BERRI ON PRESIDENCY, NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001250

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2027
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY IR
SUBJECT: BERRI ON PRESIDENCY, NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT,
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 8/15 meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri, quoting diplomatic traffic from the
Lebanese Embassy in Washington, lashed out against the USG
for opposing amendments to Lebanon's constitution. If for
example the Lebanese want LAF Commander Sleiman as their next
president (a choice that requires amending the constitution),
the USG should back down. Berri warned that a simple
majority quorum for presidential elections would be
disastrous, perhaps provoking a military coup or second
cabinet. The Speaker said that Michel Aoun would never
become president. But, as Aoun needs compensation, the USG
should support a face-saving National Unity Government (NUG)
now. The NUG will not be a substitute for the presidency if
the NUG and the consensus president are linked, with public
announcements and private understandings carefully
choreographed. Berri expected to begin major negotiations
with the Patriarch by late August on the presidency, and he
seemed to accept that the USG would not advance its own
candidates. On the international scene, Berri expressed
support for an international conference on Lebanon, but only
if the U.S., Iran and Syria all participated. In explaining
the return to the MFA of resigned Minister Fawzi Salloukh,
Berri insisted that Salloukh was, inter alia, protecting a
key Maronite position that Acting Foreign Minister Tariq
Mitri handed to a fellow Greek Orthodox. End summary.

BERRI ANNOYED BY REPORT OF US POSITIONS
FROM LEBANESE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
--------------


2. (S) Opening up the 8/15 one-on-one meeting with the
Ambassador, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri quoted the
diplomatic cable sent by Lebanon's new charge d'affaires in
Washington, Antoine Chedid, describing his introductory
meeting with Secretary Rice. According to Chedid's cable,
the Secretary noted U.S. opposition to amending Lebanon's
constitution. Going on at some length, Berri expressed deep
unhappiness with U.S. "meddling," saying that it was "none of
your business" whether the Lebanese parliament amended the
constitution or not.


3. (S) The Ambassador reminded Berri of UNSCR 1559 and
international opposition to Syrian-ordered amendments in
2004, and Berri denied the connection. If all of Lebanon
wants LAF Commander Michel Sleiman as Lebanon's next
president (a choice that requires amending the constitution,
to cancel the requisite two-year cooling-off period),Berri
said, then the USG shouldn't block the wishes of the Lebanese
people. "I'm not saying it will be Sleiman," Berri added,
"but are you saying no?" The Ambassador counseled Berri not
to be disingenuous: of course, if there was a genuine
Lebanese consensus behind a certain candidate, we would
respect that. But the point was that the decision had to be
Lebanese, not made because of intimidation. As of now, the
Ambassador said, Sleiman seemed to be the beneficiary of a
lot of very suspicious propaganda.

NO U.S. CANDIDATES
--------------


4. (S) Saying "if you don't like Sleiman, than who do you
like," Berri attempted to engage the Ambassador on USG
preferences for presidential elections. "I know you don't
like Aoun," he said; "neither do I." Aoun won't be
president, Berri insisted. With an air of deja vu, the
Ambassador repeated his now frequent statements about the USG
not trying to advance candidates. After some desultory
back-and-forth, Berri seemed satisfied as to the sincerity of
that approach. He then tried to elicit U.S. "vetoes." The
Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. doesn't want to see
someone emerge who is an agent of Syria or Hizballah, we
expected that Lebanon's parliament, responsible for
presidential elections, also would not permit such a result.
So, Berri concluded, "you're trusting your friends" in the
parliament to reject the sorts of candidates the U.S. also
dislikes. That is more or less the case, the Ambassador
said; the USG trusts parliament, if permitted to vote, to do
the right thing.


BEIRUT 00001250 002 OF 003


IF PARLIAMENT HAS ONLY SIMPLE MAJORITY,
THEN PERHAPS MILITARY COUP WILL BE ANSWER
--------------


5. (S) Berri made a pitch for the USG coming out explicitly
in favor of the two-thirds quorum he argues is required by
the constitution and by precedent. The Ambassador said that
we were not taking a position on the interpretation of an
ambiguous constitution that is not our own. Emphasizing the
importance of "consensus candidate," Berri warned that, if
March 14 would try to elect a president with a simple
majority quorum only, "then all of your nightmares might come
true." The Ambassador asked Berri is he was hinting at a
second cabinet or military coup or something similar. "I
don't know," Berri said, "maybe. But tell your (March 14)
friends that it would be a disaster" to elect a president
with anything less than the two-thirds quorum. "Even the
Patriarch agrees with me on the quorum," Berri said, noting
that he planned to start work with the Patriarch in earnest
in late August to vet presidential candidates.

NATIONAL UNITY CABINET:
BONE THROWN TO AOUN
--------------


6. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri why he was still
insisting publicly on a National Unity Government (NUG) now,
when he knows that the government must be replaced when a new
president begins his term in office, scheduled for November

24. It seems to be a waste of time to change the Siniora
cabinet now, when the new cabinet would only last until
November 24. Berri argued that March 14 figures are wrong to
suspect that the NUG is designed to take the pressure off
having a president or to create a vacuum. Instead, it is
meant to compensate Michel Aoun. Aoun will not be president,
and, after presidential elections, his parliamentary bloc
will vanish, as his MPs defect to new, more promising
alliances. When Aoun realizes this, "he'll go crazy." Who
knows what he'll do, Berri said, referring to Aoun's veiled
threats against the Ministry of Interior as Metn votes were
being counted on 8/5. By having Aoun inside a NUG now, he is
neutralized prior to elections. He won't be able to rally
his people to "make a mess."

DECIDING PRIVATELY ON PRESIDENT
BEFORE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING NUG
--------------


7. (S) If March 14 truly sees a NUG now as a trick, Berri
said, then "let's decide" on a consensus president first.
The name of the consensus president can be kept under wraps
until the parliamentary elections. But, with March 14
satisfied that presidential elections will take place, then
negotiations can lead to a NUG that is announced prior to
elections. Privately, the consensus on the president comes
first, then negotiations on a NUG. Publicly, the NUG is
sworn in, then the president elected (with a new cabinet to
be formed after the president takes office). The Ambassador
expressed bewilderment that Berri would wish to go through
all of this for a cabinet that will last only until November

24. "Believe me, it's worth it," Berri said, talking about
the need for something "to save face."

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: WAY
TO BRING IRAN, SYRIA AND U.S. TOGETHER
--------------


8. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri about his public comments
talking about an international conference. Berri, grabbing
his notebook, read from an account of a 8/6 meeting he had
with outgoing Egyptian Ambassador Hussein Derar. Derar
reported to him of a meeting in Cairo between French Foreign
Minister Kouchner, Egyptian Foreign Minister Abu-Gheit, and
Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa. There, Kouchner
allegedly proposed a regional conference to support Lebanon,
to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and France. Berri said that
he was a strong supporter of such a conference, but only if
the United States, Iran, and Syria were included. He said
that Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja was initially
enthusiastic but later, having fallen under the nefarious
influence of March 14 leaders, demurred. Asked what such an
unlikely conference would accomplish, Berri said that it
would help lead to the package of consensus president and NUG
he described earlier. When the Ambassador tried to counter

BEIRUT 00001250 003 OF 003


that those decisions need to be made by the Lebanese, not
outside powers, Berri waved his hands, "don't be naive."

SALLOUKH'S RETURN AS FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------


9. (S) The Ambassador asked about resigned Foreign Minister
Fawzi Salloukh's return to his MFA office. Berri laughed,
saying that "I expected that." He insisted that Salloukh had
returned to address a wrong against the Maronites committed
by Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri (a Greek Orthodox).
Mitri, taking advantage of Salloukh's absence, had given the
third-ranking position in the ministry to William Habib, a
Greek Orthodox, when it should have gone, "as it always
does," to a Maronite. Alerted to the Maronite snub by Beirut
Bishop Boulos Mattar, Berri ordered Salloukh to return to
work to replace Habib with Raymond Baaklini, a Maronite. The
Ambassador expressed skepticism, noting that Berri had read
from a diplomatic cable at the start of the meeting. "You
think I need Salloukh for this?" Berri asked. In any case,
the Ambassador said, it was wonderful that Salloukh again
recognized the legitimacy of the Siniora cabinet. "No, no,
no," Berri said, wagging his finger. "Don't do that! He's a
caretaker only. He wouldn't be there except for the thief,
Tariq Mitri."

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) To listen to Berri, he is the stoutest, noblest,
most selfless defender of the Maronites: he wants a National
Unity Government out of concern for Michel Aoun, and he
violated his boycott of Siniora's cabinet (in ordering
Salloukh back to the MFA) to protect a traditionally Maronite
slot. We doubt these are his real motivations, but he will
no doubt use them when he starts talking with Patriarch Sfeir
about presidential candidates: he'll argue to the Patriarch
that he is a true friend of the Christians, whereas the evil
Siniora cabinet and March 14 leaders are simply advancing a
Sunni agenda. We suspect that the suspicious Patriarch, who
surely has sized up Berri after all of these years, will be
susceptible to the second part of the message but not the
first.


11. (S) Fawzi Salloukh's return to the MFA, while something
publicly trumpeted by March 14 as acknowledgment of the
legitimacy of the Siniora cabinet, is ominous. Besides
removing Habib in favor of Baaklini, he changed many
appointments, probably using confessional balance and Shia
prerogatives as excuses to plant pro-Syrians in key slots.
We are particularly concerned that, as the UN looks to staff
up the Special Tribunal on Lebanon, pro-Syrian spies inside
the Ministry will be able to skew the employment of clerks,
security guards, etc. We know already, for example, that
Lebanon's charge d'affaires in the Hague, Johnny Ibrahim, is
extremely close to President Emile Lahoud -- meaning he's
also close to the Syrians. He has peddled a number of
resumes of Lebanese who are active in the international court
system, arguing that he is helping the UN to find experienced
Lebanese to fill a variety of Tribunal slots. We need to
beware the possibility that Ibrahim will work hand-in-hand
with Salloukh in an effort to pack the tribunal with Syria's
friends. This would have both intelligence and security
implications.


12. (S) We do agree with Berri on one thing: he surely
didn't need Salloukh to get access to Lebanon's diplomatic
traffic (which could probably benefit from something akin to
an EXDIS caption). Berri already has active agents within
the MFA, where, we note, his career diplomat daughter now
heads the passport division. We guess that the Lebanese
Embassy's cable on Antoine Chedid's meeting with Secretary
Rice was also shared with LAF Commander Sleiman: someone
would have wanted Sleiman to see our opposition to a
constitutional amendment (which he would interpret as our
opposition to him),and that may explain his recent pointed,
public criticisms suggesting -- facts of the matter
notwithstanding -- that we have not been responsive to LAF
needs.
FELTMAN