IRAN AND AOUN: THINKING ALIKE, ACCORDING TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001209

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY IR
SUBJECT: IRAN AND AOUN: THINKING ALIKE, ACCORDING TO
CHARLES RIZK

REF: A. BEIRUT 1184


B. BEIRUT 1186

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, his presidential
aspirant's heart beating faster than ever, told the
Ambassador over an 8/8 lunch that he was delighted to receive
Iranian Ambassador Mohammed Rida Chibani two days earlier.
Chibani, who boycotts the Siniora cabinet in solidarity with
Hizballah, told Rizk that U.S.-Iranian talks, while nascent,
were serious and would affect Lebanon. The U.S. military
commitment to the Gulf Sunnis was intended merely to distract
the Arabs from what was really going on in terms of
U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. On the presidency, Chibani
encouraged Rizk to keep in close touch with Parliament
Speaker Berri. A day later, Rizk visited MP Michel Aoun, who
explained why he and Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah
had grown so close. Lebanon's Maronites and Lebanon's Shia
are alike, with a love for the land that the Sunnis,
foreigners and extremists, will never understand. While Aoun
had a temporary relationship with the Syrian regime as a
bulwark against the Sunnis, Aoun counted on a long-term
strategic relationship with Iran and Hizballah. While vague
on the details, he hoped to announce a second-generation
"understanding" document with Hizballah soon. Aoun told Rizk
that, with the USG and Iran NOW in dialogue, Hizballah and
Aoun would remain the dominant forces in Lebanon. While
noting striking similarities in the points made by Chibani
and Aoun, Rizk marveled at the unabashed racist terms Aoun
used to describe the Sunnis as well as Aoun's refusal to
absorb the lessons of his narrow margin in Sunday's
parliamentary by-elections (reftels). End summary.

BREAKING CABINET BOYCOTT, IRAN'S AMBASSADOR
REACHES OUT TO, AND PRAISES, RIZK
--------------


2. (S) Over lunch with the Ambassador on 8/8, Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk read from notes he had written
immediately after a call on him by Iranian Ambassador
Mohammed Rida Chibani on 8/6. Rizk found Chibani's request
for a meeting significant, given that Chibani has boycotted
the Siniora cabinet (while continuing to meet regularly with
President Emile Lahoud) ever since the 11/11/06 cabinet
walk-out by the Shia ministers. Chibani opened the meeting
by praising Rizk as "different, better, wiser," than his
cabinet colleagues, someone with whom Iran can work.
(Comment: While the bemused Rizk is clever enough to have
seen through the charm offensive, he is also sufficiently
vain and ambitious to allow himself to succumb in part. End
comment.) Rizk made small talk about the previous day's Metn
election, but Chibani did not offer substantive views.

IRANIAN MESSAGE: U.S.-IRANIAN TALKS
SERIOUS, WILL HAVE IMPACT ON LEBANON
--------------


3. (S) Chibani then opened the subject that Rizk assumes
prompted the meeting in the first place: the U.S.-Iranian
dialogue. According to Rizk, Chibani explained that Iraq had
brought the U.S. and Iran together more closely than in
decades. The USG NOW recognized that dealing with Iran was
inescapable. While bilateral talks were in their nascent
stage only, with many differences between the two countries,
the dialogue would grow to encompass not only Iraq but
security in the Gulf and Lebanon. This is a positive
development, for the USG NOW recognizes Iran's regional role.
And Iran recognizes that, however much it may appreciate its
warming relations with France, it must deal directly with the
U.S. For Lebanon's stability, this is good news, Chibani
told Rizk. "I got the sense that, in a strange way, this
guy's actually pro-American," Rizk said. Rizk also said that
he had the impression that Chibani was fairly dismissive of
Syria, considering it as a minor player.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE ARABS:
TO DISTRACT THEM FROM U.S.-IRAN TALKS
--------------


4. (S) Rizk asked why, if the trend lines were positive for

BEIRUT 00001209 002 OF 003


the U.S.-Iranian relationship, the USG had just announced a
USD 20-billion security commitment to its moderate Arab
allies. Chibani, gesturing to a bowl of sweets on Rizk's
coffee table, said that the announcement was mere chocolate,
something to make the Sunnis happy and distract them. While
the Gulf Arabs are busily unwrapping and eating their
U.S.-provided candies, the U.S. and Iran, out of necessity
rather than love, will be building a new partnership. (The
Ambassador refuted Chibani's interpretation.) Rizk said that
Chibani then tried to explain Iran's nuclear policies, but
Rizk stopped the discussion, saying that he was not
well-informed enough to comment. Chibani then went into a
long explanation about how much Lebanon's Christians and Shia
have in common, and why Iran is so interested in offering
protection to both from the growing threat of Sunni extremism
and ambition.

ADVISE TO RIZK: KEEP IN TOUCH
WITH BERRI ON PRESIDENCY
--------------


5. (S) Rizk tried to engage Chibani on Iran's views of
Lebanon's presidential elections, but Chibani did not take
the bait. "He was noncommittal on Aoun," Rizk said, who
toyed aloud inconclusively with whether that was good news or
bad news for his own presidential hopes. Chibani counseled
Rizk to stay in close touch with Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri in the weeks leading up to presidential elections.
Iran, Chibani said, trusts Berri's management of the
presidential issue. Rizk found it curious that Chibani did
not raise the issue of a national unity cabinet now, which is
the demand of Hizballah and Amal. Ever the optimist, Rizk
concluded that the Iranian visit was a harbinger of good
things to come for his own presidential prospects.

AOUN COMPARES SHIA AND MARONITES
--------------


6. (S) The following day (8/7),Rizk spent two hours with
MP Michel Aoun. Rizk said that he was struck by the
difference in tone but similarities in content between the
underlying themes of Aoun's and Chibani's comments. Using
"shockingly racist descriptions" that the more polished
Chibani avoided, Aoun talked about Lebanon's Sunnis as
"animals." His expressed distaste for the Syrian regime but
explained that there is no choice but to work with the
Alawites NOW in order to help protect Lebanon against the
Sunnis. Syria should never be permitted to fall under Sunni
rule, as the combination of Lebanese and Syrian Sunnis would
drive out the Christians permanently.


7. (S) Much of the two-hour meeting, Rizk said, was devoted
to Aoun's explanation of how close he has grown to Nasrallah.
In Rizk's view, Aoun wanted to leave the impression that he
privately visits Nasrallah regularly, "whether that's true or
not." According to Aoun, Nasrallah is a wise, moderate
leader. Lebanon's Shia are salt-of-the-earth people like
Lebanon's Maronites. The Maronites and Shia both love the
land, and loving the land is the first step to loving the
country. The Sunnis are foreigners, rootless, cosmopolitan,
money-grubbing, and increasingly extremist. (Rizk
acknowledged that Aoun seems to have adopted typically
anti-Semitic tones to apply them to Sunnis rather than Jews.)
The Maronites and Shia, by bonding together, can withstand
the Sunni threat, which is both internal (i.e., Hariri and
Siniora-based) and external (i.e., Saudi).

A NEW AOUN-HIZBALLAH MOU?
--------------


8. (S) Aoun explained to Rizk and he and Nasrallah
recognize each other's unique leadership role. That is why
the MOU they signed on 2/6/06 remains strong. Rizk said that
Aoun talked vaguely about a new understandings document that
was being worked upon privately between representatives of
the two men. In this document, Nasrallah would pledge to
support secular initiatives such as civil (vice
religious-based) marriages. The Sunnis, Aoun said, would
never dare make such a proposal, and the differing approaches
again shows how open-minded Nasrallah is to the Christians.
(The Ambassador subsequently asked Aoun bloc MP Ibrahim
Kanaan about a possible second-generation Aoun-Nasrallah MOU.
"God forbid!" Kanaan exclaimed, in what seemed to be genuine
shock. "We'll be finished!")

BEIRUT 00001209 003 OF 003



U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS GUARANTEE
FOR LEBANON, AND FOR AOUN PRESIDENCY
--------------


9. (S) Aoun then regaled Rizk with tales similar to those
of the Iranian ambassador about the importance of the
Iranian-U.S. dialogue. Claiming to have inside sources privy
to the talks, Aoun said that these talks would provide
protection for Lebanon's Christians and Shia from the
external and internal Sunni threat. They also would help
pave the way to an Aoun presidency, supported by Hizballah.
Iran will help the U.S. understand the dangers of Sunni
"arrogance." Hizballah and Aoun will remain strong through
this dialogue; the Hariris will wither. When he and
Nasrallah are together, Aoun revealed, both leaders prefer
Iran to Syria, in part because distance makes good neighbors.
The Iranians, Aoun told Rizk, do not speak Arabic, are not
Sunnis, and do not sit on Lebanon's borders. That makes both
Nasrallah and Aoun more comfortable. Rizk said Aoun also
seemed oblivious to the implications of the Metn elections,
convinced despite the facts to the contrary that he still
enjoys overwhelming Maronite support.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) Rizk is one of the brighter pupils in that
overcrowded Lebanese school that teaches that Lebanon's
presidency will be decided only if there is some kind of
external understanding that includes the U.S., France, Iran,
Syria, and Saudi Arabia. As (unusual for Lebanese) one who
prefers thinking regionally than diving into the minutiae of
Lebanese internal politics, he could hardly disguise his
delight at having been contacted by the Iranian ambassador.
(We wonder, in fact, if Chibani was indeed conducting a job
interview, since Rizk's presidential aspirations are far from
secret.) Try as we did to underscore the problems between

SIPDIS
the U.S. and Iran, we suspect Rizk was susceptible to
Chibani's pitch that a U.S.-Iranian dialogue will affect
Lebanon's future.


11. (S) Rizk will no doubt try to cultivate his new
ambassadorial contact, while studiously avoiding doing
anything to provoke our opposition to his presidential bid.
We wonder if he will try to renew his once active, NOW
suspended, direct contact with Nasrallah. In addition, we're
sure that Rizk's call on Aoun was part of his strategy of
positioning himself as everyone's fallback candidate, once it
becomes clear that Aoun has no chance of ascending to Baabda
Palace and that March 14 cannot advance its own candidate
(assuming March 14 ever manages to focus on a single
candidate). Unfortunately, the view from the Aounist camp
has not yet cleared sufficiently for serious fallback talks
to begin, and March 14 still hopes for its own victor (which,
of course, would be our preferred outcome as well). But, if
it comes down to compromise, given the choice between Rizk
and the other so-called consensus candidates -- LAF Commander
Sleiman, Central Bank Governor Salameh, happy-but-aging
gourmand Michel Edde, etc. -- we'd pick Rizk. He proved his
credentials by pushing through the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon and refusing to resign from the cabinet, despite
considerable pressure from his childhood friend Emile Lahoud.
Alas, last we checked, we have no parliamentary vote in the
matter.


12. (S) Finally, Rizk has expressed keen interest in going
to Washington. He purportedly wants to discuss regional
issues and how to move Lebanon forward in the years to come.
But it is obvious that he sees a trip to Washington as a
requisite audition for higher office. (He has also been
prompted by UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen to have a coming-out
tour.) He is an amusing, articulate, and intelligent -- if
occasionally long-winded -- interlocutor, and, if Washington
officials have time to receive him at a level that would
include at least some brief cabinet-level exposure, we're all
for it. But, as we've told Rizk repeatedly, he doesn't
really need us: if he's serious about the presidency, he
should concentrate on lining up parliamentary votes rather
than on getting our external support. U.S. backing will come
naturally by virtue of policies he would pursue as president,
not because of the impression he makes NOW in Washington.
FELTMAN