LEBANON: GEAGEA OUTLINES MARCH 14 PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001178 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA OUTLINES MARCH 14 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION STRATEGY Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea outlined to Ambassador on August 2 the presidential election strategy he claims he and his March 14 allies have agreed on. He urged that USG treat all declared candidates, including Michel Aoun of March 8, equally in public so as to be seen as supporting a fair democratic process rather than one side. Geagea did not think Hizballah representatives were getting any serious advantage as a result of the French including them in their mediation efforts between March 14 and the opposition, nor did he believe that the French were being soft on Syria. He thought the upcoming August 5 by-election in the Metn district would be "very close", adding that there may be security problems. End summary. MARCH 14 TO NAME TWO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, HE CLAIMS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador, DCM and poloff met August 2 with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea at the new, sleek, modern, mountaintop LF headquarters and Geagea home. Geagea, a member of the March 14 ruling coalition, thought it was in the interest of the opposition March 8 that presidential elections be held on time, noting that it would not look good for Hizballah to appear to be depriving the Christians of the election for the presidential position that must be occupied by a Christian. He said March 14 will absolutely not cave in and agree to the interpretation that a two-thirds quorum of Parliament is required for selecting a president. Geagea said he did not believe those March 14 ministers who have spoken out in favor of the two-thirds quorum, in an apparent split from their March 14 allies, would actually block the election if the quorum was not attained. March 14 needs to maintain the possibility of a simple majority quorum as a fall-back option. ¶3. (C) March 14 has decided on a presidential strategy, Geagea said. It will start the presidential election "momentum" a week or two after the August 5 by-election by presenting two or three candidates. He said that March 14 has developed a strategy in which its two preferred candidates, MP Boutros Harb and former MP Nassib Lahoud, will declare their candidacies independently--thus perplexing March 8 at the beginning. However, both Lahoud and Harb understand they will not be real adversaries, and that March 14 decisionmakers will agree on one candidate. Unenthusiastic at the thought of an Amine Gemayel nomination, Geagea commented that Gemayel would not run for president anyway, unless he had unanimous March 14 support. USG SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE ALL CANDIDATES EQUALLY -------------- 4.(C) Under this scenario, there would be three declared candidates: two from March 14 and General Michel Aoun, the candidate of the March 8 opposition. Geagea urged that the U.S. treat all candidates, including Aoun, equally. For example, any USG official who comes to Lebanon during the election period should meet all three. Stressing the importance of not cold-shouldering Aoun, Geagea said this was the way for the U.S. to acknowledge that pluralistic democracy in Lebanon was functioning as it should. While it was important for the U.S. to publicly support Aoun's candidacy, privately it could pressure Aounist MP's by suggesting, for example, that they might be placed on the U.S. visa ban list. The U.S. should concentrate on building momentum for elections, leaving it up to March 14 MPs to ensure that a candidate committed to March 14 policies emerges as the winner. FRENCH DEALINGS WITH HIZBALLAH, SYRIA -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Discussion turned to the French Initiative. Asked about Hizballah's involvement, Geagea noted the French have been dealing with Hizballah for the past three years, and added that the French may have "cut a deal" with Hizballah regarding protection of French troops in UNIFIL. He had lingered at the French Ambassador's residence after FM Kouchner's 7/29 luncheon for participants in the French BEIRUT 00001178 002 OF 002 Initiative and felt that the Hizballah representatives were on surprisingly familiar terms with Embassy staff there, as if they had regular contact. Hizballah interlocutors, such as External Relations Director Nawaf Musawi, were cleverly asserting at the French Initiative meetings that Hizballah was not Iranian, did not want to fight Israel, but rather just wanted its place in Lebanese society. Geagea was convinced the French have no illusions about Syria and French visits to Damascus were merely to send strong messages to the Syrian leadership. GEAGEA PREDICTS A TIGHT BY-ELECTION RACE -------------- ¶6. (C) Geagea was generally optimistic about the outcome of the upcoming August 5 by-election in the Metn district. He noted that MP and Metn strongman Michel Murr, while feigning to mobilize voters to support the Aoun candidate, was actually telling them to vote as they wished. (The very next day, however, Geagea showed up at the Embassy unannounced, expressing concern that Murr had changed tack and, instead of giving his allies freedom to vote as they wished, was aggressively telling them to line up behind Aoun's candidate. Embassy sounded out people close to Murr who disputed that such a move was taking place). He cited the possibility that if Aoun's camp realizes it will lose the by-election, it will take actions to prompt the Syrians to do something to prevent the election. Geagea said March 14 candidate Amine Gemayel was doing well, but that he was risking a lot by rejecting Aoun's latest proposal for both candidates to withdraw in favor of a decision on another candidate at a later time. Geagea also commented that Gemayel was not spending campaign funds available to him fast enough. FELTMAN