KOUCHNER'S TRIP: LITTLE TO SHOW, BUT KOUCHNER TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001145

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY FR
SUBJECT: KOUCHNER'S TRIP: LITTLE TO SHOW, BUT KOUCHNER TO
RETURN IN LATE AUGUST


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Although MP Boutros Harb perhaps best summed up
current French diplomacy as "wishful thinking politics,"
French Ambassador Bernard Emie provided the Ambassador a
relatively upbeat description of Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner's July 27-29 Lebanon visit. Emie said that getting
together Lebanon's political leaders not once but twice was a
worthy accomplishment in and of itself. According to Emie,
Kouchner perceived some openness on the part of Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri and MP Michel Aoun, although Emie
admitted that, with Hizballah stonewalling on each
suggestion, Berri and Hizballah might have a good cop/bad cop
routine underway. While there is nothing tangible to show
for his efforts, Kouchner will be back in Lebanon in August,
Emie reported. Separately, MP Walid Jumblatt told the
Ambassador that the French, afraid of failure, are merely
going through the motions, while Hizballah and Syria behind
the scenes make final preparations for either seizing the
presidency or preventing presidential elections that do not
go their way. Kouchner failed to make headway in getting
Hizballah to accept a package deal. End summary.

EMIE CITES GET-TOGETHERS
AS KOUCHNER'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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2. (C) On July 29, French Ambassador Bernard Emie, MP Walid
Jumblatt, and MP Boutros Harb all briefed the Ambassador
separately on their impressions of the July 27-29 visit of
French Ambassador Kouchner. Predictably, Emie was the most
upbeat. Lebanon's feuding politicians got together not once
but twice, he noted: On July 27, Kouchner hosted a reception
for La Celle-St. Cloud participants (i.e., the "second tier"
political leaders),and on July 29 Emie hosted a luncheon for
Kouchner with the "number one" National Dialogue leaders.
Emie downplayed the fact that three of "top tier" leaders
skipped the lunch and sent proxies instead -- Hizballah
Secretary General Nasrallah, Berri, and PM Fouad Siniora (who

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refused to go once Berri had declined). It was "quite an
accomplishment" to have such representation at the French
residence, Emie said, especially given the bitter disputes
between Michel Aoun and Amine Gemayel (who ignored each other
at the lunch except to exchange bitter glances) over the Metn
parliamentary by-election. "The food was quite good," Harb
laughed, when asked about the outcome of the lunch.

KOUCHNER WARNS OF WAR
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3. (C) Emie said that, in part, Kouchner's message was
stern. He admonished the participants individually and over
the group gatherings that "the spirit of La Celle- St. Cloud
had not been respected." The Lebanese themselves "had not
done their homework," in following up on La Celle-St. Cloud
with local contacts. Kouchner told his Lebanese
interlocutors that he found the situation "quite worrying."
Emie underscored that Kouchner, in hopes of frightening the
leaders into action, had publicly and privately cautioned
that civil war is no longer such a remote possibility. If
the Lebanese do not act, there is no telling what might
happen, he cautioned.

KOUCHNER PUSHES PACKAGE
BASED ON CONSENSUS APPROACH
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4. (C) In terms of substance, Emie said that Kouchner, like
Jean-Claude Cousseran before him, tried again to promote a
package. The elements included presidential elections on
time and according to a two-thirds quorum, a National Unity
Government post-elections, an agreed-upon cabinet program,
and the possibility of moving parliamentary elections ahead
from 2009 to 2008. Faced with Hizballah's refusal to discuss
anything except a National Unity Government now, Kouchner
then presented the idea of having an expanded transitional
government now, along the 19-10-1 idea (which would give the
opposition a "blocking" but not "toppling" minority),to
oversee Lebanon between now and presidential elections (which
could be as early as six weeks from now).


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5. (C) According to Emie, the key to Kouchner's package is
consensus -- by agreeing to support the March 8-Aoun view of
a two-thirds quorum, the successful presidential candidate
will be a consensus figure. By having a National Unity
Government after presidential elections in which the March
8-Aoun opposition enjoys both a blocking and a "toppling"
minority, the government will have to operate largely by
consensus. Unfortunately, he acknowledged, no consensus
emerged behind Kouchner's package. Emie believed that March
14 leaders, despite being uncomfortable with giving March
8-Aoun forces an indefinite veto over government policy,
would accept Kouchner's package, if they believed Hizballah
would go along.

BERRI, AOUN INDICATE OPENNESS;
HIZBALLAH REPRESENTATIVES STONEWALL
--------------


6. (C) Emie said that he detected interest on the part of
Michel Aoun to Kouchner's proposal, and "new openness" on the
part of Nabih Berri. But the Hizballah representatives who
met Kouchner -- Nawaf Musawi and Mohammed Fneish --
categorically rejected every bridging proposal presented by
Kouchner. Emie acknowledged that Berri's openness may be
less than what it appears, if Berri and Hizballah have agreed
on a good cop/bad cop routine.

HARB, JUMBLATT SEE NO ACHIEVEMENT
--------------


7. (C) Boutros Harb and Walid Jumblatt were more downbeat.
Harb said that the French are merely practicing what he
described as "wishful thinking politics." Consistent with
Emie's description of Berri's openness, Harb said that the
only ray of hope he took away from the Kouchner events was
the "relatively positive attitude" of MP Samir Azar, Berri's
representative at the Emie-hosted lunch. But Harb suspected
that, if there was actual movement toward a solution, then
Berri's representatives would be as negative as Hizballah.


8. (C) For his part, Jumblatt groused that the French are
"kidding themselves" in a dangerous way. While the French
continue to talk about "dialogue," Hizballah, Syria, and its
allies are preparing either to seize the presidency some way
or to prevent presidential elections from taking place. The
French initiative has become a harmful distraction, Jumblatt
argued, preventing March 14 leaders from concentrating on how
to combat the objectives of Syria and Hizballah. At this
point, the French are merely going through the motions,
Jumblatt said, "afraid of admitting failure." The only way
the French will be able to succeed is if March 14 "gives up
everything." Jumblatt said that he was already uncomfortable
with the extent of the concessions March 14 offered, despite
continued rejections by Hizballah. Asked about the consensus
approach, Jumblatt asked how one can have consensus "between
freedom and Hizballah."

NEXT STEPS: KOUCHNER BACK (MON DIEU!)
DURING AUGUST VACATION SEASON
--------------


9. (C) In terms of next steps, Emie reported that Kouchner
is committed to returning to Beirut in mid to late August
("which, for us, shows the level of commitment," Emie noted,
referring to Kouchner's willingness to abandon the sacrosanct
French vacation period). Kouchner also told his Lebanese
interlocutors that he was willing to reconvene La Celle-St.
Cloud participants in France, should that be useful. Trying
to put a positive spin on the Kouchner visit, Emie concluded
by reporting that all of the participants had at least
reaffirmed their commitment to the "basics of the Lebanese
state," including the constitution, the Taif accord, the need
to avoid violence in setting political disputes, and the need
to avoid reliance on foreign interference.


10. (C) We will also be in touch with other Lebanese
contacts who participated in the Kouchner meetings. We will
report any significant reactions by septel.
FELTMAN