LEBANON: CENTCOM COMMANDER VISITS WITH LEBANESE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001335 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: CENTCOM COMMANDER VISITS WITH LEBANESE DEFENSE LEADERSHIP Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander United States Central Command met with Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Lieutenant General Michel Sleiman and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Elias Murr on 8/29 in Beirut, Lebanon at the Ministry of Defense. During these introductory meetings, Admiral Fallon and Gen Sleiman discussed recent fighting against terrorists in the Nahr Al Bared refugee camp. Admiral Fallon and Minister Murr discussed strategic leadership decisions, the role of Syria and Iran in Lebanon, as well as the role of USG military assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces. Outcomes from the meetings include a suggestion by Admiral Fallon that U.S. shoulder-fired penetrating weapons and armored bulldozers might be helpful in the Nahr Al Bared fight, an After Action Review should take place after combat operations end, and that Lebanon seeks to establish a strategic partnership with the United States. MILITARY HONORS, TACTICAL UPDATE AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WITH THE LAF COMMANDER -------------- ¶2. (S) Upon arrival at the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Headquarters, Admiral Fallon and Ambassador Feltman were greeted by the LAF Commander LTG Michel Sleiman. Full military honors were rendered in the LAF's Military Square. This square has not been used in over 50 years for foreign military dignitaries and was opened in honor of Admiral Fallon's visit. Post cannot help but surmise that Sleiman was trying to garner as much press as possible to bolster his bid to be the next Lebanese President. (In an aside to the Ambassador, an upbeat Deputy PM and Defense Minister Murr commented that, had he thought two years ago about a Lebanese-U.S. military ceremony at MOD, he would have immediately dismissed the idea as "beyond belief.") ¶3. (S) Sleiman and Admiral Fallon spoke at length about the tactical situation in Nahr Al Bared with Sleiman inviting the Admiral over to his desk to review his tactical maps. Admiral Fallon commented that times are changing now vis-a-vis ammunition and equipment support for the LAF and that the relationship seems to be heading back to the level it was at �0A;in the early 1980s. Admiral Fallon remarked that he had never seen such a quick, positive change in assistance for any country in his area of responsibility. ¶4. (S) Admiral Fallon and Gen Sleiman also discussed the fusion of military assistance with tactical employment on the ground. Gen Sleiman specifically reiterated an urgent request for SMAW-D Bunker Busters to finish the fight against Fatah Al Islam in Nahr Al Bared. Admiral Fallon told Gen Sleiman that he would move immediately to make these weapons available, as well as assist him with armored bulldozers. Sleiman was also generous in his praise of US military assistance to the LAF and handed the Ambassador an official letter of appreciation. WELCOME BACK TO LEBANON THANK YOU FOR ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶5. (S) Admiral Fallon received an extremely warm welcome from MinDef Murr. Quietly holding a somewhat private discussion about their time in Lebanon as pilots in the 1980s, the MinDef and Admiral Fallon immediately passed to frank and open discussions. Murr thanked Admiral Fallon for his friendship, the "huge" assistance that the USG has provided to the LAF, as well as the good relations between his officers and US military officers stationed in Lebanon. Murr noted that USG military assistance to Lebanon had faced political difficulty in the last fifteen years, but that he was glad to see that the partnership has changed in all aspects of the relationship. Based on this personal relationship, BEIRUT 00001335 002 OF 004 Murr told Admiral Fallon that he hoped to see the security assistance relationship develop into an even more important strategic partnership. DECISION TO ATTACK NAHR AL BARED WAS DIFFICULT -------------- ¶6. (S) Minister Murr was not bashful about taking credit for ordering the attack on Nahr Al Bared. Indeed, he told Admiral Fallon that he had taken this decision without the consent of the Cabinet. Murr stated that he was in a lose-lose situation at the time and had to attack. He felt that if he had done nothing, the Army would have disintegrated after Fatah Al Islam murdered 30 soldiers. On the other hand, he felt that if he attacked, he might lose soldiers to political defection due to their religious affiliation. Murr assessed that he had a 70 percent chance of winning in Nahr Al Bared, so he took it, making the decision to invade the camp without the political consent of the Cabinet. Murr characterizes this decision as an action of self-defense in order to save the Army. ¶7. (S) Murr recounted the many warnings given to him before the battle in Nahr Al Bared that Al Qaeda would threaten his children. With bravado, Murr explained that he was proud to face this danger as it was a win-win situation for Lebanon. Murr said that he has not been surprised by the level of foreign terrorism in Lebanon, especially Al Qaeda, because he got his "first smell of Al Qaeda in Lebanon" when he was the Minister of Interior in 2000. Murr seems pleased that the terrorists are concentrated in the refugee camps because he can kill capture them all in one place. THE NEW LEBANESE ARMY AND ITS NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US -------------- ¶8. (S) Minister Murr, normally soft-spoken, was very vocal in his admiration of the "New Lebanese Army." Murr said that the LAF is a new Army that is only two years old, the time when the Syrian Army left Lebanon. This new Army has had the benefit of US Army training that has paid off greatly. In fact, just prior to Nahr Al Bared, a US training team was able to work with Lebanese Special Operations Forces. These forces put that training directly to use in the fight against Fatah Al Islam in the Nahr Al Bared refugee camp. Indeed, Minister Murr thinks his Ranger Regiment will be the best trained Ranger Regiment in the Middle East at the conclusion of Nahr Al Bared. ¶9. (S) Assessing the future, Murr does not see any possibility that the LAF would have any conflict with its neighbors in the next ten years. Murr stated that his war will be against terrorism. The LAF have already paid a heavy price in blood, but this fight will continue. Even so, Murr is happy with the level of training programmed for the LAF extolling, "This is a new beginning for us. We are paying with our lives, but we feel we are backed by the most powerful Army in the world and that we are not alone." Admiral Fallon replied, "That is a good feeling for you to have. You are not alone." POLITICAL STABILITY AND UNIFIL WILL THE ARMY STAND, OR CRACK? -------------- ¶10. (S) Murr discussed an 8/28 meeting with MG Graziano, the UNIFIL Commander in south Lebanon. Graziano is concerned about LAF actions if no President is elected or if two governments are declared. Murr related that he told Graziano that Lebanon would respect the international resolutions no matter what happens in the country. In this manner, the LAF will ensure that there are no problems either in south Lebanon or northern Israel no matter what happens between Syria and Israel or the United States and Iran. ¶11. (S) Stressing the need for cooperation between the LAF and UNIFIL, Murr emphasized that cooperation is needed to avoid Blue Line problems. To this end, Murr has ordered the UNIFIL Commander and the LAF Commander to begin training and patrolling together in south Lebanon. The purpose of this BEIRUT 00001335 003 OF 004 training is to show the Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah that UNIFIL is not only a peacekeeping force, but a force for the protection of Lebanon. COURTING SYRIA AND IRAN HEZBOLLAH ARMED FOR OFFENSE AND DEFENSE -------------- ¶12. (S) Murr explained to Admiral Fallon that current Cabinet decrees allow Hezbollah to operate outside of the UNIFIL mandate area without any repercussions. Clearly unhappy with this, Murr stated that Hezbollah is "10 times more prepared than a year ago" when they seized Israeli captives and precipitated a war with Israel. ¶13. (S) Murr offered an interesting assessment of Hezbollah's courtship that we had not heard before. Specifically, Syria sees Hezbollah as a defensive bulwark against Israel. As such, the majority of military supplies and preparations that Syria supplies to Hezbollah are defensive in nature, designed to help repel an Israeli attack. Meanwhile, the Iranians see Hezbollah as an offensive weapon and are training and equipping Hezbollah for offensive operations against Israel using Katusha rockets, long range rockets, etc. Thus, Hezbollah profits from both sides to develop a comprehensive military strategy and disposition vis--vis Israel while enjoying the safety of the mountain valleys of the Beka'a region. REGION REACTIONS TO US ACTION AGAINST IRAN -------------- ¶14. (S) While Murr feels that Syria is primarily in a defensive mode at this time, he feels they would immediately be forced into action against Israel if there is any US action against Iran. Murr expects that Syria would begin this aggression without much hesitancy on the part of Bashar Al-Asad. According to Murr, Bashar has had an inferiority complex since his was a child. "What can you expect, he was promoted from civilian to five star general in one day?" Murr says that Bashar believes that all Arab leaders must start at least one war before they can be accepted as real Arab leaders. These are the calculations of a period gone by, but they are still the calculations of Bashar. ¶15. (S) Murr says that he has indications and warnings that "something" will happen in the not so distant future. The non-specific nature of the comment leads us to believe that Murr may just be hedging his bets as are many politicians in Lebanon right now. Even so, Murr was adamant that if the US strikes Iran, Hezbollah and Syria will react. PREVIOUS QUESTIONS BY SECRETARY GATES VINDICATED BY ACTION ON THE GROUND -------------- ¶16. (S) As with most of our Lebanese hosts, they like to remind guests of their travels to Washington. Minister Murr told Admiral Fallon about Secretary Gates' questionsabout the LAF when he visited in April 2007. Murr said that Secretary Gates was justified in having his doubts about the LAF and what they would, or would not, do if called in to service. Murr thinks the LAF has answered some of these questions for Secretary Gates and for Secretary Rice. Indeed, Murr feels that the LAF's efforts have the hallmarks of acts that benefit the entire world. Murr stressed that one can train and plan, "but the real test is what you do on the ground." LOOKING FORWARD AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW -------------- ¶17. (S) Minister Murr stressed the need to assess how the LAF has done in Nahr Al Bared. The Minister feels that perhaps there are some things the LAF could have done better and these issues need to be discussed. Minister Murr also believes that there are possibly some lessons that the US Forces could learn from this fight in order to be more successful in Iraq. Minister Murr reaffirmed his strong BEIRUT 00001335 004 OF 004 commitment for a lessons learned exercise (i.e. After Action Review) after the completion of combat operations in Nahr Al Bared. Admiral Fallon echoed the Minister's belief in the need for solid assessments and pledged to support the LAF in this process. ¶18. (S) Admiral Fallon has reviewed this cable. FELTMAN