of which Murr accepted: presence of the Qataris when the FAI fighters emerged from their bunkers (to prevent the LAF from executing them),presence of ICRC personnel on the buses transporting them to MOD (to prevent enraged local Lebanese or relatives of killed LAF soldiers from murdering them en route),and ICRC access to them in the MOD prison to ensure no mistreatment. Late on 9/1, Murr called to report that FAI had asked for a fourth condition, that the families of Shakr al-Absi and Abu Selim Taha be given safe passage to Damascus, a condition Murr said he had not accepted. ¶8. (S) Asked why the Qataris would be involved, Murr mused that it had to do with Qatar's competition with Saudi Arabia. Look at the contrast, he urged. If successful, Qatar would appear to be a peacemaker, a successful diplomatic player. By contrast, many of the fighters who would emerge in a surrender of the 95 persons thought to be remaining on 9/1 (a number passed from Sheikh Hajj to the Qataris) would be Saudis. This would be a great embarrassment to Saudi Arabia. According to Sheikh Hajj, the Qataris themselves did not take the initiative to get involved but were suggested by Shakr al-Absi as potential intermediaries. But they quickly BEIRUT 00001346 003.2 OF 004 saw the diplomatic value of saying yes. In the aftermath of the 9/2 FAI assault, Murr thought that the Qataris had been "naive," tricked into persuading the LAF to stand back (which he insisted the LAF never did). Predictably, MP Walid Jumblatt and Senior Advisor to PM Siniora Mohamed Chatah (both of whom independently told the Ambassador of Qatar's supposed diplomatic initiative) were more suspicious, with Jumblatt calling the Qatari role "fishy," and Chatah claiming that "the Qataris are not naive." INVESTIGATIONS OF CAPTURED FAI FIGHTERS TO BE CONDUCTED JOINTLY BY LAF-ISF, MURR SAYS -------------- ¶9. (S) Murr reported that the investigation of the captured FAI fighters would be conducted by a joint task force made up of seven officers from the LAF's G-2 intelligence division and seven officers from the Internal Security Service's intelligence division, under the leadership of the G-2's General Georges Khoury and the ISF's Col. Wissam al-Hassan. It is essential that the two intelligence agencies cooperate, Murr said. If the G-2 had sole authority and discovered Saudi or even Hariri connections to Fatah al-Islam, then the ISF and even March 14 political leaders would tend to disregard the findings as being somehow politicized against them. By contrast, if the ISF were in charge and found Syrian links, then the LAF and March 8-Aoun politicians would claim that the ISF is exaggerating and distorting to advance March 14 political goals. Only a joint operation will blunt the ability of either political camp discrediting the investigations and interrogations. Murr said that the USG and other friendly countries would certainly be asked for assistance, and he promised to see that the USG had access to information captured, interrogation reports, weaponry seized, etc. ¶10. (S) Asked to speculate based on what he knew already what would be discovered, Murr said that he thought that Saad Hariri and Lebanon's Sunni politicians were "lucky," in that all of the Lebanese FAI fighters had been killed. He thought that the investigation would, however, uncover some "extremely minor" links between some FAI leaders and the Hariris and/or Saudis, from before FAI emerged as a terrorist force. While these links would be similar to other Hariri or Saudi financing of any number of Sunni institutions, "of course" March 8-Aoun politicians will try to trumpet them as proof that Hariri and the Saudis back terrorists. That is not true, Murr insisted: the point now is that the Hariris and Saudis fully backed the LAF against FAI. Any "stupid contributions" should be ignored, and they will be proven to be "a long time ago" and insignificant, he predicted. Murr also thought that there would be some evidence that Syria had facilitated the movement of foreign fighters from Iraq to Lebanon, including those who joined up with FAI. But, based on what he knew so far, he did not expect major revelations linking Syria operationally to FAI. "I wish I could say otherwise," he said, "but it doesn't seem to be true that Syria controlled Fatah al-Islam." COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (S) Murr is justifiably proud of the LAF and pleased with his own role -- perhaps somewhat embellished in his telling, but we'll indulge him, given the clearly positive influence he exercised -- in pushing an initially reluctant LAF Commander and a worried, hesitant cabinet into going all the way in wiping out FAI's strongholds in Nahr al-Barid. While describing a much-welcome happy ending to a long, tough struggle, Murr's specific comments should be seen as an initial read-out of the end of the Nahr al-Barid fight, subject to further revisions as the details become more clear. But, after 105 days of fierce fighting, the LAF and GOL can be proud of an unexpected and unprecedented victory by the state over a terrorist organization that had established remarkably deep roots quickly in a lawless bit of Lebanese territory. ¶12. (S) Counting severe injuries, the LAF suffered roughly a one-for-one casualty rate with FAI fighters killed in order to defeat Fatah al-Islam. In the process, it established itself as the only truly cross-confessional state institution that has received near universal backing from Lebanon's BEIRUT 00001346 004.2 OF 004 otherwise divided population. With the execution by FAI of LAF soldiers on 5/20, the LAF was forced into this battle woefully under-equipped. USG responsiveness, in establishing an emergency airlift of needed ammunition and supplies and by working at unprecedented speed to approve third-party transfers, played an essential role in the LAF's success. Now, as we have reported previously, the "day after" will pose new and equally difficult challenges to the GOL, although we hope they are more of a political rather than security nature. FELTMAN