MURR CLAIMS LAF COMMANDER'S COWARDICE WORKED TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000126 SIPDIS SIPDIS EMBASSY PARIS PLEASE PASS TO NEA A/S WELCH; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PARM LE SY SUBJECT: MURR CLAIMS LAF COMMANDER'S COWARDICE WORKED TO DEFUSE CRISIS (TEMPORARILY) Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a meeting with the Ambassador on 1/24, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr acknowledged that Saudi-Iranian ties and a generalized fear of sustained violence helped persuade the March 8-Aounist opposition to suspend its road-blocking demonstrations after only one day. But, he said, the real gift that definitively stopped the increasingly violent clashes was the cowardice of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander (LAF) Michel Sleiman: faced with criticism and immobilized by fear that any orders could lead to bloodshed and fissures within the LAF, Sleiman tendered his resignation. Murr used the threat of a vacancy at the top of the LAF -- which, by law, would be temporarily filled by the Chief of Staff, a Druse allied with Walid Jumblatt -- to frighten Michel Aoun, Nabih Berri, and Hizballah into backing down, out of fear that the LAF's arsenals would end up on the side of Jumblatt and his March 14 allies. Murr also said that he had to get Prime Minister Siniora to back down from his insistence that the LAF shift units from the south and the Syrian border to stabilize the situation in Beirut. Siniora, Murr said, would have thrown away Lebanon's obligations under 1701, given Hizballah a victory in the south (as the LAF would never have been permitted to return), and destroyed his own reputation with the international community just before Paris III. "I saved the country yesterday," Murr joked. Murr said that, according to his information, Hizballah will be patient for about a week before trying something else: Hizballah sees no reason yet to back down, even if Hizballah now realizes how little value Michel Aoun is to them. End summary. USING THREAT OF RESIGNATION TO STOP DEMONSTRATIONS -------------- ¶2. (S) Greeting the Ambassador at his house on 1/24, Murr joked (more in good humor than vanity) that "I saved the country yesterday." He said that the March 8-Aounist opposition had suspended its road-blocking demonstrations after a single day for several reasons. The anticipated trip by Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan to Teheran and Saudi-Iranian contacts had an impact, as Iran didn't want its Lebanese allies to destroy the atmosphere. So did the widespread fears that, with Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces starting to fight back against Aounists and Suleiman Franjieh's Marada "thugs," Lebanon was on the threshold of widespread violence. ¶3. (S) But what really convinced Aoun, Hizballah, and Nabih Berri to call their people off the street, Murr said, was the fear -- intentionally spread by Murr -- that the command of the LAF was about to pass into the hands of LAF Chief of Staff Shawki al-Masri, a Druse loyal to Walid Jumblatt. That might have split the army, with the Shia refusing to serve under a Jumblatt ally. Rather than standing aside from politics as has been the so-called "neutral" policy of LAF Commander Sleiman, the LAF and its considerable arsenal could take sides in any future confrontations on the side of March ¶14. (March 14 supporters, of course, see the LAF's passivity on 1/23 as evidence that the LAF's "neutrality" turned out -- this time, unlike during previous demonstrations -- to reflect a bias in favor of Michel Aoun and Hizballah.) ¶4. (S) Murr explained that, starting in the morning on 1/23, first with an SMS text message, LAF Commander Michel Sleiman tried to tender his resignation to Murr. Throughout the day, as the violence worsened and the LAF maintained its passivity under his orders, Sleiman tried to come up with new reasons to quit: people didn't like him, people issued orders with which he did not agree, people criticized his performance. Under LAF rules, the Chief of Staff -- currently Masri -- serves in the interim, until a new army commander is appointed. Given the atmosphere in the country, it is virtually impossible to get cabinet approval and requisite signatures of both PM Siniora and President Lahoud for a new commander. Thus, Murr said in delight, he was able to use the threat of an indefinite interim command by Masri to frighten Aoun, Hizballah, and Berri. BEIRUT 00000126 002 OF 003 SLEIMAN PUTS REQUEST TO QUIT IN WRITING -------------- ¶5. (S) Sleiman has not yet given up his quest to resign, Murr noted, passing the Ambassador a copy of a written letter just delivered. In his letter, Sleiman referred to complaints about his performance the previous day and orders given by Siniora during an emergency security cabinet meeting. He asks for three months leave without pay, during which time he requests an independent investigation to look into his performance during his eight years as Commander. Murr said that Sleiman is serious about leaving, as he now realizes that the 1/23 riots preclude the chance of becoming president. With the Sunni-Shia tensions now causing problems within army units, with bloodshed on a larger scale becoming more likely, Sleiman does not want or need the blemishes on his record, after steering the LAF to a good position during the "Cedar Revolution" and subsequent traumas. But, Murr said, he will not accept the resignation, even if it means that Sleiman becomes a "zero commander," simply passing on orders that Murr himself will have to give. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked whether Sleiman's resignation might be part of a plot by the Syrians and their allies to split the army and deepen the crisis. The Maronites, outraged if the army command stays for an extended period of time with a Druse, will fear losing more power; this might revive Michel Aoun's declining fortunes. Or Emile Lahoud could insist that, as titular Commander in Chief, he takes direct control of the army. Murr said that, unless new information is uncovered, he thought Sleiman was sincerely scared and tired. SINIORA UNWISELY TRIES TO REVERSE 1701 PROGRESS -------------- ¶7. (S) Murr said that he also had to "have a big fight" with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora during the height of the crisis. In an emergency security cabinet meeting, Siniora insisted that the LAF redeploy its units from south Lebanon and the Lebanese-Syrian border, in order to beef up troop levels in the capital to re-open roads and prevent a Hizballah takeover of Beirut. Murr refused to budge. If the LAF leaves the south, Murr warned Siniora, Hizballah will "celebrate a huge victory." Somehow, through demonstrations or other means, Hizballah will prevent the LAF from ever returning to the south. The same thing can happen with the troops stationed along the border. Murr warned Siniora that his international reputation rested in part on UNSCR 1701, and now -- on the verge of Paris III -- he was proposing something that would show Lebanon abandoning its responsibilities under 1701. (The Ambassador and Murr then spoke about the severe problem of arms smuggling, continuing despite the LAF presence.) HIZBALLAH TO PAUSE FOR A WEEK BEFORE RESUMING; AOUN DEPRESSED -------------- ¶8. (S) As for what is happening next, Murr said that Hizballah has spread the word that a "new phase" of opposition to the Siniora cabinet will begin in about a week, if some kind of compromise is not found before then. Hizballah is in the fight for the long haul and sees no reason to back down. Hizballah will create one crisis after another, until the Siniora cabinet collapses. There are two options Hizballah could consider, Murr said: freezing the Special Tribunal indefinitely, with a 19-10-1 cabinet split; or a 19-11 cabinet split (giving Hizballah-Aoun-Amal a blocking/toppling minority) that would discuss the tribunal. Either option, Murr noted, calls into question how quickly the tribunal can be established. ¶9. (S) Aoun, Murr said, is angry and depressed, as he realizes that only his hard-core followers answered his call to take to the streets the previous day. Most of the activists were from Hizballah or Franjieh's Marada party, not from Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. Aoun is finally starting to recognize that he is losing support. Even Hizballah realizes now that Aoun has little value beyond the symbolic Christian cover he provides. Nevertheless, Murr BEIRUT 00000126 003 OF 003 said, he did not expect Aoun to start switching sides, as his only chance of achieving anything -- even cabinet slots -- is to stick with Hizballah at this point. FELTMAN