LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ADMIRAL FALLON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001255

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MCAP SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ADMIRAL FALLON

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

OVERVIEW
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1. (C) Admiral Fallon: as the first CENTCOM Commander to
visit Lebanon, your visit provides us an excellent
opportunity to reinforce the message of strong U.S. support
for Lebanon. Your visit comes during a critical period
leading up to presidential elections this autumn, when the
Lebanese are particularly vulnerable to rumors circulated by
pro-Syrian politicians that our attention may be waning.
Your presence refutes this allegation. You arrive as the
much-buffeted democratic government of Prime Minister Fouad
Siniora is engaged on a number of critical issues. One is
the three months-long battle between the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) and Sunni extremists in the Nahr al-Barid
refugee camp. This fight is an important test for the LAF,
now winning both militarily and from a public support
standpoint. However, the 57,000 LAF personnel are stretched
thin: guarding the country's 450 kilometer border;
patrolling south Lebanon for the first time in 30 years;
engaging with Sunni extremists in the north and patrolling
the perimeters of 11 other refugee camps elsewhere in the
country; and protecting democratic institutions from
Hizballah-led opposition elements that have already tried to
overrun the government in both December 2006 and January

2007. So far, no one has forged a resolution to a political
crisis prompted nine months ago by the walk-out of six
pro-Syrian ministers. Negotiations to resolve the political
impasse are linked to the presidential election period
September 25-November 24.


2. (C) Added to this list of challenges is the need to
maintain the momentum of UNSCR 1757, which authorized the
establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon under
Chapter VII, a parliament blocked from meeting by its
pro-Syrian Speaker, and a very real threat by the pro-Syrian
president of Lebanon to create a competing, destabilizing
parallel government later this year to prevent the emergence
of a president truly independent of Syria. The other
daunting tasks faced by the Siniora government -- reducing a
USD 44 billion national debt, reconstructing an
infrastructure damaged by last summer's conflict between
Israel and Hizballah, and revitalizing a struggling economy
-- pale by comparison.


3. (C) Yet despite repeated blows from an imposing list of
unsavory characters -- Syria, Iran, Palestinian
rejectionists, Hizballah, pro-Syrian sympathizers -- the
government of Siniora keeps plodding steadily forward. We
may view with dismay the pace of certain reforms, but Siniora
and his beleaguered ministers and allied members of
parliament have by and large pursued policies that they hope
will lead to a democratic, secure, and prosperous country.
International organizations such as the IMF have applauded
the GOL,s progress on economic matters, stating "the country
shouldn't be doing this well." When you view Lebanon from a
strategic point of view, we believe you will discern trends
both good and bad, but on the whole you will see a country
with potential to become a model in a tough neighborhood.

SECURITY SERVICES UNDER GREAT STRAIN
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4. (C) Elite units of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have
been engaged since May in a hard-fought battle against Sunni
extremists in the dense urban environment of the Nahr
al-Barid refugee camp in northern Lebanon. The camp is
usually home to 35,000 Palestinian refugees but also became
the stronghold for several hundred well-trained extremists
from a group called Fatah al-Islam. The current battle
erupted without notice on May 20, when Fatah al-Islam (FAI)
militants struck LAF units stationed near the camp in the
aftermath of a raid by Lebanon's Internal Security Forces on
a FAI hideout in the nearby city of Tripoli. Part of the
determination and sacrifice of the LAF currently engaged in
the fight can be traced to the murder of unsuspecting LAF
guards during the first few hours of the conflict.


5. (C) In recent weeks, progress has been slow and measured
as virtually every building in the camp has been damaged by
the heavy artillery, tank, and mortar fire. Piles of fallen
concrete and other rubble from the fighting create obstacles
in the narrow alleyways making it difficult and dangerous to
advance and engage the enemy. LAF officials have reported a
steady decline in hostile fire from FAI militants remaining

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within the camp. The current number of LAF forces killed in
action as of August 14 is 136, with over 1,500 wounded in
action. There have been reports that negotiations are
ongoing for the remaining FAI fighters to surrender, but
there have been no signs of their willingness to do so. The
LAF will not accept anything less than an unconditional
surrender.


6. (C) The influx of U.S.-supplied weaponry has been
essential to the LAF's progress. Many observers have been
surprised by the tenacity of the LAF in attacking and
eventually taking FAI strong points. While armed forces
victory over the FAI now seems certain, the long-term results
remain in doubt, in part because FAI is a murky group. A
year ago, FAI didn't even exist as an entity and it is still
not known exactly who controls and supplies it. (Note:
Secretary Rice formally designated FAI as a global terrorist

SIPDIS
group on August 13. End Note.)


7. (C) The outcome of this fight, and any others against
Palestinian or Al Qaeda groups in the immediate future, will
do much to determine the long-term credibility and
operational effectiveness of the LAF. Pro-democratic forces,
both in and outside the government, believe the outcome will
be pivotal for Lebanon and they are pulling out all the stops
to obtain assistance for the troops. Some of these
well-intentioned calls for assistance are misplaced, because
they unduly emphasize "precision" weapons without fully
understanding engagement constraints, to say nothing about
the lack of pertinent training. But regardless of the
inapplicability of some calls for assistance, it can be
stated with assurance that the LAF desperately needs
re-supply of munitions and upgrades are needed for their
intelligence and urban war-fighting capacities.


8. (C) Supporting the LAF is particularly important to the
stability of Lebanon, as it is the only institution supported
by all of Lebanon's confessions. USG support to the LAF,
which is traditionally led led by a Christian, does not
endanger the delicate balance between Christian and Shia,
Sunni and Druse Muslims. Unfortunately, the other security
services struggle to overcome their image as sectarian
forces. The Internal Security Force (ISF),Lebanon's
national police force, is closely associated with
Parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri and his Sunni
followers. The Surete Generale, which covers internal police
activities, such as anti-trafficking in persons, anti-piracy,
anti-organized crime, is generally thought to be Shia-based.
Both organizations badly need assistance in the form of
training and equipment to fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities. The Department of State in cooperation
with other U.S. agencies, including the Department of
Defense, is engaged in a substantial USD 60 million plus
effort to provide this assistance, but the program is
expected to take several years and requires sustained
commitment.

A POROUS BORDER....AND SHEBAA
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9. (C) In July 2006, Hizballah kidnapped two Israeli
soldiers, prompting an Israeli attack on Lebanon and a
month-long war during which Hizballah fired more than 4,000
rockets into northern Israel. A year later, Lebanon is awash
once more in weapons. Despite efforts to improve border
security by positioning approximately 8,000 additional LAF
troops on the border, all evidence indicates that weapons
smuggling has continued unabated to both Hizballah and
several Palestinian rejectionist groups resident in the
country.


10. (C) The most serious attempt to address this critical
issue, whose enforcement is emphasized in UNSCR 1701, the
resolution which ended last summer's conflict, is the
German-led Northern Border Pilot Project. The chief problem
with this well-conceived and well-financed project is that it
will take until the end of 2007 to fully test the integrated,
intelligence-based concept. The second drawback is that it
will only apply to the less problematic northern border with
Syria, while it appears the primary flow of weaponry and
militants cross into Lebanon along its long eastern border
with Syria. There are already plans to "turn the corner" and
extend the project's integrated approach to the more
difficult eastern border in December 2007. The German-led
effort is presently the best option, and although we would
like to see a more rapid timeline, it holds the greatest
promise to finally seal Lebanon's border to the destabilizing

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trafficking of illegal arms and militants.


11. (C) One final border issue you may encounter is the
problem of Shebaa Farms. This is a 45 square kilometer piece
of contested land controlled by Israel that the UN has
formally recognized as Syrian, but which Siniora's government
steadfastly maintains is Lebanese. Although it is an
insignificant slice of border territory with no inhabitants,
PM Siniora seems to believe that if it could be transferred
from Israeli control to UN oversight, it would give his
government the instrument it needs to force the disarming of
Hizballah's powerful militia. This somewhat naive position
has unfortunately become embedded in almost every policy
discussion the Prime Minister now has with U.S. officials,
and even though your interests lie elsewhere, do not be
surprised if Siniora also raises it with you.

POLITICAL SITUATION -- NEVER BE SURPRISED
--------------


12. (C) As implied above, PM Siniora is the glue that holds
it all together. Through an unanticipated war, difficult
cease-fire negotiations, coup attempts by a well-financed and
unscrupulous opposition led by Hizballah, multiple
assassinations and assassination attempts of pro-reform
leaders, and political in-fighting among his own coalition,
PM Siniora has demonstrated remarkable endurance and
commitment to democratic rule. He frequently states that his
dream is to peacefully leave office to another democratically
elected government.


13. (C) That said, it is also clear that Siniora and his
close circle of loyal advisors need help to continue and
persevere in their difficult fight. A key challenge will be
the upcoming presidential election, scheduled to take place
in a special electoral session of parliament in the September
25 - November 24 timeframe. The current president, Emile
Lahoud, makes no secret of his allegiance to Syria and he has
effectively stalled many of the pro-reform programs Siniora
has tried to implement. In the face of its defeat to block
the establishment of a UN Special Tribunal to investigate a
series of political assassinations, Syria appears to be
pulling out all the stops to re-elect another pro-Syrian
president. The Syrians apparent goal is blunt the
effectiveness of the Special Tribunal and to keep alive
Syria's deeply held desire to re-establish its hegemony over
Lebanon.


14. (C) The recent parliamentary by-elections to fill the
seats of two assassinated MPs, Pierre Gemayel and Walid Eido,
proved to be an interesting test case for the upcoming
presidential elections. The balance of power did not shift
as a result of this election, as both sides each picked up
one seat. What the election did show, however, was that the
Lebanese Maronite Christian community is deeply divided. The
Lebanese presidency is traditionally held by a Maronite and
this division in the community will make the upcoming race
interesting and hard to predict.


15. (C) One of your interlocutors, LAF Commander Sleiman, has
emerged as an oft-mentioned contender for those seeking a
compromise candidate and has indicated his willingness to
become president if all parties agree. In the political
turmoil that typifies Lebanon, it is important that you are
not seen to be tipping the balance in his favor. We
appreciate your position that men in uniform should not be
talking about being President. It would be useful for you to
share this message with Sleiman and to emphasize that
servicemen should focus on their duties as military officers
and not interfere in politics.


15. (C) Because of the very high stakes involved and the
approaching electoral period, maneuvering has become the key
activity among the Lebanese political elite. Hizballah wants
a president amenable to its self-perceived role as the
"resistance" so that it can keep its powerful armed militia.
Opposition member and Christian leader Michel Aoun is the
tormented Hamlet of Lebanon, deeply desiring the throne, but
forever changing his positions and then attempting to explain
them using tortured logic. The influential Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir continually tries to preserve the "Christian"
institution of the presidency, but remains anxious of openly
supporting one candidate due to events in the past. At the
same time, Saad Hariri, leader of the parliamentary majority
as well as the Sunni community, wants to protect the
fledgling Special Tribunal and his majority, but at the same
time is cognizant of the charges that the Sunnis already

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control too much of the government. And then there are the
six, or seven, or even eight political leaders of the
Maronite community who all want to be president but, in
fighting each other, make the opposition's job that much
easier. And finally, there is the Druse leader Walid
Jumblatt, who has been both ally and enemy to almost every
other participant in Lebanon. He is perhaps the strongest
and most impassioned voice for Lebanese sovereignty, but
everyone is mindful that his ultimate allegiance is toward
his small community.

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
--------------


16. (C) With the presidential election period coming up,
discussions among political players have increased in both
frequency and seriousness. But we have witnessed increased
dialogue before, only to see it unceremoniously dissolve into
recriminations and renewed impasse. The difference now is
that the coming six weeks are indeed critical: if Lebanon
emerges with a president committed to the country's
sovereignty and stability, democracy stands a good chance of
success. If on the other hand, another pro-Syrian president
is installed in the presidential palace, continued stalemate
may actually be a preferred outcome.

YOUR INTERLOCUTORS
--------------


17. (C) As we have discussed, your primary host for this
visit will be Elias Murr, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime
Minister. He will host your lunch and will be the primary
GOL representative for the Humvee presentation ceremony.
Murr has taken great pride in our expanded military
cooperation over the past 12 months. He is also not shy
about taking his share of the credit. He was instrumental in
the passage of our bilateral Acquisition and Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA),even playing a role from his hospital bed
as he recovered from a July 2005 assassination attempt. He
is very good at focusing on strategic level concepts and you
will find him to be a knowledgeable interlocutor.


18. (C) Prime Minister Siniora has been a good partner to
the U.S. However, he remains sensitive about Lebanon being
grouped with other "problem children" in the region, such as
Iraq and Afghanistan. When we speak to him about U.S.
assistance, we often try to stress that our military
relations with Lebanon are similar to those with other key
allies, such as Jordan and Egypt.


19. (C) LAF Commander Sleiman has tended to focus on
tactical level issues with recent VIPs, but we will stress to
him ahead of time that you are here to explore more
strategic-level topics.

CONCLUSION
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20. (SBU) Admiral Fallon, you arrive at an important time
when Lebanon is at yet another crossroads.
Yours is the highest level USG military command visit in a
number of years. Your visit is a good opportunity to deliver
several key messages, as follows.

-- Use opportunities to re-confirm America's commitment to
Lebanon and her struggle for sovereign, independent rule
throughout the country. That includes the military equipment
that the USG is providing for the LAF that will be
highlighted by your visit.

-- Provide assurances in response to concerns that we might
be tempted to trade away our strong support for Lebanon's
sovereignty for concessions elsewhere in the region.
Specifically, the Lebanese worry that we may make a deal with
Syria at Lebanon's expense, by which we look away as Syria
reestablishes hegemony over Lebanon in return for Syrian
cooperation on Iraq. Your visit can help refute this
allegation.

-- With regard to upcoming presidential elections, underscore
the message that the U.S. supports the process but does not
have a favored candidate -- it is up to the Lebanese to
decide.

-- Avoid actions that could be interpreted as favoring LAF
commander Sleiman's presidential ambitions; your message that
men in uniform should focus on their duties and not interfere

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in politics is ideal. It is also consistent with Lebanon's
constitution that requires a two-year cooling-off period
before officials of Sleiman's rank can be eligible for the
presidency.

Lebanon has become a critical case for democracy and reform
in the Arab world. It is essentially the only Arab country
with a pluralistic tradition and some experience with
democracy. We are convinced our assistance can make a real
difference. We urge you to listen to your Lebanese
interlocutors, give them your valued counsel, and let us know
how we can better help you advance U.S. interests in this
most important country.
FELTMAN