Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT121
2007-01-23 17:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH SEES CHRISTIANS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KCRM PTER SY LE 
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DE RUEHLB #0121/01 0231711
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231711Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7208
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0766
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000121 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH SEES CHRISTIANS
DIVIDED, AOUN UNABLE TO LEAVE THE OPPOSITION


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: sections 1.4 (b
) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000121 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PTER SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH SEES CHRISTIANS DIVIDED, AOUN UNABLE TO LEAVE THE OPPOSITION Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: sections 1.4 (b ) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador Feltman and econoff met January 23 with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, who expressed his concern that Lebanese Christians are fighting each other and did not appear engaged in trying to de-escalate the nationwide strike. The Patriarch agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that extremists within the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) are setting its agenda, and worried that if Aoun gained representation in the cabinet, or even the presidency, the situation could worsen. Sfeir recognized that one path out of the crisis is a new presidential election, but he is not working for an early election or promoting a candidate. The Patriarch's sole suggestion for constructive international intervention to defuse the rising tensions in Lebanon was to support the creation of the Special Tribunal. The Patriarch rebuffed all suggestions that, given the crisis environment in Lebanon, he take a more vocal role in encouraging moderation. End Summary. PATRIARCH FRUSTRATED AT CHRISTIAN FACTIONALISM -------------- ¶2. (C) On the morning of January 23, the Ambassador and econoff drove along an eerily empty highway and passed scattered groups of orange-clad Aounist protestors, and scenes of conflict between the opposition and the army at Nahr al-Kelb, en route to to a meeting with Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutrous Sfeir. Black smoke from burning tires obscured the usual clear view over Jounieh Bay. The 87-year-old Patriarch, who admitted in a hoarse voice that he was recovering from a cold, appeared distressed and fatigued. He expressed his concern that Lebanese Christians were fighting each other. While more and more people are talking about federalism, Sfeir said, Lebanon is too small to be further divided and the Christians would still fight each other -- a sad reality. Most of those who are emigrating are Christians who have affinities with the West, further diminishing Lebanon's pro-western Christian base. ¶3. (C) The Patriarch did not appear to be engaging with any of the opposition leaders or actively involved in trying to de-escalate the country-wide January 23 s
trike,launched by the opposition. The previous day, he had spoken out against the proposed strike, but to no avail. His Maronite initiative to foster reconciliation between Christian leaders has faltered, with each politician standing firm in reaction to entreaties for flexibility. Sfeir expressed frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces' lackluster performance in keeping roads open that morning, and he worried that Shia soldiers could desert their posts. (Note: January 23 afternoon news reports suggested that Christian soldiers taking sides with Aounist protestors was a more relevant concern than Shia soldiers' desertion. End Note.) FPM EXTREMISTS ASCENDANT -------------- ¶4. (C) The Patriarch agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that extremists within the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) are setting its agenda, with leaders' emotional rhetoric threatening citizens if they do not participate. "Only Hizballah knows where Aoun is taking his people," the Patriarch told us. The Patriarch spculated that even if Aoun himself were to be convinced that he has taken his followers in the wrong direction, he would probably be unable to withdraw from his alliance with Hizballah, because the group would threaten him. Aoun must feel he is unable to leave the alliance, Sfeir postulated, or Aoun would, like other politicians before him, wake up to the idea that Hizballah is not following a Lebanese agenda, and then break with them. The Patriarch said he does not understand why Aoun's followers are still with him, but believes he has fewer adherents than before. Opposition leaders who visit Sfeir defend their actions by saying that the demands of the people in the streets have not yet been met. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked the Patriarch (who sees Lebanon's ties to the west as a guarantee for the Christian BEIRUT 00000121 002 OF 003 community) to remind Aoun's followers when he meets them that the FPM segment of the Christian community risks losing any relationship with the United States, not because of personal dislike for Aoun, but because of the consequences of his actions. THE PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶6. (C) If Aoun gained representation in the cabinet, or the presidency, the situation could worsen, the Patriarch told us. Just as President Lahoud has refused to allow diplomatic and judicial appointments and the Metn by-elections to replace assassinated MP Pierre Gemayel, Aoun could use the presidency to block many important actions. Aoun doesn't seem to realize that he is no longer a viable presidential candidate. Or perhaps he is just unwilling to give up hope for the presidency. The ideal candidate for president, Sfeir said, should inspire confidence in March 14 forces, be equidistant from both sides but strong enough to take a position against all factions, and must not be from a military background. ¶7. (C) The Patriarch recognized that one path out of the crisis would be to start the cycle of government renewal with a new presidential election. He is not, however, taking any action to encourage selection of a new president, and he believes Lahoud will insist on serving his full term. The Patriarch suggested to the most recent Hizballah delegation he saw that starting the formation of a new government with a new president would be most efficient; this step would also constitutionally mandate the formation of a new government. ¶8. (C) Sfeir had few ideas on how to elect a new president, but did express the opinion that the next president must be independent, equidistant between March 14 and March 8, and of a strong enough character that he will not be a weak leader despite his neutrality. The Patriarch reluctantly gave a few hints as to his presidential preferences, ruling out Michel Sleiman because of his military background, Michel Edde for his weakness, and Jean Obeid because he would not induce confidence in March 14. The Patriarch was noncommittal on Riad Salameh, who he described as somewhat influenced by the Syrians. (Those four names were volunteered by the Ambassador to gauge Sfeir's reaction; unlike an earlier meeting when he hinted that Simon Karam might be an acceptable choice, the Patriarch raised no names on his own.) INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶9. (C) The Patriarch had just one suggestion for constructive international intervention to defuse the rising tensions in Lebanon. He asked that the international community continue to support the creation of a Special Tribunal to try suspects accused of the Hariri assassination. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite the fact that the Aounists had clearly disobeyed their spiritual leader's public call the previous day to avoid blocking what the Patriarch had called "the right to work," the Patriarch was disinclined to intervene further. Astute in his analysis but hesitant to act, he both recognizes the risks to the Christian community and to Lebanon by current developments, and he fears provoking the populist power of Aoun against him -- as happened in 1989, when the Aounists paraded the Patriarch around on their shoulders in a humiliating fashion, in response to the Patriarch's support of the Taif accord. We don't think that this 87-year-old man, so fearful of irrelevence, will much further than he has already, unless he can see that his words are being heeded. With his written request to Emile Lahoud to resign the presidency and his oral admonishments to the Aounists not to block roads both ignored, we have an uphill fight trying to get him to go further. ¶11. (C) And, reminded of the Patriarch's age by his tired and ill demeanor today, we shudder to think what would happen should the Patriarch die while Lebanon's future remains in balance: the Maronite hierarchy from which a new Patriarch will be elected (by the bishops, but ratified by the Vatican) BEIRUT 00000121 003 OF 003 split along the same pro-Aoun and pro-Ja'ja' sentiments that characterize the rest of Lebanon's Christian community. If a pro-Aoun bishop would become Patriarch upon Sfeir's death, then -- given the extent Aoun will go in favor of his current alliances -- Syria will have captured the one influential office in Lebanon that had evaded its grasp during Sfeir's careful, cautious stewardship of the church. FELTMAN

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