BERRI ON PRESIDENCY, NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001250 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY IR SUBJECT: BERRI ON PRESIDENCY, NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 8/15 meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, quoting diplomatic traffic from the Lebanese Embassy in Washington, lashed out against the USG for opposing amendments to Lebanon's constitution. If for example the Lebanese want LAF Commander Sleiman as their next president (a choice that requires amending the constitution), the USG should back down. Berri warned that a simple majority quorum for presidential elections would be disastrous, perhaps provoking a military coup or second cabinet. The Speaker said that Michel Aoun would never become president. But, as Aoun needs compensation, the USG should support a face-saving National Unity Government (NUG) now. The NUG will not be a substitute for the presidency if the NUG and the consensus president are linked, with public announcements and private understandings carefully choreographed. Berri expected to begin major negotiations with the Patriarch by late August on the presidency, and he seemed to accept that the USG would not advance its own candidates. On the international scene, Berri expressed support for an international conference on Lebanon, but only if the U.S., Iran and Syria all participated. In explaining the return to the MFA of resigned Minister Fawzi Salloukh, Berri insisted that Salloukh was, inter alia, protecting a key Maronite position that Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri handed to a fellow Greek Orthodox. End summary. BERRI ANNOYED BY REPORT OF US POSITIONS FROM LEBANESE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON -------------- ¶2. (S) Opening up the 8/15 one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri quoted the diplomatic cable sent by Lebanon's new charge d'affaires in Washington, Antoine Chedid, describing his introductory meeting with Secretary Rice. According to Chedid's cable, the Secretary noted U.S. opposition to amending Lebanon's constitution. Going on at some length, Berri expressed deep unhappiness with U.S. "meddling," saying that it was "none of your business" whether the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution or not. ¶3. (S) The Ambassador reminded Berri of UNSCR 1559 and international opposition to Syrian-ordered amendments in 2004, and Berri denied the connection. If all of Lebanon wants LAF Commander Michel Sleiman as Lebanon's next president (a choice that requires amending the constitution, to cancel the requisite two-year cooling-off period),Berri said, then the USG shouldn't block the wishes of the Lebanese people. "I'm not saying it will be Sleiman," Berri added, "but are you saying no?" The Ambassador counseled Berri not to be disingenuous: of course, if there was a genuine Lebanese consensus behind a certain candidate, we would respect that. But the point was that the decision had to be Lebanese, not made because of intimidation. As of now, the Ambassador said, Sleiman seemed to be the beneficiary of a lot of very suspicious propaganda. NO U.S. CANDIDATES -------------- ¶4. (S) Saying "if you don't like Sleiman, than who do you like," Berri attempted to engage the Ambassador on USG preferences for presidential elections. "I know you don't like Aoun," he said; "neither do I." Aoun won't be president, Berri insisted. With an air of deja vu, the Ambassador repeated his now frequent statements about the USG not trying to advance candidates. After some desultory back-and-forth, Berri seemed satisfied as to the sincerity of that approach. He then tried to elicit U.S. "vetoes." The Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. doesn't want to see someone emerge who is an agent of Syria or Hizballah, we expected that Lebanon's parliament, responsible for presidential elections, also would not permit such a result. So, Berri concluded, "you're trusting your friends" in the parliament to reject the sorts of candidates the U.S. also dislikes. That is more or less the case, the Ambassador said; the USG trusts parliament, if permitted to vote, to do the right thing. BEIRUT 00001250 002 OF 003 IF PARLIAMENT HAS ONLY SIMPLE MAJORITY, THEN PERHAPS MILITARY COUP WILL BE ANSWER -------------- ¶5. (S) Berri made a pitch for the USG coming out explicitly in favor of the two-thirds quorum he argues is required by the constitution and by precedent. The Ambassador said that we were not taking a position on the interpretation of an ambiguous constitution that is not our own. Emphasizing the importance of "consensus candidate," Berri warned that, if March 14 would try to elect a president with a simple majority quorum only, "then all of your nightmares might come true." The Ambassador asked Berri is he was hinting at a second cabinet or military coup or something similar. "I don't know," Berri said, "maybe. But tell your (March 14) friends that it would be a disaster" to elect a president with anything less than the two-thirds quorum. "Even the Patriarch agrees with me on the quorum," Berri said, noting that he planned to start work with the Patriarch in earnest in late August to vet presidential candidates. NATIONAL UNITY CABINET: BONE THROWN TO AOUN -------------- ¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri why he was still insisting publicly on a National Unity Government (NUG) now, when he knows that the government must be replaced when a new president begins his term in office, scheduled for November ¶24. It seems to be a waste of time to change the Siniora cabinet now, when the new cabinet would only last until November 24. Berri argued that March 14 figures are wrong to suspect that the NUG is designed to take the pressure off having a president or to create a vacuum. Instead, it is meant to compensate Michel Aoun. Aoun will not be president, and, after presidential elections, his parliamentary bloc will vanish, as his MPs defect to new, more promising alliances. When Aoun realizes this, "he'll go crazy." Who knows what he'll do, Berri said, referring to Aoun's veiled threats against the Ministry of Interior as Metn votes were being counted on 8/5. By having Aoun inside a NUG now, he is neutralized prior to elections. He won't be able to rally his people to "make a mess." DECIDING PRIVATELY ON PRESIDENT BEFORE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING NUG -------------- ¶7. (S) If March 14 truly sees a NUG now as a trick, Berri said, then "let's decide" on a consensus president first. The name of the consensus president can be kept under wraps until the parliamentary elections. But, with March 14 satisfied that presidential elections will take place, then negotiations can lead to a NUG that is announced prior to elections. Privately, the consensus on the president comes first, then negotiations on a NUG. Publicly, the NUG is sworn in, then the president elected (with a new cabinet to be formed after the president takes office). The Ambassador expressed bewilderment that Berri would wish to go through all of this for a cabinet that will last only until November ¶24. "Believe me, it's worth it," Berri said, talking about the need for something "to save face." INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: WAY TO BRING IRAN, SYRIA AND U.S. TOGETHER -------------- ¶8. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri about his public comments talking about an international conference. Berri, grabbing his notebook, read from an account of a 8/6 meeting he had with outgoing Egyptian Ambassador Hussein Derar. Derar reported to him of a meeting in Cairo between French Foreign Minister Kouchner, Egyptian Foreign Minister Abu-Gheit, and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa. There, Kouchner allegedly proposed a regional conference to support Lebanon, to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and France. Berri said that he was a strong supporter of such a conference, but only if the United States, Iran, and Syria were included. He said that Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja was initially enthusiastic but later, having fallen under the nefarious influence of March 14 leaders, demurred. Asked what such an unlikely conference would accomplish, Berri said that it would help lead to the package of consensus president and NUG he described earlier. When the Ambassador tried to counter BEIRUT 00001250 003 OF 003 that those decisions need to be made by the Lebanese, not outside powers, Berri waved his hands, "don't be naive." SALLOUKH'S RETURN AS FOREIGN MINISTER -------------- ¶9. (S) The Ambassador asked about resigned Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh's return to his MFA office. Berri laughed, saying that "I expected that." He insisted that Salloukh had returned to address a wrong against the Maronites committed by Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri (a Greek Orthodox). Mitri, taking advantage of Salloukh's absence, had given the third-ranking position in the ministry to William Habib, a Greek Orthodox, when it should have gone, "as it always does," to a Maronite. Alerted to the Maronite snub by Beirut Bishop Boulos Mattar, Berri ordered Salloukh to return to work to replace Habib with Raymond Baaklini, a Maronite. The Ambassador expressed skepticism, noting that Berri had read from a diplomatic cable at the start of the meeting. "You think I need Salloukh for this?" Berri asked. In any case, the Ambassador said, it was wonderful that Salloukh again recognized the legitimacy of the Siniora cabinet. "No, no, no," Berri said, wagging his finger. "Don't do that! He's a caretaker only. He wouldn't be there except for the thief, Tariq Mitri." COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (S) To listen to Berri, he is the stoutest, noblest, most selfless defender of the Maronites: he wants a National Unity Government out of concern for Michel Aoun, and he violated his boycott of Siniora's cabinet (in ordering Salloukh back to the MFA) to protect a traditionally Maronite slot. We doubt these are his real motivations, but he will no doubt use them when he starts talking with Patriarch Sfeir about presidential candidates: he'll argue to the Patriarch that he is a true friend of the Christians, whereas the evil Siniora cabinet and March 14 leaders are simply advancing a Sunni agenda. We suspect that the suspicious Patriarch, who surely has sized up Berri after all of these years, will be susceptible to the second part of the message but not the first. ¶11. (S) Fawzi Salloukh's return to the MFA, while something publicly trumpeted by March 14 as acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Siniora cabinet, is ominous. Besides removing Habib in favor of Baaklini, he changed many appointments, probably using confessional balance and Shia prerogatives as excuses to plant pro-Syrians in key slots. We are particularly concerned that, as the UN looks to staff up the Special Tribunal on Lebanon, pro-Syrian spies inside the Ministry will be able to skew the employment of clerks, security guards, etc. We know already, for example, that Lebanon's charge d'affaires in the Hague, Johnny Ibrahim, is extremely close to President Emile Lahoud -- meaning he's also close to the Syrians. He has peddled a number of resumes of Lebanese who are active in the international court system, arguing that he is helping the UN to find experienced Lebanese to fill a variety of Tribunal slots. We need to beware the possibility that Ibrahim will work hand-in-hand with Salloukh in an effort to pack the tribunal with Syria's friends. This would have both intelligence and security implications. ¶12. (S) We do agree with Berri on one thing: he surely didn't need Salloukh to get access to Lebanon's diplomatic traffic (which could probably benefit from something akin to an EXDIS caption). Berri already has active agents within the MFA, where, we note, his career diplomat daughter now heads the passport division. We guess that the Lebanese Embassy's cable on Antoine Chedid's meeting with Secretary Rice was also shared with LAF Commander Sleiman: someone would have wanted Sleiman to see our opposition to a constitutional amendment (which he would interpret as our opposition to him),and that may explain his recent pointed, public criticisms suggesting -- facts of the matter notwithstanding -- that we have not been responsive to LAF needs. FELTMAN