LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: BUILDING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001252

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY IR FR
SUBJECT: LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: BUILDING
MOMENTUM, COALTIONS TO MAKE THEM INEVITABLE

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) A clear pattern exists in Lebanon of Syria's allies
trying to prevent free and fair elections. In summer 2004,
efforts by the Lebanese and the international community
failed to prevent the Syrian-directed, three-year term
extension of Lebanon's president, Emile Lahoud. Lahoud's
shameless pandering to Syria haunts Lebanon to this day. By
contrast, in spring 2005, local, regional, and international
partners bonded together in the aftermath of former PM Rafiq
Hariri's assassination to overpower the stiff opposition to
legislative elections by Syria's Lebanese allies. The March
14 majority that emerged from the May-June 2005 elections
made Fouad Siniora prime minister and continues to provide
the essential political backing to the Siniora cabinet.


2. (C) Today, with Lahoud's amended term finally
approaching its end, Syria's allies in Lebanon are fearful of
the implications of a six-year presidency in the hands of
March 14. Thus, they are up to their old tricks of trying to
manipulate elections or cancel them. They are relying on a
strategy to frighten people about chaos or vacuum in the
presidency in hopes that a so-called compromise solution of
their design suddenly appears palatable to our March 14
allies. With no guarantees of who will be PM in the years to
come, much rests on the positions of Lebanon's next
president, including the fate of UNSCR 1701, the next
legislative elections, implementation of the Special
Tribunal, and so on. We need to build a strong partnership
with the new president, but we must first work to ensure that
presidential elections take place. In our view, we will, as
in spring 2005, need to exercise leadership to build the
coalitions and momentum that make it impossible to avoid the
election of a credible presidential candidate. End summary.

PRESIDENT ESSENTIAL TO ENSURING
SUSTAINABILITY OF USG POLICIES IN LEBANON
--------------


3. (C) For the USG, Lebanon's upcoming presidential
elections are of primary importance. Lebanon's next
president will help decide whether the democratic and
independence gains since 2005 are strengthened, stagnate, or,
instead, are weakened. The president -- elected by
parliament -- has a single, six-year constitutional term
(Lahoud's extension notwithstanding, as well as the similar
extension of Lahoud's immediate predecessor, Elias Hrawi),
with powers including a veto-proof signature on cabinet
formation decrees. This provides him enormous leverage over
the composition of cabinets that may come and go during his
tenure. By working for or against the March 14 majority, the
president will also influence the outcome of 2009 legislative
elections. Regarding UNSCR 1701 implementation, if he sides
with the PM rather than (as Emile Lahoud does now) Hizballah,
he can help tip the balance of power in favor of the state
(including control of the Lebanese-Syrian border) and against
militias. Lebanon's president will also have an impact on
Lebanon's cooperation with the Special Tribunal on Lebanon.

SINIORA LEAVING; 6-YEAR PRESIDENT
SHOULD BE OUR NEW PARTNER
--------------


4. (C) For two years now, our primary partner inside the
GOL has been Fouad Siniora. Now, we need to think about a
partnership with a credible, six-year president. Per the
constitution, Siniora's cabinet falls and must be replaced
with the start of a new presidential term. Siniora may
return as PM in a new cabinet, but that would require Saad
Hariri (who controls the largest bloc in parliament) to cede
the position to him again -- something Hariri, unless
prompted by the Saudis, would be unlikely to do, given his
concern that Siniora's reputation is eclipsing his own.
Ideally, we will have a partnership with both the PM and the
president, but we know from the outset that the president
should be in office for six full years, whereas the PM can be
replaced. Moreover, while Saad Hariri as PM would be
generally friendly to the policy lines taken by Siniora, he
is inexperienced and thus unpredictable, making our
relationship with Lebanon's next president that much more
important.

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VARIOUS SCHEMES TO TWIST
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


5. (C) Under normal circumstances, the March 14
parliamentary bloc should have no difficulty electing a
president of its choice: were parliament to convene on
September 25 as scheduled with at least two-thirds of the
members present, March 14 could elect its choice for
president -- assuming March 14 can united around a single
candidate -- on the second ballot, requiring only a simple
majority. Unfortunately, extremely powerful forces are
working against the election (by parliament) of a credible,
six-year president before the 11/24 conclusion of Emile
Lahoud's term in office. The Syrians and their allies in
Lebanon are utilizing a variety a means to ensure that the
increasingly slim March 14 parliamentary majority cannot
elect a president of its choice:

-- Playing with the quorum to create a vacuum: having
persuaded the majority of Lebanese (including influential
voices like the Maronite Patriarch) that a two-thirds quorum
is required to hold presidential elections, the
Hizballah-Aoun alliance may fail to show up for presidential
elections, creating a vacuum in the presidency. If March 14
would elect a president with only a simple majority quorum
(an approach many March 14 members themselves now question),
the president will be deemed illegitimate by a significant
portion of the Lebanese. Alternatively, but less likely
given Michel Aoun's recent success in the Metn elections
(making it more difficult for him to challenge parliament's
legitimacy),the March 8-Aoun forces could physically block
MPs access to parliament (as happened to prevent the election
of Suleiman Franjieh in 1988).

-- Forming a second government: While Lebanon's
constitution specifies that in the case of a vacancy in the
presidency the cabinet shall assume the presidential
functions temporarily, Emile Lahoud has stated that, as he
views the Siniora cabinet as illegal, he will not hand power
to it. This could signal that, without a president elected
by parliament with a two-thirds quorum, Lahoud will carry
through with the threat to name a second cabinet. While that
cabinet would have no constitutional legitimacy, it would
have recognition in key parts of Lebanon, including the area
south of the Litani. Furthermore, because several key
ministries and the revenue-contributing phone companies are
geographically located in Hizballah strongholds, the
opposition would gain de facto control of their operations.

-- Promoting a military solution: This is a variation on
the second cabinet idea, by which Lahoud would, upon leaving
office, hand his powers to the six-person Higher Military
Council or another military body temporarily. That military
body would then try to organize presidential elections,
perhaps by dissolving parliament and holding new legislative
elections first. Some (including Parliament Speaker Berri)
suggest that the military coup will be prompted by any move
by March 14 to elect a president with a simple parliamentary
majority only -- meaning that March 14 would be blamed for
this turn of events. Others say that the military solution
would not count as a coup d'etat, because it would only
happen if backed by a majority of Lebanese (who might be
intimidated into fearing any other choice).

-- Delaying the presidency through a National Unity
Government (NUG) "parachute": Many of the pro-Syrian
opposition figures ask about the rush toward presidential
elections, saying that it is more important to form a NUG
first as a "parachute" in case presidential elections do not
happen on time. Given that presidential elections start
September 25, the emphasis on a NUG now strikes us as
evidence that the pro-Syrians want to delay presidential
elections, with the NUG (in which the pro-Syrians will have
veto and "toppling" power) to govern in the meantime. The
idea might be to delay presidential elections until after new
legislative elections, with the pro-Syrians hoping that a new
legislative majority will emerge to elect a president
friendly to the Asad regime.

-- Setting up a transitional presidency: Some argue that,
while the political divide here makes a six-year presidency
impossible, a two-year presidency can fill the void. Like

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the emphasis on a NUG now, this is a ploy to postpone full
presidential elections for a six-year term until after
legislative elections. This scenario has the double
advantage for those hoping to block a March 14 presidency by
placacint Aoun -- who could still hold out hopes of becoming
president in two years -- and aligning Lebanon's political
timetable with the U.S. presidential elections, which the
opposition is counting on to produce a less anti-Syrian U.S.
policy.

-- Insisting on a Michel Aoun presidency: Some of the most
widely reviled figures in Lebanon such as former Environment
Minister Wi'am Wihab claim that Michel Aoun is the only
possible president. Given what a polarizing figure Aoun is,
we believe that this tactic is intended to make a solution
harder, not easier, to reach. (As for Aoun himself, we think
he doesn't mind a vacuum, believing that he can exploit the
Christian outrage over a vacancy in the Christian presidency
to rebuild his popular base and propel himself into Baabda
Palace later.)

-- Creating a security nightmare: By reviving
assassinations, provoking new uprising in Palestinian camps
to exhaust the LAF, setting off bombs to terrorize the
civilian population, those fearful of a March 14 president
could tip the balance through violence toward some kind of
military solution. Alternatively, assassinations (and
resulting intimidation) of more March 14 MPs could further
chip away at March 14's slim majority, perhaps eliminating it
altogether. We also should watch for signs of another
high-profile assassination of a major figure like Walid
Jumblatt as a way to derail elections and lead to chaos that
will reinforce a call for a "military solution." Indeed, the
closer Lebanon gets to a presidential election, the more
dangerous the situation becomes for March 14 figures. If
there is no president elected within ten days of the end of
the president's mandate, in fact, parliament is considered to
be automatically in session -- presumably dispensing with
quorum questions and thus increasing the likelihood of
terrorism and murder to prevent a March 14 candidate from
being elected.

-- Using all of the above to frighten everyone into
accepting a "compromise" president: We believe that this is
probably the current game plan of the pro-Syrians. LAF
Commander Sleiman is the current front-runner in a long list
of those who are touted as possible compromise presidents, as
less-bad options to any of the possibilities listed above.
While this may be the option ultimately pursued, one suspects
that this appeals to the pro-Syrians because they believe
that the compromise candidate, whatever his consensus
clothing, is actually aligned with Syria. We note, in fact,
that LAF Commander Sleiman's name has been proposed as part
of many of the other options listed above.

ELECTIONS THWARTED AND SUCCESSFUL,
IN SUMMER 2004 AND SPRING 2005
--------------


6. (C) In summer 2004, some Lebanese publicly (including
the Christian "Qornet Shehwan" movement opposed to Syrian
rule and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt) and others privately
(including then PM Rafiq Hariri) began exploring how to
ensure free and fair presidential elections that autumn. The
international community got involved, including by passing on
9/2/04 UNSCR 1559 declaring the UNSC's "support for a free
and fair electoral process in Lebanon's upcoming presidential
elections conducted according to Lebanese constitutional
rules devised without foreign interference or influence."
The following day, however, Syrian pressure lead to Lebanon's
parliament (despite a walk-out by Walid Jumblatt's bloc and
many Christian MPs) amending the Lebanese constitution to
extend Emile Lahoud's by three years. Rafiq Hariri was
murdered just over five months later.


7. (S) The following spring, with Lebanon's parliamentary
term about to expire, Syria's Lebanese allies again opposed
free and fair elections. Hizballah, Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri, President Lahoud, PM Mikati (initially),and the
various pro-Syrian players and parties hoped to postpone the
May-June 2005 legislative elections. They argued that,
because of the trauma of Rafiq Hariri's murder, Lebanon's
potential instability after the Syrian troop withdrawal, and
(most plausibly) the need to draw up a fair election law,

BEIRUT 00001252 004 OF 005


Lebanon's existing parliament -- dominated by pro-Syrian
figures -- should be extended for months or even years. We
knew from other channels that pro-Syrians wanted to delay
elections until they were assured of again winning a
parliamentary majority, something that was impossible in
spring 2005. This worked out better than the aborted
presidential elections in autumn 2004: the May-June
legislative elections. held on time, produced a solidly
pro-March 14 majority of 72 seats out of 128. While that
majority -- due to death, defections, and by-elections -- has
dropped from 72 to 68 MPs, March 14 (assuming bloc discipline
and resolution of the quorum issue) could still elect a March
14 president, should the quorum question be resolved.

COALITIONS AND MOMENTUM
LEAD TO SUCCESS IN 2005
--------------


8. (C) The question is why we failed in 2004 but succeeded
in 2005 in promoting elections. In the aftermath of Hariri's
murder and the dramatic 3/14/05 "Cedar Revolution"
demonstration, it was possible for us to assemble stronger
local, regional, and international coalitions in favor of
legislative elections. Lebanese opposed to Syria's
domination came out of the closet in droves. We used these
coalitions to build momentum that ultimately made it
impossible for the pro-Syrians to evade the legislative
elections. There was no choice but to proceed with
elections. Inside Lebanon, political leaders (from what
become known as March 14 only later) mobilized rallies, and
motivated youth organized an ongoing downtown demonstration
in support of elections. Regionally, various diplomatic
efforts won Arab support for elections. Internationally,
France and the USG used a strong partnership in building a
climate for elections. With President Emile Lahoud's
signature needed for the election decree to be considered
valid, we even lobbied Lahoud directly (with Ambassadors Emie
and Feltman breaking their boycott of Lahoud for one-on-one
meetings urging his support) and indirectly, with Arab
pressure applied to Lahoud.

ONE KEY CONCESSION:
THE ELECTION LAW
--------------


9. (C) But the push for legislative elections on time did
include one key concession to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri,
in order to win Berri and Hizballah's agreement: the deeply
flawed 2000 election law (drafted by the Syrians) remained in
place. For those advocating elections, reverting to the
existing law prevented the pro-Syrians from delaying
elections indefinitely through endless debate of a new law.
For Berri and Hizballah, the 2000 election law ensured their
continued domination of south Lebanon, with independent
voices impossible to emerge given the enormity of south
Lebanon's two electoral districts. Undoubtedly, use of the
2000 election law was the least principled and most
expeditious part of the spring 2005 deal on elections, and it
has given the pro-Syrians and Michel Aoun a pretext by which
to raise nagging questions about the parliament's legitimacy.

TRYING TO SHAME CHRISTIAN MPS
INTO SHOWING UP FOR PARLIAMENT
--------------


10. (C) Today, we need to work again to see that our local,
regional, and international coalitions are all pushing in the
same direction. With March 14 leaders able to turn out the
Sunni and Druse MPs to parliament, and with Hizballah and
Amal determined to withhold quorum unless a consensus
president is agreed upon in advance, the key is getting the
Christian MPs to show up. If the Aoun bloc Christians are
pressured by local and international religious and political
forces into joining their March 14 Christian MP colleagues in
the presidential elections, then the two-thirds quorum seen
by many people as required for elections is achievable.
Getting the Aoun bloc Christians to show up would also
embarrass the Shia MPs: would they really want to be seen as
the only group boycotting the elections for Lebanon's highest
Christian office? We will work with our March 14 contacts to
see what incentives there might be for Aoun's deputies to
show up -- whether there will be places for them in future
legislative tickets and future cabinets -- but sticks are
needed as well. We hope that the Vatican can, essentially,

BEIRUT 00001252 005 OF 005


shame the Christian MPs into refusing to participate in the
creation of a vacuum in the only Christian presidency in the
Middle East.

EMPHASIZING PARTNERSHIP WITH FRANCE
TO KEEP SYRIA'S ALLIES OFF BALANCE
--------------


11. (C) Key to all of this, too, is our partnership with
France. Pro-Syrians in Lebanon are hinting that French
policy is softening toward Syria, which makes March 14
activists nervous. We don't want March 14 MPs to concede
prematurely to a "compromise" presidential candidate because
they fear the international resolve is weakening. In
addition, one major lesson from spring 2005 (compared to our
summer 2004 experience) is that it is easier to achieve our
results if Syria is off-balance. We defer to Embassy
Damascus for analysis of Syrian positions, but we note that,
just prior to the 2005 legislative elections, Syria felt
nervous enough under local, regional, and international
pressure to withdraw its troops and close its intelligence
offices in Lebanon. Now, despite the May passage by the UNSC
of the Special Tribunal on Lebanon, Syria seems to be feeling
confident that it can wait out the current U.S.
administration and flirt with France and other EU countries
in the meantime. By finding public occasions to underscore
our continuing partnership with France on behalf of Lebanon's
independence -- and specifically on behalf of presidential
elections on time -- we can help keep Syria and its Lebanese
allies from complacency.

AVOIDING THE "NAME GAME"
AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
--------------


12. (C) We may need to adjust our tactics in the weeks
ahead, to be able to respond nimbly to local developments.
But, for now, we strongly believe that we should continue to
refrain from supporting specific candidates. Given the
inevitable pro-Syrian propaganda, we would do our friends no
favors by mentioning their names. We should, instead, rely
on our allies in Lebanon's parliament to ensure that a
credible president emerges (or that no U.S. red lines are
crossed). So the focus should remain on how to make sure
that the parliamentary session electing a president takes
place.


13. (C) We also note that our March 14 allies and Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir remain opposed to constitutional amendments
affecting the presidency (either by changing the length of
the term or by waiving the cooling-off period for certain
candidates, including front-runner Sleiman). This opposition
to a constitutional amendment is consistent with the
international view from 2005, when UNSCR 1559 was passed. If
there is truly a Lebanese -- vice Syrian -- consensus that
the constitution should be amended, we would be in no
position to block it. But, now, there is no such consensus,
and we suggest working with France and others to pass the
message that we concur with the Patriarch's insistence on
respecting the constitution.


14. (C) At some point, we may also wish to let it be known
that we and our allies will recognize a president who is
elected by the simple majority in the last ten days of
Lahoud's mandate, when parliament comes into session
automatically if no president has been elected. This is an
option to hold in reserve for now, in order not to provoke
security problems by those fear a March 14 presidency. But
the knowledge that the international community is about to
recognize a March 14 figure may be leverage to force MPs from
Michel Aoun's bloc who are looking for a way off their
sinking Aoun ship to side with the majority on electing a new
president.


15. (SBU) In messages in the weeks to come, we will
continue to share ideas on what tactical moves we might
consider in order to build the momentum for presidential
elections on time and by which the Lebanese MPs have the
opportunity themselves to choose Lebanon's next president.
FELTMAN