LEBANON: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HEADED FOR A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001320 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HEADED FOR A SHOWDOWN? REF: BEIRUT 1184 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 ( b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) With less than one month to go before the beginning of the two-month presidential election period, the gulf between the majority March 14 and opposition March 8 appears to be widening. The battle currently is being fought in the Christian arena, split into two opposing camps: one, representing the majority, led by Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and the other, representing the opposition, by Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun. The March 14 camp recently went on the offensive, essentially ruling out the possibility of a consensus candidate and instead declaring it will elect its own candidate by simple majority if the opposition refuses to make the two-thirds quorum required to hold elections. March 8, predictably, reacted by ratcheting up its own rhetoric, with threats ranging from civil disobedience to a second government if March 14 proceeds with its plan. ¶2. (C) With the Christians divided, a wavering Patriarch has yet to play a decisive role, occasionally alluding to a compromise presidency under Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman as a means to "save the country," while Sleiman himself remains noncommittal, playing to both sides to maintain an air of neutrality. Many believe the opposition's ultimate goal is a vacuum in the presidency, paving the way for a Sleiman or second government that would ensure continuing Syrian (and Iranian) influence in Lebanon. End summary. ¶3. (C) Following the August 20 meeting of March 14 Christian leaders and the August 21 meeting of March 8 Christian leaders, Charge, Pol/Econ Chief, and Embassy staff discussed current prospects for Lebanon's upcoming presidential election with representatives from both sides. These included: from the pro-March 14 camp, former MP Nassib Lahoud, Dory Chamoun (head of the National Liberal Party), Carlos Edde (head of the National Bloc party),Elie Khoury (Geagea advisor),MP Wael Abou Faour (from Jumblatt's bloc), self-described independent Michel al-Khoury, MP Robert Ghanem and his advisor, Joseph al-Amm; and, from the pro-March 8 camp, MP Michel Murr, MP Elie Skaff, MP Hagop Pakradunian, and Rony Arayji, advisor to Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh. MARCH 14 CHRISTIANS GO ON THE OFFENSIVE -------------- ¶4. (C) 29 March 14 Christian leaders, including Nassib Lahoud, MP Boutros Harb, Amine Gemayel, MP and Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad, Dory Chamoun, MP Michel Pharaon, former MP Fares Souaid, and others, met August 20 at the home of Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea in Marab to discuss strategies for identifying and electing a single March 14 candidate to replace President Emile Lahoud, whose mandate (extended in 2004 for three years under pressure from the Syrians) expires November 24. In what Embassy contacts described as an excellent meeting, Nassib Lahoud, Emile's distant (at least politically) cousin, has emerged as the unofficial lead candidate, to no one's surprise, but to the dismay of at least two other potential March 14 candidates: Boutros Harb and Amine Gemayel. Mouawad, widely expected to announce her candidacy, reportedly promised to withdraw her name in support of Lahoud. ¶5. (C) Harb, liked by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri of March 8, seems to have accepted Lahoud's front-runner status as a temporary tactic that will eventually turn in his favor once it becomes clear that Harb alone is the only March 14 candidate capable of delivering the opposition's support (an overly optimistic assessment, in our view, given that Berri would not be able to do so without the consent of his true masters, Hizballah and Syria, who are unlikely to support any March 14 candidate, even Harb). Al-Khoury told us the atmosphere at the March 14 meeting was excellent despite what BEIRUT 00001320 002 OF 005 he termed a "cold war" between Harb and Lahoud; in the end, however, Harb would not go against the March 14 majority. ¶6. (C) Gemayel, meanwhile, had threatened to boycott the meeting, claiming that, as a former president, the father of a martyr (son Pierre, a March 14 MP and Industry Minister, was assassinated November 21),and the person who "defeated" Aoun (at least in terms of Maronite votes) in the August 5 Metn by-election (reftel),he had earned the right to host the event and secure the nomination. Amine represents the Metn region, as Nassib Lahoud did when he was in parliament, and presumably feels a Lahoud presidency would challenge his leadership there. ¶7. (C) Another horse in the race, MP Robert Ghanem, who announced his candidacy on August 14, was not invited to the gathering. According to our March 14 contacts, the meeting was limited to heads of political groups and independents (like al-Khoury). One contact jokingly complained to PolStaff that Geagea took a blood test for Ghanem and another MP, Jumblatt ally Fuad Saad and discovered "they are not pure Christians." Although Ghamen is ostensibly a member of March 14, al-Khoury recalled that three years ago, when he announced his candidacy for the presidency, Ghanem said Syrian President Asad had asked him to run. When he subsequently withdrew his name, again it was at Asad's request. Furthermore, Ghahem is from the Biqa', where Hizballah has a great deal of influence, and uses him as a tool. It would be difficult, al-Khoury said, for Ghanem to suddenly change his true colors. Harb reportedly put it more bluntly, referring to Ghanem as a "Syrian agent" in a meeting with his supporters (but this may have been pure electoral posturing to further his own prospects; at the same meeting Harb also reportedly called Lahoud, whose sister-in-law was married to Saudi King Abdallah, as a "Saudi puppet"). ¶8. (C) Putting a positive face on Ghanem's exclusion, Michel Murr told Polstaff it was to Ghanem's advantage not to be closely associated with March 14, as this would increase his chances of becoming an eventual consensus candidate, an opinion Ghanem's own political advisor, Joseph al-Amm, echoed with PolStaff. Ghanem himself told us that Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh told him it was to his advantage not to have been invited. Even al-Khoury conceded that for a March 14 candidate to be elected, he must have good relations with Syria and Hizballah, albeit without going too far. For this reason, al-Khoury warned, we shouldn't be surprise to hear relatively moderate statements on Hizballah's arms and arms shipments from Syria from March 14's candidate. ¶9. (C) The March 14 leaders meeting at Marab added more fuel to the fire by declaring that March 14 would elect its chosen candidate by simple majority if necessary, in the event the opposition refused to make the two-thirds quorum required to hold the election. Several contacts told us they believe March 14 can peel off Aoun MPs like Farid Khazen (who suffers a "crisis of conscientiousness," according to al-Khoury) and Ghassan Moukheiber, to ensure it has a simple majority in case some March 14 MPs defect (Minister of Public Works and Transportation Mohamed Safadi, rumored to have been pressured by Syria to call for a two-thirds quorum, comes to mind). ¶10. (C) The next step is a meeting between Geagea and non-Christian March 14 leaders Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt and Future Movement leader Saad Hariri, both of whom reportedly are on board with Lahoud's candidacy. Lahoud himself said he will announce his candidacy officially in ten days. MARCH 8 COUNTERATTACKS -------------- ¶11. (C) Not to be outdone, Christian opposition leaders Michel Murr, Hagop Pakradunian, Elie Skaff, Marada party leader Suleiman Franjieh former Minister Sebouh Hovnanian, Tashnaq Party head Hovig Mekhiterian, and Aoun advisor (and son-in-law) Gebran Bassil gathered August 21 at Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun's residence in Rabieh. They claimed the meeting had been scheduled ten days earlier -- and thus was not a reaction to BEIRUT 00001320 003 OF 005 the March 14 meeting. However, it was clear the meeting's purpose was to challenge Geagea's claim to represent the Christians, must less to nominate a presidential candidate on their behalf, and to warn against the consequences of "imposing" that candidate with a simple majority. ¶12. (C) Pakradunian told PolStaff the group stressed the need for a two-thirds majority to elect the president, declaring they would not recognize a president elected by a simple majority. They also discussed steps the opposition could take to confront such a scenario, including the formation of a second cabinet, which Skaff told PolStaff was a serious option given March 14's refusal to recognize it cannot rule by itself and to make concessions. According to Pakradunian, Franjieh reportedly advocated the most extreme measures, such as taking to the streets, arguing that the opposition's actions so far have been ineffective. A more moderate Michel Murr stressed the need to elect a compromise candidate such as LAF Commander General Michel Sleiman. ¶13. (C) The next March 8 meeting will be expanded to include non-Christian opposition leaders. Meanwhile, one of them, Amal leader and Parliament Speaker Nabbih Berri, continues to stress his role as mediator, promising to convene parliament on September 25 as scheduled. Al-Khoury dismissed this claim, calling the Amal leader an "apparent mediator" and wondering aloud whether Berri himself would actually go to parliament or wait in his office with his supporters to see who shows up first. Berri is a puppet of Syria and Iran, al-Khoury declared, and Amal's "third way" is in reality a Syrian creation. ¶14. (C) Al-Khoury said the Iranian Ambassador in Beirut had proposed five names: Former minister Jean Obeid, Central Bank governor Riad Salameh, General Sleiman, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Fares Boueiz, and Maronite League President Michel Edde, none of whom would accept UNSCRs 1559 or 1701. Salemeh, though originally close to Hariri (and whose wife is Rafiq Hariri's widow's secretary) distanced himself from March 14 when he realized the Syrians had more to offer in terms of financial assistance, al-Khoury said, and now both Saad Hariri and PM Siniora oppose him. Al-Khoury referred to Boueiz as more of a Syrian foreign minister than Lebanese. Obeid is a "well-known friend of Syria." That left only Michel Edde, a "friend of everybody and therefore friend of nobody," al-Khoury said, thereby making him the "least objectionable" of the five. An "intelligent opportunist," Edde reportedly claimed he would stay only two years to keep Aoun's hopes alive. ¶15. (C) Geagea advisor Elie Khoury told Pol/Econ Chief August 20 that Hizballah, which has said it will not name a candidate until the last minute, will at first pretend to support Aoun in a strategy aimed at "killing two birds with one stone." First, Aoun's candidacy will keep the Christians divided; then, when it becomes clear he has no chance of being elected, Hizballah can claim it supported his candidacy, but the oppoition was not forced to seek an alternative soluion. According to several of our contacts, the pposition doesn't really want elections at all and is stalling to create a presidential vacuum that it would use to divide the country and justify the creation of a second government. According to Skaff, Aoun said at the August 21 meeting he would not mind a presidential vacuum until the 2009 parliamentary elections (presumably to boost his chances of becoming president in 2009). HIZBALLAH STEPS UP ITS RHETORIC -------------- ¶16. (C) March 14's offensive seems to have rattled Hizballah, resulting in some of the group's most threatening language yet. Sheikh Nabil Qawook, Hizballah leader in south Lebanon, stated August 21 that Hizballah would "not allow the new president of Lebanon to be part of the American national security, as is the case with the unconstitutional government...we will not allow the unconstitutional Siniora government to take hold of the country." Mahmoud Qomati, deputy chief of the Hizballah politburo, warned that the Lebanese people are losing their patience with the Siniora BEIRUT 00001320 004 OF 005 government and accused the Bush administration of using the March 14 alliance to provoke internal strife in Lebanon. MP Hussein Hajj Hassan threatened on August 23 to deal with any president elected by simple majority as a "representative for the American mandate and occupation" with whom Hizballah "would deal with accordingly." This is the first time Hizballah has explicitly threatened March 14; until now it has contented itself with saying it would not recognize a March 14 president. CAN SLEIMAN BRIDGE THE GAP? -------------- ¶17. (C) Ostensibly a neutral player in this drama, LAF Commander General Sleiman has adopted a dual strategy of supporting the Lebanese army (a rare unifying force in Lebanese politics) while at the same time appeasing Syria by denying its involvement with Fatah al-Islam to show he won't be a threat to Damascus either. Khoury rejected Sleiman's pretense of neutrality, arguing he is a friend of Asad and FAI prisoners have told interrogators that Syrian Director of Military Intelligence Assef Shawkat is their leader. AND WHERE IS THE PATRIARCH? -------------- ¶18. (C) According to many of our contacts, Patriarch Sfeir will continue to urge Lebanon's Christians to go to parliament to vote. However, an aging Patriarch besieged by lobbyists from all sides seems to change his position daily, depending on who bent his ear last. According to al-Khoury, Sfeir himself doesn't even know what he wants. "In his mind," al-Khoury said, the Patriarch would still prefer (former Ambassador to the US) Simon Karam, who al-Khoury dismissed as not up to the task. March 14 needs to surround the Patriarch, al-Khoury said, because "the opposition gets up earlier." (Comment: Other March 14 contacts like Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad also have lamented the fact that, primarily due to security considerations, March 14 members have not been able to visit the Patriarch nearly as often as March 8, though they have stepped up their efforts recently, recognizing that the early bird gets the worm. End comment.) Ostensibly opposed to a constitutional amendment, the Patriarch nevertheless continues to speak about a Sleiman presidency if that's what it take to "save the country." Sfeir will visit the Vatican September 5. US SHOULD KEEP ITS DISTANCE, WORK THROUGH FRANCE, VATICAN, SAUDI ARABIA -------------- ¶19. (C) Al-Khoury, repeating the well-known March 14 argument (which PM Siniora again evoked in an August 27 meeting with the Charge) that the current showdown represents a broader struggle between Iranian hegemony and friendly US influence, warned against overt US support for March 14, which would undermine its platform of a sovereign Lebanon that is not a puppet of foreign powers. Although the US would never convince Syria or Iran of the desirability of any March 14 candidate, it should continue to threaten or intimate those who would seek to gain power through undemocratic means, Khoury said. ¶20. (C) Furthermore, a clear harmonization of US-French policy would give France the political weight it needs, to influence Iran and Syria. Khoury saw Sarkozy's recent visit to the US and A/S Welch's follow-up visit to Paris as a good start, and encouraged the US to pressure the Vatican to convince Christians, especially Aoun supporters, to make quorum. He said had recently written to Vatican Foreign Secretary Mamberti, a friend, who reportedly promised to help SIPDIS Lahoud "discreetly." ¶21. (C) The US should also counter the "millions if not billions" Iran is spending to buy votes and provide money, arms, and military training to the opposition by convincing the Saudis to do more, Khoury suggested. Finally, the US should stress the need to avoid a vacuum -- thereby implying our acceptance of a president chosen by simple majority (a risky move, in our view, since the opposition could interpret BEIRUT 00001320 005 OF 005 this as justifying the imposition of a Sleiman/military or second government). IF MARCH 14 PREVAILS, THEN WHAT? -------------- ¶22. (C) In the end, al-Khoury argued, the presidency should not be a question of names but of principles, such as adherence to UNSCRS 1559 and 1701 and Lebanese sovereignty. He outlined one scenario in which March 14 could bring the opposition on board -- by selling the carrot of a national unity government after the presidential election that would increase March 8's presence both in terms of numbers and important portfolios. This, he explained, is the price March 14 would have to pay to avoid a confrontation. ¶23. (C) If March 14 somehow manages to resolve the thorny issue of the presidency in its favor, the question then becomes who will be the next prime minister? A Nassib Lahoud presidency almost certainly would exclude Saad Hariri; both are perceived as having close Saudi ties, and the combination of a pro-Saudi president and prime minister would be too much Saudi Arabia for many -- in both the opposition and majority -- to swallow. Al-Khoury suggested one possibility would be a transitory PM like Mijati, who stepped in briefly following the 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri; stressing it was pure speculation on his part, he said the Syrians might accept this scenario. (Note: We find it unlikely that Saad Hariri would cede the premiership he sees as his "right" to Mikati, who has financial resources that rival Hariris and who could potentially end Hariri's influence in Tripoli. End note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶24. (C) With both sides hardening their positions and rhetoric, the prospects for a compromise solution to Lebanon's nearly ten-month old crisis seem to be fading each day. March 14 seems to have woken up to the realization that, by agreeing to a "compromise" candidate, it would only be playing into the opposition's hands by ensuring that a pro-Syrian replacement is found for Emile Lahoud. It therefore has concluded that it has nothing to lose by putting forth its own candidate; better an all-out confrontation than another Emile Lahoud. ¶25. (C) March 14's fears are not without grounds. What is at stake here are two separate visions for Lebanon: a sovereign state versus one under continuing, and probably increasing, Syrian (if not Iranian) control. And although the battle is being played out in the Christian arena, this may only be the stage for the larger behind-the-scenes struggle between Shia and Sunni, content to let other actors battle it out whilst they observe from the wings, yet ready to take center stage once the minor characters have met their tragic fate. FELTMAN