Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT1342
2007-08-31 15:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: GEAGEA CHARTS MARCH 14 ELECTION COURSE,

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5823
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1342/01 2431530
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311530Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9264
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1517
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001342 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA CHARTS MARCH 14 ELECTION COURSE,
HINTS AT DANGERS AHEAD

REF: BEIRUT 1320

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001342

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA CHARTS MARCH 14 ELECTION COURSE,
HINTS AT DANGERS AHEAD

REF: BEIRUT 1320

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) A thoughtful and deliberate Lebanese Forces (LF)
leader Samir Geagea outlined March 14's presidential election
strategy and the opposition's efforts to scuttle or otherwise
disrupt the election. Geagea stressed that the U.S. could
best serve itself and Lebanon in the period before the
election by limiting official U.S. statements to generic
support for holding the election on time and according to the
Lebanese constitution. He urged that we not go into details
in our public statements. Geagea questioned Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF)Commander Michel Sleiman's political neutrality,
noting that Sleiman had not declared that he opposed
resistance to the election. Geagea also thought that Sleiman
may well attempt to take over as prime minister, should
tensions between March 14 and the opposition result in civil
disorder. End summary.

U.S.-MARCH 14 ELECTION GOALS: THE LESS SAID THE BETTER
--------------


2. (C) In an August 31 meeting with the Ambassador, LF
Executive Committee President Samir Geagea, accompanied by
advisors Elie Khoury and Joseph Nehmeh, concurred with the
Ambassador that it was not necessary that the USG be vocal
(at least not at this point) about opposition to amending
the constitution that would allow LAF Commander Sleiman to
become president. Geagea stressed that it would be better
for U.S. (and Lebanese) interests to limit official U.S.
comments to support for holding the election on time and
according to the Lebanese constitution. Anything more would
be perceived as U.S. interference. Expressing approval over
recent USG public comments, he urged that we keep our
comments generic and not go into details.

CHRISTIAN HARMONY--SOME MINOR DISCORDANCE
--------------


3. (C) Geagea termed the August 20 gathering of March 14
Christian leaders which he hosted (reftel) as "good" because
they had agreed on a presidential strategy and overcome

problems. In his words, the meeting was about "declaring
March 14 and Chrisitian legitimacy." As for MP and
presidential hopeful Robert Ghanem's absence, Geagea said
they had wanted to keep the focus on the two preferred
choices: Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb. Geagea added he
would receive Ghanem privately next week and continue to
engage him, thus keeping him in store as a possible
compromise candidate. Former President Amine Gemayel, miffed
at not having been asked to host the event and at being
passed over as a candidate , was finally persuaded to attend,
although, Geagea noted, it had taken some coaxing.
Furthermore, some other March 14 members including former MP
and Saad Hariri advisor Ghattas Khoury were upset at not
having been invited at all, because of, as Geagea termed it,
their "other connotation", a reference to their closeness to
Hariri's (Sunni-based) Future Movement, and the fact that
their political support rested on Sunni votes.

NASSIB LAHOUD'S THE MAN--AT LEAST FOR NOW
--------------


4. (C) Geagea unequivocally stated that at the next meeting
in about a month's time, Nassib Lahoud would be chosen as the
March 14 candidate. Harb would accept the selection of
Lahoud, as he has stated he does not want to be elected by a
simple majority (the March 14 mantra countering the
opposition's insistence on a two-thirds quorum.) However, in
the event a two-thirds quorum was achieved, then Harb could
be the compromise candidate. Commenting on the opposition's
intense dislike of Lahoud, Geagea said they perceive him as a
pro-Hariri Saudi puppet. When the Ambassador asked how
Lahoud could be seen as a Saudi puppet when he so frequently
clashed with Rafiq Hariri, Geagea said that Lahoud's
differences with Hariri were seen as tactical only.

OMINOUS SIGNS OF ARMED OPPOSITION RESISTANCE
--------------


5. (C) Terming Hizballah "the master of the game," Geagea

BEIRUT 00001342 002 OF 002


asserted that armed Hizballah members and their supporters
were preparing for armed clashes should they see that March
14 is determined to proceed with the election with only a
simple majority. Furthermore, according to Geagea,
opposition candidate Michel Aoun's supporters all over
Lebanon were preparing themselves for confrontation, with
about 1000 receiving military training in the Biqa'--a
dangerous development, as it would be the first time Aounists
resorted to arms. Geagea thought that "someone" in the Army
is aware of this, and is doing nothing to counter it. Since
LAF Commander Sleiman has not publicly opposed those who
resist holding the election, Geagea predicted Sleiman might
well attempt to take over as prime minister, should tensions
between March 14 and the opposition lead to violence. With
regard to opposition supporters' symbolic occupation of tents
in downtown Beirut since late 2005, Geagea said their numbers
had recently increased from 20-30 persons to 200 or more.
Nevertheless, he did not expect any real action by the
opposition until after October 12, or after Eid al-Fitr, the
holiday marking the end of Ramadan.
FELTMAN