LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ADMIRAL FALLON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001255 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MCAP SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ADMIRAL FALLON Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). OVERVIEW -------------- ¶1. (C) Admiral Fallon: as the first CENTCOM Commander to visit Lebanon, your visit provides us an excellent opportunity to reinforce the message of strong U.S. support for Lebanon. Your visit comes during a critical period leading up to presidential elections this autumn, when the Lebanese are particularly vulnerable to rumors circulated by pro-Syrian politicians that our attention may be waning. Your presence refutes this allegation. You arrive as the much-buffeted democratic government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is engaged on a number of critical issues. One is the three months-long battle between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Sunni extremists in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. This fight is an important test for the LAF, now winning both militarily and from a public support standpoint. However, the 57,000 LAF personnel are stretched thin: guarding the country's 450 kilometer border; patrolling south Lebanon for the first time in 30 years; engaging with Sunni extremists in the north and patrolling the perimeters of 11 other refugee camps elsewhere in the country; and protecting democratic institutions from Hizballah-led opposition elements that have already tried to overrun the government in both December 2006 and January ¶2007. So far, no one has forged a resolution to a political crisis prompted nine months ago by the walk-out of six pro-Syrian ministers. Negotiations to resolve the political impasse are linked to the presidential election period September 25-November 24. ¶2. (C) Added to this list of challenges is the need to maintain the momentum of UNSCR 1757, which authorized the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon under Chapter VII, a parliament blocked from meeting by its pro-Syrian Speaker, and a very real threat by the pro-Syrian president of Lebanon to create a competing, destabilizing parallel government later this year to prevent the emergence of a president truly independent of Syria. The other daunting tasks faced by the Siniora government -- reducing a USD 44 billion national debt, reconstructing an infrastructure damaged by last summer's conflict between Israel and Hizballah, and revitalizing a struggling economy �00A;-- pale by comparison. ¶3. (C) Yet despite repeated blows from an imposing list of unsavory characters -- Syria, Iran, Palestinian rejectionists, Hizballah, pro-Syrian sympathizers -- the government of Siniora keeps plodding steadily forward. We may view with dismay the pace of certain reforms, but Siniora and his beleaguered ministers and allied members of parliament have by and large pursued policies that they hope will lead to a democratic, secure, and prosperous country. International organizations such as the IMF have applauded the GOL,s progress on economic matters, stating "the country shouldn't be doing this well." When you view Lebanon from a strategic point of view, we believe you will discern trends both good and bad, but on the whole you will see a country with potential to become a model in a tough neighborhood. SECURITY SERVICES UNDER GREAT STRAIN -------------- ¶4. (C) Elite units of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been engaged since May in a hard-fought battle against Sunni extremists in the dense urban environment of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in northern Lebanon. The camp is usually home to 35,000 Palestinian refugees but also became the stronghold for several hundred well-trained extremists from a group called Fatah al-Islam. The current battle erupted without notice on May 20, when Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants struck LAF units stationed near the camp in the aftermath of a raid by Lebanon's Internal Security Forces on a FAI hideout in the nearby city of Tripoli. Part of the determination and sacrifice of the LAF currently engaged in the fight can be traced to the murder of unsuspecting LAF guards during the first few hours of the conflict. ¶5. (C) In recent weeks, progress has been slow and measured as virtually every building in the camp has been damaged by the heavy artillery, tank, and mortar fire. Piles of fallen concrete and other rubble from the fighting create obstacles in the narrow alleyways making it difficult and dangerous to advance and engage the enemy. LAF officials have reported a steady decline in hostile fire from FAI militants remaining BEIRUT 00001255 002 OF 005 within the camp. The current number of LAF forces killed in action as of August 14 is 136, with over 1,500 wounded in action. There have been reports that negotiations are ongoing for the remaining FAI fighters to surrender, but there have been no signs of their willingness to do so. The LAF will not accept anything less than an unconditional surrender. ¶6. (C) The influx of U.S.-supplied weaponry has been essential to the LAF's progress. Many observers have been surprised by the tenacity of the LAF in attacking and eventually taking FAI strong points. While armed forces victory over the FAI now seems certain, the long-term results remain in doubt, in part because FAI is a murky group. A year ago, FAI didn't even exist as an entity and it is still not known exactly who controls and supplies it. (Note: Secretary Rice formally designated FAI as a global terrorist SIPDIS group on August 13. End Note.) ¶7. (C) The outcome of this fight, and any others against Palestinian or Al Qaeda groups in the immediate future, will do much to determine the long-term credibility and operational effectiveness of the LAF. Pro-democratic forces, both in and outside the government, believe the outcome will be pivotal for Lebanon and they are pulling out all the stops to obtain assistance for the troops. Some of these well-intentioned calls for assistance are misplaced, because they unduly emphasize "precision" weapons without fully understanding engagement constraints, to say nothing about the lack of pertinent training. But regardless of the inapplicability of some calls for assistance, it can be stated with assurance that the LAF desperately needs re-supply of munitions and upgrades are needed for their intelligence and urban war-fighting capacities. ¶8. (C) Supporting the LAF is particularly important to the stability of Lebanon, as it is the only institution supported by all of Lebanon's confessions. USG support to the LAF, which is traditionally led led by a Christian, does not endanger the delicate balance between Christian and Shia, Sunni and Druse Muslims. Unfortunately, the other security services struggle to overcome their image as sectarian forces. The Internal Security Force (ISF),Lebanon's national police force, is closely associated with Parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri and his Sunni followers. The Surete Generale, which covers internal police activities, such as anti-trafficking in persons, anti-piracy, anti-organized crime, is generally thought to be Shia-based. Both organizations badly need assistance in the form of training and equipment to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. The Department of State in cooperation with other U.S. agencies, including the Department of Defense, is engaged in a substantial USD 60 million plus effort to provide this assistance, but the program is expected to take several years and requires sustained commitment. A POROUS BORDER....AND SHEBAA -------------- ¶9. (C) In July 2006, Hizballah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, prompting an Israeli attack on Lebanon and a month-long war during which Hizballah fired more than 4,000 rockets into northern Israel. A year later, Lebanon is awash once more in weapons. Despite efforts to improve border security by positioning approximately 8,000 additional LAF troops on the border, all evidence indicates that weapons smuggling has continued unabated to both Hizballah and several Palestinian rejectionist groups resident in the country. ¶10. (C) The most serious attempt to address this critical issue, whose enforcement is emphasized in UNSCR 1701, the resolution which ended last summer's conflict, is the German-led Northern Border Pilot Project. The chief problem with this well-conceived and well-financed project is that it will take until the end of 2007 to fully test the integrated, intelligence-based concept. The second drawback is that it will only apply to the less problematic northern border with Syria, while it appears the primary flow of weaponry and militants cross into Lebanon along its long eastern border with Syria. There are already plans to "turn the corner" and extend the project's integrated approach to the more difficult eastern border in December 2007. The German-led effort is presently the best option, and although we would like to see a more rapid timeline, it holds the greatest promise to finally seal Lebanon's border to the destabilizing BEIRUT 00001255 003 OF 005 trafficking of illegal arms and militants. ¶11. (C) One final border issue you may encounter is the problem of Shebaa Farms. This is a 45 square kilometer piece of contested land controlled by Israel that the UN has formally recognized as Syrian, but which Siniora's government steadfastly maintains is Lebanese. Although it is an insignificant slice of border territory with no inhabitants, PM Siniora seems to believe that if it could be transferred from Israeli control to UN oversight, it would give his government the instrument it needs to force the disarming of Hizballah's powerful militia. This somewhat naive position has unfortunately become embedded in almost every policy discussion the Prime Minister now has with U.S. officials, and even though your interests lie elsewhere, do not be surprised if Siniora also raises it with you. POLITICAL SITUATION -- NEVER BE SURPRISED -------------- ¶12. (C) As implied above, PM Siniora is the glue that holds it all together. Through an unanticipated war, difficult cease-fire negotiations, coup attempts by a well-financed and unscrupulous opposition led by Hizballah, multiple assassinations and assassination attempts of pro-reform leaders, and political in-fighting among his own coalition, PM Siniora has demonstrated remarkable endurance and commitment to democratic rule. He frequently states that his dream is to peacefully leave office to another democratically elected government. ¶13. (C) That said, it is also clear that Siniora and his close circle of loyal advisors need help to continue and persevere in their difficult fight. A key challenge will be the upcoming presidential election, scheduled to take place in a special electoral session of parliament in the September 25 - November 24 timeframe. The current president, Emile Lahoud, makes no secret of his allegiance to Syria and he has effectively stalled many of the pro-reform programs Siniora has tried to implement. In the face of its defeat to block the establishment of a UN Special Tribunal to investigate a series of political assassinations, Syria appears to be pulling out all the stops to re-elect another pro-Syrian president. The Syrians apparent goal is blunt the effectiveness of the Special Tribunal and to keep alive Syria's deeply held desire to re-establish its hegemony over Lebanon. ¶14. (C) The recent parliamentary by-elections to fill the seats of two assassinated MPs, Pierre Gemayel and Walid Eido, proved to be an interesting test case for the upcoming presidential elections. The balance of power did not shift as a result of this election, as both sides each picked up one seat. What the election did show, however, was that the Lebanese Maronite Christian community is deeply divided. The Lebanese presidency is traditionally held by a Maronite and this division in the community will make the upcoming race interesting and hard to predict. ¶15. (C) One of your interlocutors, LAF Commander Sleiman, has emerged as an oft-mentioned contender for those seeking a compromise candidate and has indicated his willingness to become president if all parties agree. In the political turmoil that typifies Lebanon, it is important that you are not seen to be tipping the balance in his favor. We appreciate your position that men in uniform should not be talking about being President. It would be useful for you to share this message with Sleiman and to emphasize that servicemen should focus on their duties as military officers and not interfere in politics. ¶15. (C) Because of the very high stakes involved and the approaching electoral period, maneuvering has become the key activity among the Lebanese political elite. Hizballah wants a president amenable to its self-perceived role as the "resistance" so that it can keep its powerful armed militia. Opposition member and Christian leader Michel Aoun is the tormented Hamlet of Lebanon, deeply desiring the throne, but forever changing his positions and then attempting to explain them using tortured logic. The influential Maronite Patriarch Sfeir continually tries to preserve the "Christian" institution of the presidency, but remains anxious of openly supporting one candidate due to events in the past. At the same time, Saad Hariri, leader of the parliamentary majority as well as the Sunni community, wants to protect the fledgling Special Tribunal and his majority, but at the same time is cognizant of the charges that the Sunnis already BEIRUT 00001255 004 OF 005 control too much of the government. And then there are the six, or seven, or even eight political leaders of the Maronite community who all want to be president but, in fighting each other, make the opposition's job that much easier. And finally, there is the Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, who has been both ally and enemy to almost every other participant in Lebanon. He is perhaps the strongest and most impassioned voice for Lebanese sovereignty, but everyone is mindful that his ultimate allegiance is toward his small community. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES -------------- ¶16. (C) With the presidential election period coming up, discussions among political players have increased in both frequency and seriousness. But we have witnessed increased dialogue before, only to see it unceremoniously dissolve into recriminations and renewed impasse. The difference now is that the coming six weeks are indeed critical: if Lebanon emerges with a president committed to the country's sovereignty and stability, democracy stands a good chance of success. If on the other hand, another pro-Syrian president is installed in the presidential palace, continued stalemate may actually be a preferred outcome. YOUR INTERLOCUTORS -------------- ¶17. (C) As we have discussed, your primary host for this visit will be Elias Murr, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. He will host your lunch and will be the primary GOL representative for the Humvee presentation ceremony. Murr has taken great pride in our expanded military cooperation over the past 12 months. He is also not shy about taking his share of the credit. He was instrumental in the passage of our bilateral Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA),even playing a role from his hospital bed as he recovered from a July 2005 assassination attempt. He is very good at focusing on strategic level concepts and you will find him to be a knowledgeable interlocutor. ¶18. (C) Prime Minister Siniora has been a good partner to the U.S. However, he remains sensitive about Lebanon being grouped with other "problem children" in the region, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. When we speak to him about U.S. assistance, we often try to stress that our military relations with Lebanon are similar to those with other key allies, such as Jordan and Egypt. ¶19. (C) LAF Commander Sleiman has tended to focus on tactical level issues with recent VIPs, but we will stress to him ahead of time that you are here to explore more strategic-level topics. CONCLUSION -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Admiral Fallon, you arrive at an important time when Lebanon is at yet another crossroads. Yours is the highest level USG military command visit in a number of years. Your visit is a good opportunity to deliver several key messages, as follows. -- Use opportunities to re-confirm America's commitment to Lebanon and her struggle for sovereign, independent rule throughout the country. That includes the military equipment that the USG is providing for the LAF that will be highlighted by your visit. -- Provide assurances in response to concerns that we might be tempted to trade away our strong support for Lebanon's sovereignty for concessions elsewhere in the region. Specifically, the Lebanese worry that we may make a deal with Syria at Lebanon's expense, by which we look away as Syria reestablishes hegemony over Lebanon in return for Syrian cooperation on Iraq. Your visit can help refute this allegation. -- With regard to upcoming presidential elections, underscore the message that the U.S. supports the process but does not have a favored candidate -- it is up to the Lebanese to decide. -- Avoid actions that could be interpreted as favoring LAF commander Sleiman's presidential ambitions; your message that men in uniform should focus on their duties and not interfere BEIRUT 00001255 005 OF 005 in politics is ideal. It is also consistent with Lebanon's constitution that requires a two-year cooling-off period before officials of Sleiman's rank can be eligible for the presidency. Lebanon has become a critical case for democracy and reform in the Arab world. It is essentially the only Arab country with a pluralistic tradition and some experience with democracy. We are convinced our assistance can make a real difference. We urge you to listen to your Lebanese interlocutors, give them your valued counsel, and let us know how we can better help you advance U.S. interests in this most important country. FELTMAN