LEBANON: FORMER PM MIKATI'S POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001149 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FORMER PM MIKATI'S POLITICAL ASSESSMENT Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: On July 30, the Ambassador and Special Assistant met with former Prime Minister Najib Mikati to discuss upcoming parliamentary by elections and the prospects of various presidential candidates. Mikati, who has traditionally been linked to President al-Assad of Syria, made comments reflecting a desire for coordination with the government of Syria (GOS) to ensure that candidates on the final presidential ballot can be accepted by all interested parties. Mikati repeatedly negated General Aoun's chances to be elected as president, saying that no one takes him seriously. Mikati ended the meeting with a proposal to fund study programs for moderate Sunni religious leaders in his home district of Tripoli, but asked for USG advice before he proceeding. End summary. Business and Leisure -------------- ¶2. (C) Mikati provided a brief business update for the Ambassador. His family-owned business, the M1 Group, recently purchased the Facconable brand from Nordstom's for $210 million dollars. He was pleased with this deal and noted that this business venture, like other M1 Group projects, will be headquartered in Monaco. Mikati is about to depart for "much needed" summer holidays in Monaco, adding that his private yacht will meet up with the family in Sardinia for a week. The price of real estate in Monaco did have Mikati at bit down, however. He was recently forced to pay 7 million USD for an apartment when its twin only cost 3.5 million USD in 2005. ¶3. (C) Mikati then turned to politics He does not fear the prospect of a political vacuum in Lebanon if the electoral process should fail. He said that there are many issues to be resolved, including important regional matters which require international cooperation before a final settlement can be reached. Mikati said that a vacuum would not, in fact, create new problems for Lebanon and that it was a mistake to think that a new president could or would heal all of the country's divisions. The Perfect Candidate and the Preferred Process -------------- ¶4. (C) Mikati has a very clear idea of the profile for Lebanon's next president. He wants a candidate who can unify and one who will be accepted by Syria and the international community, including the U.S. He said it is hard for him to name one specific person right now as the nature of the times, i.e war vs. peace and economic expansion vs. depression, will determine which candidate and qualities will be best suited for the office. When asked which presidential candidate would bring about a respectful and mature relationship with Syria based on mutual respect, Mikati had no response. Mikati did make it very clear that a list of multiple candidates should be vetted or approved by both Syria and the U.S. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked Mikati whether this one close relationship with the Asads gave him any insights as to whether the rumors were true about the Syrians have signaled that five candidates were acceptable: Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, former Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, former Foreign Minister Fares Bouez, former Maronite League head Michel Edde, and LAF Commander Michel Sleiman. Mikati said that the Syrians definitely do not want Obeid; had they accepted him, he would have been elected in 2004, saving the country from the Lahoud extension. Salameh might be fine if the presidential agenda was focused on economic growth. Preferring Civilian over Military Leader -------------- ¶6. (C) As for the LAF Commander, Mikati began by providing a personal assessment of Suleiman, whom he characterized as respectful, honest and sensitive to the needs of Lebanese society. Mikati praised Suleiman's approach to the Syrians, saying that he kept to the middle of the road, for the most part, and did not inflame tensions after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. (Note: When pressed about Suleiman's alleged role in defying the Syrian orders in spring 2005 to BEIRUT 00001149 002 OF 003 prevent the March 14 "Cedar Revolution" demonstrations, Mikati said he had no information. End Note.) Mikati personally enjoyed working with Suleiman during his tenure as PM and believes Suleiman has done an excellent job with the LAF. However, when asked about Suleiman as a presidential candidate, Mikati expressed a very strong preference for a civilian to hold the office. Mikati said that if the entire country is able to unite behind Suleiman, he has no problem with this, as he likes the General personally. However, if given a choice, Mikati said that he would always choose a civilian over a military leader. "Aoun is a Joke" -------------- ¶7. (C) Mikati was very negative about Aoun's chances of becoming president. "At this point, it's better to just eliminate his name and start to put others - any others - forward." He feels that Aoun is completely unable to generate the kind of consensus that would be needed to win the next presidential election. Mikati stated that Aoun is perceived to be against the Sunni, perceived to be buying and selling votes and that he is too unpredictable. When pressed to speculate on Aoun's chances as a compromise candidate, Mikati shook his head and said, "No, it would be far too difficult. He is a joke, a laughingstock, and he is only around because of the political games that are being played." Mikati does, however, think that Aoun's candidate has a very good chance of winning the Metn by-election against Amine Gemayel. What the Future Could Bring -------------- ¶8. (C) Mikati disparaged Michel Murr's plan for a two-year interim presidency, calling it a clear attempt to wait for a change in administration in Washington. He also thinks that it is a plan to eliminate the Maronite hold over the office. Mikati thinks that an interim presidency will cause Christian groups to fight amongst themselves for two years, causing a rift which will make them unable to elect a presidential consensus candidate in 2009. ¶9. (C) Mikati went further with his concerns. He said that a two-year interim term could create additional confessional conflict. With only two years to woo the voters, a Christian president would play to his own political base, while a Sunni prime minister would do the same. A stand-off could result, with the president and prime minister vying for votes at the expense of each other and at the expense of national unity. Mikati believes that this would bring Lebanon back to square one, with the government dissolved and the country at a stand-still. ¶10. (C) Mikati also shared his views for the way forward in the months to come: -- The USG should speak to the Syrians about the Lebanese elections. Regardless of anyone's wishes, the Syrians do "hold the upper hand" in Lebanon and the future president must be on good terms with them. Mikati acknowledges that none of the existing candidates are "against" Syria, but certain candidates will clearly be more acceptable than others. He agreed that March 14 candidates such as Boutros Harb and Nassib Lahoud are not inherently "anti-Syrian," but that is the label that has stuck to them. -- The USG should also speak with Iran about these elections. Mikati said that while Iranians are "less greedy" when it comes to Lebanon, they will not support a candidate who opposes Syria. -- As mentioned above, Mikati believes that Syria, the U.S. and other international players should "vet" a number of candidates and then let Lebanese MPs chose from that small list. Prospects for Nahr al-Barid - The Day After -------------- ¶11. (C) In talking of the LAF fight against Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid, Mikati agreed that this is a precarious situation for the country as a whole and that the time has come for a permanent solution regarding the Palestinians. He believes that the Palestinian Authority should grant "citizenship" and passports to all Palestinians living in BEIRUT 00001149 003 OF 003 Lebanon, who could then be treated as all other resident foreigners. They would have the right to work and live wherever they wanted to in the country, but the GOL would also have the right to deport those who did not respect the GOL's sovereignty or those who engaged in terrorist activities. He also believes that, with passports, many Palestinian refugees could be processed for resettlement in Canada or Australia if they so desired. Mikati does not think another camp should be rebuilt, and, were he PM today, he would hold off on all reconstruction until these residency issues have been resolved. Mikati Money for Moderate Muslims -------------- ¶12. (S) Mikati is a devout Sunni Muslim and a popular leader from Tripoli who is greatly disturbed by the potential for extremist expansionism in his home district. Drawing on his considerable personal wealth, he wants to initiate a program to educate 40 - 100 moderate Sunni religious leaders as examples for the community, to draw people away from extremist views. Mikati has been approached with requests for educational grants, a television station and other programs. He has been extremely cautious to date and has not acted on most requests. "I am a businessman first. It would be easy for me to help these people, but I don't want any of their future actions to be held against me, my family or my business interests. And I know people are watching these things carefully." Mikati asked the Ambassador to advise him on this matter. Is there a menu of programs approved of by the USG? Is there a checklist to follow before providing financial support? Ambassador promised to provide feedback on this issue. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The extent of Najib Mikati's current links to the Asad family is always fertile ground for political debate in Lebanon. There was genuine scratchiness between the Asads and Najib Mikati when Mikati came out publicly in favor of an international tribunal in December 2005 after Gebran Tueni's murder. But we suspect that, by now, Najib's brother Taha has healed the wounds. In any case, Mikati does not flaunt his relationship with Syria (whatever it is). Worldly and sophisticated, he is a far different character than Syria's other allies in Lebanon, who tend to be defensive provincial bumpkins and thugs of the white-sock-wearing variety. ¶14. (C) We believe that Mikati will do nothing to endanger his relationship with the west or put his considerable business empire at risk. Indeed, his concern about financial sanctions no doubt prompted him to ask our advice as to how he can help support moderate Sunni clerics in his hometown of Tripoli. But because of Mikati's understanding of Syria, his views regarding Aoun were particularly interesting. Too intelligent to be taken in by the General's vulgar populism, Mikati probably despises Aoun for the latter's use of anti-Sunni stands to attract Christian support. But we suspect that, if Syria were truly backing Aoun, Mikati would have chosen discretion rather than verbal attack in his comments to us about Aoun. FELTMAN