MARCH 14 CONCENTRATES ON NASSIB LAHOUD AND BOUTROS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001144 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY SUBJECT: MARCH 14 CONCENTRATES ON NASSIB LAHOUD AND BOUTROS HARB AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES REF: BEIRUT 1135 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) While presidential politics are in suspended animation pending the outcome of the Metn elections on August 5, three options look increasingly likely as the 11/24 end of President Emile Lahoud's extended term approaches: 1) Parliament fails to achieve a two-thirds quorum, leaving either a vacuum or a president elected by a March 14 simple majority that leads to chaos. 2) Enough March 14 MPs support Michel Aoun's bid for president that the mercurial general wins. 3) A "compromise" president, most likely LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, emerges through conditions that weaken the office and leave it subject to excessive Syrian influence. Recognizing that all three options are bad and hoping to insert a fourth option, March 14 leaders Samir Geagea, Walid Jumblatt, and Saad Hariri decided over dinner on 7/26 to narrow the choice of March 14 presidential candidates to two, former MP Nassib Lahoud and MP Boutros Harb. Geagea prefers Harb, while Jumblatt and Hariri prefer the former, but all three will accept whomever can win the office. Knowing that they risk splitting their own movement, they are monitoring what happens in the Metn (seen as a proxy for the presidential elections, with March 14 leader Amine Gemayel running for his assassinated son Pierre's seat against a candidate of Michel Aoun) before deciding how to proceed with Harb, Lahoud, or both. End summary. IMMEDIATE FOCUS ON METN ELECTIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) With politicians focused on the August 5 parliamentary elections in the Metn, presidential politics are currently on hold. As noted reftel, the Metn elections are broadly seen as a dress rehearsal for presidential elections: former President Amine Gemayel, a March 14 stalwart, is running for the seat vacated when his son Pierre was murdered November 21. If Michel Aoun's candidate, the heretofore unknown Camille Khoury, prevails over the well-known Gemayel despite Lebanon's tradition of allowing family members to complete the parliamentary terms of dead family members, Aoun's presidential prospects are greatly enhanced. In Nassib Lahoud's words, Aoun might become "unstoppable." If, on the other hand, Gemayel would demolish Khoury in what would be seen as a popular rejection of Aoun, then Gemayel becomes a serious contender to return to Baabda Palace. Some efforts remain underway in an attempt to postpone the Metn elections altogether, to avoid an all-out fight that risks damaging everyone. THREE SCENARIOS ON PRESIDENCY LIKELY (AT LEAST FOR NOW) -------------- ¶3. (C) But, while the Metn elections could change the calculus, as of now, many of our contacts believe that three scenarios are more likely than others regarding the presidential elections that should take place in the parliament before the expiration of Emile Lahoud's term on November 24. None of these three options are good for the pro-independence March 14 movement: -- First, vacuum or chaos. If there is no advance agreement on a presidential candidate that suits the March 8 bloc, Parliament could fail to muster the two-thirds quorum that March 8-Aoun MPs argue is constitutionally required and that some March 14 figures accept is politically (but not necessarily constitutionally) necessary. This would leave a vacuum in the office, possibly leading to the long-feared "two government" scenario or a refusal by Emile Lahoud to step down. This might lead the March 14 majority to use a simple majority (if the movement can achieve it, given the doubts expressed by some of its members) to elect a president not recognized by the others, plunging the country into chaos and violence. -- Second, a Michel Aoun presidency. Michel Aoun is rumored to be playing with some of the March 14 MPs about switching sides. According to these rumors, he has promised Tripoli MP Mohammed Safadi (an increasingly shaky part of the March 14 BEIRUT 00001144 002 OF 003 alliance) that he will make Safadi Prime Minister, a prize Safadi could not win as long as the Hariri bloc maintains its grip on the premiership. With four MPs in his sub-bloc of March 14, Safadi, along with a couple of other March 14 defections or assassinations, could throw the elections to Michel Aoun, assuming Hizballah and Amal MPs would indeed vote for him. Even other March 14 representatives are musing about whether it is better to try to make a deal with Aoun, by promising him the presidency in return for a commitment to implement March 14 policies. "Can we take Michel Aoun out of Hizballah's hands?" Mohamad Chatah mused last week. -- Third, a weak, compromise (and perhaps compromised) president, with LAF Commander Michel Sleiman the current front-runner (a status that, of course, could easily change). Some argue that Syria is ordering its allies to promote a Michel Aoun candidacy simply in order to trade him away in favor of someone who is less frightening to March 14 but who, in fact, might be even worse. Our March 14 contacts muse about how closely linked the so-called consensus candidates are to Syria, whether they have skeletons in their closet that would subject them to Syrian blackmail, etc. One ploy would be to have such a weak president, perhaps for a shortened term, that the office is essentially vacant and unable to help thwart Syrian interference in Lebanon. Michel Murr's two-year presidency idea is seen as falling under this option. MARCH 14 LEADERS CHOOSE TWO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES -------------- ¶4. (C) The March 14 contacts do not want to wake up one day to face the situation of having to choose between those three unpalatable options. After a broader March 14 meeting on 7/26, Samir Geagea, Saad Hariri, and Walid Jumblatt -- considered, along with Amine Gemayel, the senior March 14 leaders -- dined together to discuss the presidency. The following day, Geagea invited Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb to lunch in his brooding new residence. Over these two meals, a March 14 strategy began to emerge. ¶5. (C) According to Nassib Lahoud and Marwan Hamadeh (who was included in the private 7/26 dinner),Geagea, Hariri, and Jumblatt agreed that, with Aoun already a declared candidate and Sleiman a favorite compromise figure, March 14 needed to stop being coy about its own choices. The Lebanese people need to see who March 14 proposes as president. They decided that Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb should be the March 14 candidates, with Geagea preferring Harb (who, like Geagea, is from northern Lebanon) and the other two favoring Lahoud. The question is whether to promote one first, with the other as a fall-back, or both simultaneously. Unveiling the candidates even within the larger March 14 group also has to be done carefully, so as to avoid splitting the March 14 movement either between Lahoud and Harb or in favor of other March 14 presidential aspirants who didn't make the cut (including Amine Gemayel, Nayla Mouawad, Robert Ghanem, and Samir Franjieh). ¶6. (C) Geagea, Hariri, and Jumblatt debated which of the two candidates would be best positioned to defeat Michel Aoun (assuming, of course, the needed parliamentary quorum). They agreed that Nassib Lahoud has greater regional and international stature and (in Marwan Hamadeh's words) "is more presidential." Lahoud is also squeaky clean, unusual for Lebanese politicians. Harb is reportedly disliked in France and unknown by the Arabs. But he has the important Christian street credibility that Lahoud (who lost his parliamentary seat in the Metn in 2005 to an unknown Aoun candidate) lacks and that could help blunt Michel Aoun's predictable accusations that any March 14 candidate is in reality a "Saudi." Harb is also closer to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and some of the Aoun bloc deputies, such as Zahle MP Ily Skaff, relationships that might tip the presidency more easily in his favor than would be the case with Nassib Lahoud. In television appearances, either Lahoud or Harb would make a better impression on the Lebanese than Aoun, they believed. According to Hamadeh and Lahoud, the March 14 leaders will postpone making a decision on how to proceed until after the Metn elections. COMMENT -------------- BEIRUT 00001144 003 OF 003 ¶7. (C) The three most likely presidential scenarios now before us -- a vacuum, a Michel Aoun presidency, or a weak presidency -- are not in the USG interest. Any of them has the potential to weaken and slow Lebanon's drive for genuine independence and sovereignty. But, in Lebanon, much can happen between now and November 24, when Emile Lahoud's presidential term expires. For example, what happens in the Metn elections on August 5 (if there are elections) will play a significant role in presidential politics. Still, we agree that March 14 needs to show the Lebanese people what kind of person a March 14 president would be. While the president is elected by parliament and not via popular vote, it is impossible for March 14 leaders to combat the populism of Michel Aoun's approach if they engage only in back-room politics. Picking a March 14 candidate or even two March 14 candidates would be a refreshing breath of transparency. FELTMAN